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THE

HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT

OF THE

EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

FROM

Its Origin in 1600 to the Present Times.

V O L. I.
A GENERAL MAP of INDIA within the GANGES.
THE HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,
FROM Its Origin in 1600 to the Present Times.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

Containing the Affairs of the Carnatic; in which the Rights of the Nabob are explained, and the Injustice of the Company proved.

THE WHOLE COMPILED FROM AUTHENTIC RECORDS.

A NEW EDITION.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.
MDCCCLXXII.
P R E F A C E.

THE Court of East-India Directors, having, perhaps industriously, involved the affairs of the Carnatic in obscurity, by their voluminous Defence, the Author of the following Work found himself obliged to deduce his accounts, from an early period of time. To extricate the subject from difficulty, he has connected the controversial part of the discussion, with an authentic and impartial narrative of the most important transactions, on the coast of Coromandel. His arguments and reasonings are only such, as naturally result from his facts; and his facts are founded upon the most incontrovertible evidence, to which the Reader is referred, at the bottom of every page.

The Directors, in the volumes of Original Papers, published under their inspection, have furnished the Author, with authentic materials, sufficient to overtop entirely the system, which they wished to defend. He has also availed himself of the information of other papers of equal authority, which a Gentleman employed by the Crown, for some years, in a public capacity on the Coast, was pleased to place in his hands. Private papers and documents, together with written evidences of a private nature, which unveil the springs of many measures, have come into his possession. But as his object has been, to expose public injustice,
P R E F A C E.
injustice, and not to trace the delinquency of individuals, he has made no use of such information. Though some may think or, at least, allege, that public bodies, as well as public measures, are treated with a degree of severity, in the following Volume, the Writer cannot be accused of harshness to private characters. Should any of the actors, in the scene, which he has chosen to exhibit, complain of their parts, the Author of the piece assures them and the Public, that much of the business is concealed, behind the curtain.

The labour and toil, which attended the selection of the materials, upon which this Volume is founded, employed a considerable portion of time. The facts and authorities were weighed, with the most scrupulous attention to truth and impartial justice. The relation of transactions is supported, everywhere, by a cloud of witnesses; and where the conduct of the Company is most blamed, the foundation of censure is placed, on their own records, as published by their Directors. In the printing, and even in the composition, of the Work, the shortness of the time allotted to both may have been productive of errors. But as the arrangement has not been subject to that inconvenience, it is to be hoped, the matter of fact is established, beyond the reach of any just reply.

Without presumption, we trust, it may be affirmed, that the system, which the Directors endeavoured, with so much labour
labour and expence, to defend, has been completely over-
turned. That they have not only failed " in refuting any
" one of the heavy charges brought against them," in
former publications relative to Tanjore; but that many
other charges equally heavy are established, on their own
evidence. That it only remains for them to retrieve their
characters, by acknowledging their errors and doing justice.
That a contrary conduct will probably remind the nation of
their solemn appeal to the Public, in their Declaration of
the 26th of March 1777. Their words were, " That could
" the heavy charges brought against them be proved, those
" charges would not only render them unfit to conduct
" the affairs of the Company, but utterly unworthy of
" every degree of public trust and confidence." If the
charges are actually proved, the World will draw the in-
ference.

In the authorities, at the bottoms of the pages, the pa-
pers published by the Directors, in their own defence, are
cited, under the title of Mr. Rous's Appendix. This ap-
pellation was adopted merely to distinguish those papers,
from others published by the Directors. As the Court had
disavowed Mr. Rous's pamphlet, by refusing to authenticate
it, that gentleman, strictly speaking, had no legal right to
an Appendix, printed at the expence of the Company.
The writers, who have espoused the cause of the Di-
rectors, are seldom alluded to, and never mentioned, in
PREFACE.

the course of the following Volume. This seeming neglect proceeded neither from any disrespect for their genius, nor any want of attention to their labours. Their toil has surely been rewarded, by their employers, in proportion to the badness of their cause. With that boon they ought to sit down contented; and to add to the account of profit, their present escape from censure. To pursue phantoms, through the foggy regions of romance, was no part of the labour, which the Author imposed on himself. Truth, and only truth, was his object; and the advocates of his opponents are completely answered, if he has attained his end.

The wading through the fi ink of East-India corruption and mismanagement is a task, which adds disgust to toil. But the Author fears he has gone too far, not to go further still. Bengal is a fruitful scene of peculation, injustice, and even death; and the Northern Circars, though scarcely twelve years, in our hands, present oppressions proportionable to their extent and our time. The secret intrigues in Leadenhall-Street, though less important and instructive, than the revolutions of kingdoms, merit some attention; and the world may choose to be made acquainted with the actors in the secret scenes of domestic management. These considerations may, perhaps, induce the Author, to give a Second Volume to the Public, in the course of a few months.

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CHAP. I.

A Short History of the Company, from its Origin in 1600 to the Year 1744.

During the decline and after the fall of the Roman Empire, the western provinces received, in a certain degree, new inhabitants, and consequently new manners, from those vast countries, which comprehend the northern divisions of Europe and Asia. The fierce nations who triumphed over Rome had scarcely brought any virtue, except valour, from home; and, therefore, their ravages were too general and too destructive to leave any examples of that civilization, which in some degree atones for the desolations of war. In the midst of that barbarity, which had cramped the liberal exertions of their minds in the north, the invaders fat down in the regions of the south; where many ages passed over them, without having been distinguished by any of those improvements, which, by rendering life comfortable, enlarge the views.
views of mankind. The peculiar opinions, which annexed every
honour to the sword, threw contempt on the arts of civil life; and
the insecurity of property prevented even avarice, which disregards
contempt, from pursuing industry and commerce, as they could
produce nothing but toil.

Europe, however, was not destined to remain always under that
gloomy barbarism, which had clouded its annals for near a thousand
years. The first dawn of improvement arose in Italy, where its last
ray had set. The revival of letters, in that country, was followed by
the encouragement of genius. Men becoming acquainted with the
improvements of former ages, began to transfer their discoveries to
their own times. The human mind, being softened by the accep-
tion of knowledge, acquired a taste for the sweets of peace and the
comforts of life. Government, relaxing its habitual severity, and
laying aside its former pride, gave security to property, and some
protection to industry. A free intercourse of commerce was esta-
blished at home; its communication with foreign states became less
obstructed; and either rivalry or imitation soon extended a degree
of the same kind of improvement to the rest of Europe.

A commercial intercourse had been opened between Europe and
India, in remote antiquity. The Greeks knew it, when the Persian
empire flourished; and they continued it, during the existence of
their own. The Syrians, under the Seleucidae, who were the im-
mediate successors of Alexander, in his Asiatic conquests, brought
the manufactures of India to the western markets, through the
gulph of Persia. The Egyptians, when subject to the Ptolemies,
supplied Europe, in the same manner, by the Red Sea. The Ro-
mans succeeded both, in their commerce, as well as in their power;
and transferred the trade of India, with the seat of their empire, to
Constantinople. During the decline of the eastern empire, the Ita-
lian states, particularly the Venetians, engrossed the commerce of
Asia.
Afia. The Portuguese had the merit, by exploring a new passage to the East, to lay open, though contrary to their inclination, that beneficial trade to the rest of Europe. The subjects of John the Second, after coasting the western side of Africa, doubled the Cape of Good Hope; and Emanuel improved the plan established by his predecessor. In the reign of the latter prince, the famous Vasco de Gama, with four ships, penetrated, beyond the Cape, into seas before unknown, and arrived on the coast of Malabar in 1498, about six years after Columbus had discovered America.

The success of the Portuguese on the coast of India, and the rich cargoes which they imported from that country, raised the envy, but did not immediately excite the imitation of the rest of Europe. A whole century passed before those nations, who now, in a manner, engross the commerce of the East, turned their eyes to that part of the world. The veil of secrecy, with which the Portuguese had industriously covered their course to India, was not the only cause which prevented them from having rivals in their conquests as well as their commerce. The principles of navigation and internal policy were still in their infancy in England. France was only just emerging from the savage rudeness of its feudal system; and the Dutch had not yet emancipated themselves from the stern tyranny of the heirs of the house of Burgundy, strengthened by their accession to the crown of Spain.

The Dutch, sensible of the advantages of an Indian commerce, from the success of the Portuguese, had turned their speculations towards a new and a more expeditious passage to India, than that which the latter had found, by doubling the southern point of Africa. They endeavoured to make their way, by the north-east, to the seas of China and Japan; and to arrive first on those coasts, which to
the Portuguese were the most remote in the East-Indies*. A discovery of that kind would not only shorten the voyage, but diminish its dangers; as the commerce of the Portuguese, together with the dominion of their country, had fallen to Philip the Second, the mortal enemy of the Dutch nation. Their attempts to find a north-east passage were suddenly undertaken, and as suddenly laid aside. But an accident supplied what their industry had, in vain, endeavoured to acquire. A Dutch seaman, whose name was Houtman, and who had been seized in Portugal, in the year 1594, discovered the route of the Portuguese, by the Cape of Good Hope†. Under the direction of Houtman a fleet was equipped, and in the year 1596 failed from the Texel‡.

The English nation, like the Dutch, had attempted to find a new passage to India. Before their neighbours on the continent had turned their attention to the north-east, they had made three different attempts to explore a passage to Tartary and China, by the north-west. But the lights furnished by Drake, Cavendish, and other eminent navigators, pointed out a more direct way to the trade of India. Encouraged by their discoveries, several wealthy merchants of London petitioned Queen Elizabeth for a charter empowering them to undertake this trade. On the 31st of December 1600, the prayer of their petition was granted. They were erected into a body corporate, by the style of "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London, trading to the East Indies." The charter granted a common seal: Thomas Smith, an alderman, was appointed Governor, with twenty Directors, to be chosen annually on the 1st of July, or six days after. They were vested with powers

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† Avertissement à la tête de Recueil de Voyages de la Compagnie, p. 27.  
‡ Vide Journal of this Voyage, printed at London, 1621.
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

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to make bye-laws, to export goods free from custom, for four years, to send to India by every voyage 30,000L. in foreign coin, provided they brought that sum by their commerce from foreign countries. The charter was exclusive; the Queen bound herself to grant none to other merchants, for the space of fifteen years; but a provision was made, that if it appeared the new Corporation should prove, in any respect, detrimental to the Public, the charter, upon two years warning, under the Privy Seal, should become void. The exclusive commerce, granted in the charter, extended to all places of Asia, Africa, and America, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and the Streights of Magellan; and to execute the design, a joint flock of 72,000L. was quickly subscribed and paid into the treasurer's hands.

This capital enabled the Company to equip and man five ships of small burden; and to send a considerable sum in money and goods, as a trading flock. The fleet put to sea, under the command of Captain James Lancaster; and after a tedious and sickly passage, came to anchor in the road of Achin, in the island of Sumatra, on the 5th of June 1602. The voyage was, however, so prosperous, in point of commerce, that a second trading expedition, to India, was undertaken in the year 1604, under the conduct of Sir Henry Middleton. The success of Middleton was still greater than that of Lancaster. But both yielded, in good fortune, to Captain Keeling, who returned in May 1610, with three ships committed to his care, richly laden, and without the loss of a man.

Notwithstanding the profit derived from these voyages, the trade to India was still inconsiderable, and liable to great inconvenience. The success of the adventurers depended entirely on chance, on the civility of the natives, or on the address of their officers. Without settlements to accommodate their factors, destitute of defences to protect their persons and property, they were subject to disappointment, and exposed to insult. Other nations had
had harbours, which they could command; forts, which they had either built themselves, or had bought from the Indians; and even territories, acquired by treachery or conquest. On the other hand, the Company were so far from commanding respect abroad, that they were ill-provided with resources at home. Though the English nation had already exhibited a great deal of spirit, and a considerable degree of knowledge in navigation, they had made but little progress in the art of ship-building. The Company, during the first ten years of their defultory commerce to Asia, had even been obliged to purchase their ships from the Hanse Towns of Germany.

Though the Company laboured under these disadvantages, their profits, if compared to their capital, were very considerable; and, considering the state of commerce in those times, an acquisition to the wealth of the nation. Government, therefore, enlarged the time of their charter; and, encouraged by the countenance of the State, they themselves began to build their own ships. In the year 1609, they launched a ship of twelve hundred tons, in the presence of King James, and his son the Prince of Wales. This ship, together with two others of considerable burden, under the conduct of Sir Henry Middleton, failed for Surat; where the jealousy of the Portuguese frustrated the intention of the voyage. Middleton made up for his loss in trade, by a species of piracy. He seized some rich ships belonging to the Portuguese, on the coast of Malabar; and, steering his course to the Red Sea, plundered the trade of Mocha, under the pretence of procuring satisfaction for damages he had formerly sustained at that place.

The injustice and power of the Portuguese had, hitherto, prevented the English from establishing themselves, or even from pursuing commerce, with any degree of success, on the coast of Hindoostan. The house of Tamerlane, who had reigned near a century at Delhi, had uniformly encouraged foreigners to trade in their dominions.

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minions. But, as they were possessed of no naval power, they could not enforce their authority beyond their own shores, or prevent hostilities at sea, between the rivals for their trade. Though in the year 1608, the third of the reign of Jehangire, an envoy from the Company had obtained the usual privileges of settlement and commerce from that prince, they had been debarred from the advantages of both, by the intrigues of the Portuguese. Force only could obtain justice from that jealous nation, who claimed, from their long possession, a kind of exclusive right to the commerce of India. Four ships of considerable burden were, therefore, put under the command of Captain Thomas Best, a resolute officer. He arrived at Surat, in September 1612; and having defeated, in two actions, the Portuguese squadron, enabled the factors of the Company to avail themselves of the privileges, which they had obtained in the Empire.

To secure the advantages obtained by the victory of Best, the Company prevailed with King James the First, to send a royal ambassador to the court of Hindostan. The person vested with this high character, was Sir Thomas Roe, who arrived in the end of 1614, at Ajmere, the capital of the province of that name, where the Emperor Jehangire, at that time, kept his court. But though the ambassador was received with every mark of esteem by Jehangire, he found an enemy in his son, Sultan Kurrum; to whom, as lord of Surat, the department of redressing the grievances of the English had been assigned. The Emperor's favour prevailed at last, in some degree, over the prejudices of the prince. In the month of January 1615, new firmans were obtained, for the establishment of factories in various provinces; but they were worded with caution, and the privileges granted, were defective and circumscribed *.

* Dox, vol. iii.
Radical defects in the constitution of the Company at home, misconduct, and even misfortune abroad, the smallness of their capital in Europe, their having no solid establishments, or fortified settlements in Asia, the want of protection from a government, which, soon after, could not protect itself, together with the jealousy of two powerful, and even faithless rivals in trade, the Portuguese and Dutch, all combined to cramp, and, at length, to annihilate a commerce, which, at its best, depended merely on lucky adventures. The History of the Company, from this period forward, consists of instances of misfortunes in trade, and instances of spirit in adventure and feats of valour in war. Rivalled, and even ruined ashore, by the Portuguese and Dutch, they revenged themselves of the former at sea; but the latter, by their barbarous severities at Amboyna, in the year 1622, put, in a manner, an end to their trade with the islands of Asia. On the coasts of Hindostan, and even in some inland cities of that great empire, they continued to carry on a languid commerce for several years. The government of the Moguls had, then, arrived at a degree of vigour, sufficient to command peace, and even justice, between the Europeans under its protection. The advantages derived from the commerce of foreigners, had even procured for them privileges, which had been denied to the natives.

It was during this untoward state of the English commerce in Asia, the servants of the Company obtained that establishment in Bengal, which time and accident have since improved into so many and great national advantages. Though the Portuguese had visited Bengal*, before it fell under the power of the Moguls, they had never established regular governments and garrisons in that country†. The Dutch had settled there about the year 1625, in the reign of the Emperor Jahangir‡. In 1636, when his son Shau Jehan sat on

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* L'Expedition de trois Vaiffaux, tom. i.
‡ I have, vol. ii. p. 7.
the throne, one Boughton, an English surgeon, sent from Surat to Agra, had the good fortune to cure the emperor's favourite daughter, who laboured under an illness, which had baffled the skill of the natives. Among other favours, Boughton was gratified with a patent, or Dufuc, for a free trade throughout the empire. Having proceeded to Bengal, his skill in physic procured for him the friendship of the Nabob of that province; who extended the privileges given to Boughton, to the whole English nation §. The Company's servants at Surat, availing themselves of the influence of Boughton, built a factory at Hughley, on the western branch of the Ganges, one hundred miles from the mouth of the river.

But the privileges obtained by Boughton, for his countrymen, were incapable of restoring vigour to a commerce, which had fallen into an irrecoverable decline. Harassed abroad by European rivals, who, from their superior advantages, could bring their imports cheaper to market at home, the Company lost their spirit with their success. To hasten their fate, the civil commotions, which afterwards terminated in the subversion of the constitution of the state, engaged the whole attention, and employed the whole exertion of the nation. The Dutch, availing themselves of the decline of the Portuguese, and the distractions in England, engrossed the commerce of the East; and even Cromwell, though he gained a superiority over them in war, neglected, as perhaps he understood not, the interests of the nation in India, in a peace, the conditions of which he dictated himself. He, however, renewed to the Company their ancient privileges in 1657; but before they could avail themselves of the support of government, his death threw the nation back into those public distractions, from which it had emerged but a few years before.


The
The revolution, which restored England to its ancient constitution, brought back, soon after, the commerce of India to its former channel. Charles the Second, though addicted to pleasure, was capable of useful exertions, and he loved commerce. His brother, the Duke of York, though possessed of less ability, was endued with greater perseverance; and, by a peculiar felicity, placed his chief amusement in commercial schemes, whilst he possessed the whole influence of the state. Under his auspices, a new charter was issued, on the 3d of April 1661. The animosity of the two royal brothers against the Dutch, the manifest advantage to the revenue, as well as to the nation, which was likely to be derived from the commerce of India, infused the support of government to the Company.

The charter which had been granted by Queen Elizabeth, in the forty-third year of her reign, invested the Company with an exclusive right of commerce for fifteen years. They had been erected into a perpetual body-politic, by a charter which they had obtained in the seventh of James the First. In that of April 3, 1661, new privileges were added to the old, which were all confirmed. The Company were invested with a civil jurisdiction and a military authority, with a power of making war or concluding peace with the infidels of India; the state reserving to itself, by this distinction, those prerogatives, with respect to Europeans. They were also empowered to export bullion to the amount of 150,000l. in every voyage, provided they re-exported foreign goods to the same amount. The clause in the charter granted by Elizabeth was reserved, which declared, that it should become void and of no effect, after three years notice given, should the privileges granted prove detrimental to the general interest of the nation. A capital of 369,890l. was subscribed, though only one half was paid, to derive
immediate advantage from privileges as extensive in themselves, as
they were liberally bestowed by the Crown.

Charles the Second, having espoused the Infanta of Portugal in
1662, obtained the possession of the island of Bombay in the year
1663, as a part of the portion of that Princess. Finding that the
revenues of the place were unequal to its expence, the King ceded
it, in fee-tail, to the Company, in the twentieth year of his reign;
and, five years after, he also granted to them the island of St. He-
lena. To this cession of territory, Government added its whole sup-
port, in the encouragement and protection of the Company's trade.
The injuries which they had received from the jealousy of the Dutch
Company, had formed one of the most sensible reasons for entering into
the first Dutch war. The Commons, by the management of Govern-
ment, which then was swayed by the Duke of York, addressed the
Crown, against the wrongs and indignities done to the East India
Company. The Duke himself, who spent half his time in the busi-
ness of commerce in the city, presided frequently at the meetings
of the Court of Directors. In short, no aid was wanting to the
prosperity of the Company, that either the affluence of the Duke or
his influence in the state could procure.

The encouragement and protection of government, joined to their
own industry, raised the Company, in outward appearance, to a state
of amazing affluence in the space of a few years. In 1680 and the
three succeeding years, the price of India stock was 360 per cent.
with proportionable dividends. Circumstances so favourable could
not fail to raise the jealousy of foreigners, and to inflame the avarice
of individuals at home. The mercantile interest and the court be-
came, at length, divided, on a subject of so much importance. The
first were prompted, by their eagerness for gain, to invade the
exclusive rights contained in the charter; the latter, won by the
influence, and perhaps the money, of the Company, as eagerly op-
posed their designs.

During
More ample privileges were given by Charles II.

James II. grants still more extensive powers.

1686.

During the latter years of the life of Charles the Second, the victory obtained by the court over the city, repressed the complaints of the merchants of London, as they were likely to produce no good effect against a society favoured by government. Charles had renewed the charter, in the twenty-eighth year of his reign; he had extended the privileges of the Company in the thirty-fifth; but when his brother James the Second acceded to the throne, he poured his favours, with a very lavish hand, on a body whom he had before patronized. To raise them into an equality with the Dutch Company, and, perhaps, to give them a superiority over their republican rivals, he not only increased their immunities, but even transferred to them many of his own prerogatives. He impowered them to build fortresses, to levy troops, to determine causes, under the form of courts martial, and to coin money. Encouraged by so many privileges, under the patronage of a Prince, who both knew and loved trade, the Company not only assumed the pride, but even the tyranny of sovereignty. Instead of repressing the encroachments of their foreign rivals, they persecuted such of their countrymen as seemed inclined to invade their exclusive commerce. The principal servants abroad, encouraged and protected by those who managed the affairs of the Company at home, carried insolence, oppression, and injustice into every department of their government.

Unlimited power, in the hands of a single person, may be prevented from degenerating into acts of tyranny, by the terrors of ignominy or by personal fears. But a body of men, vested with authority, is seldom swayed by restraints of either kind. As they derive, individually, but little applause from their best measures, so the portion of infamy which may fall to each for the worst public actions, is too small to affect personal character. Having, therefore, no generous inducements to follow virtue, the most sordid passions frequently lead them into vice. It is from this circumstance, that the decisions of public bodies sometimes partake of that mortifying species
species of tyranny, which is incapable of redress, and yet is beyond revenge. These observations may be applied, without the least injustice, to the actions of the India Company both at home and abroad. Avarice, the most obstinate and hardened passion of the human mind, being the first principle of commerce, was the original bond of their union; and humanity, justice, and even policy, gave way to the prospect or love of gain *.

The mismanagement of the Company at home had been long covered by that veil of secrecy which the private interests of the leaders had industriously thrown over their affairs. It afterwards appeared, that those leaders had usurped an absolute dominion over the other adventurers. That, by their private contracts and unheard-of deductions, and by the most iniquitous frauds in both, the joint flock had suffered a loss to near one half of its original amount. That when, by embezzlement, avarice, and inattention to their trust, they had in a manner devoured the property of their constituents, by unjust and unreasonable dividends, to give the fallacious appearance of health to a body fallen into a deep decline. That, though in prosecution of the same system of deception, they had doubled their capital, in the year 1682, they had not taken in but one half of the sum at first subscribed. That,

* Besides that want of generous principle, which seems excluded from the very institution of a sovereign corporation of commerce, the great distance of their administration in India secured the Company from a general inspection into their conduct, and consequently furnished ample opportunities for a wanton and uncontrolled exercise of power. All resistance, therefore, to their arbitrary edicts, whether they regarded their own servants, or the natives of the country, was considered as treason, and punished with severity. The rulers at home had their favourites abroad, whom they protected in the most cruel and oppressive measures by their authority. Hence it happened that private resentments and selfish views were too frequently the only rules of their conduct; and that their administration had scarce any other principle of union, than a mutual permission to commit injustice. Even the exclusive privilege, which was thought necessary for the prosperity of their commerce, became an engine of tyranny against all those whom they considered as interlopers; and such influences of their barbarity might be produced, supported by facts, as would excite horror.
whilst they were making extravagant dividends to the proprietors, the Company was languishing under a debt of two millions at interest. That, instead of answering legal demands, the Directors had fixed a paper on the Treasury-door, declaring that they could pay no more till a certain period; and all this at a time, when they pretended the affairs of the Company were in the most flourishing condition.

These iniquitous deceptions at home naturally produced frauds, oppression, and injustice abroad. To repair the ruins made by the avarice of the Directors, they issued orders to their governors and factors to borrow large sums in India on the credit of the Company. Their conduct, upon this occasion, was treacherous, base and unworthy of the subjects of any civilized state. In their letters to their factors they intimated, that as soon as they had pushed their credit to the utmost extent, they would then contrive means of quarrelling with the creditors, and of putting a stop to their trade.

The commands of the Directors were faithfully executed by servants suitable to such masters. Having borrowed from the merchants of Surat, under the mask of friendship, near three hundred thousand pounds, they followed the orders they had received, and retired to Bombay. To complete the injustice and even villany of these transactions, they began to make spoil of the ships and goods of their creditors and benefactors. One Sir John Child, a representative worthy of a vicious society, without any declaration, without the least pretence to justify hostilities, seized thirteen rich ships, belonging to the merchants of Surat, to the amount of more than a million sterling.

To this treachery to foreigners, the Company had added the most dreadful oppressions towards their own nation. They had seized

* White's account of the India trade.
‡ As afterwards appeared upon oath in the court of exchequer. The value of three hundred thousand pounds of this spoil was sent home to the committee of Directors who had issued the orders.—White's Account of the India Trade.
the ships and condemned the property of interlopers, after having put the crews in irons, and killed some of the captains §. Their injustice at sea was preceded and followed by unheard-of instances of tyranny ashore. The merchants and inhabitants of Bombay, exasperated into a degree of madness by the oppressions of their masters, had revolted from their authority, declared for the King and nation, imprisoned their president, and had taken the reins of government into their own hands ||. When, upon a promise of pardon, and upon stipulated conditions, they returned to their duty, the faith of the Company was broken, and they were treated with insolence, tyranny, and wanton cruelty. To such a degree of oppression had the Governor of Bombay stretched his authority, that he actually erected an inquisition under the presidency of a refugee Greek; to haras, ruin; and destroy, by a religious persecution, such as, in other respects, had eluded his vengeance *.

The conduct of the Company towards their subjects and servants was uniformly oppressive, unjustifiable, and cruel; yet, from its being unknown or disregarded at home, they escaped those animadversions, and, perhaps, punishments, which they had so much deserved. But Aurungzebe, who then sat on the throne of Delhi, resolved to obtain justice for his own subjects at Surat, for the piracies committed by the Company. Having demanded that justice in vain, by messages to the government of Bombay, he had ordered an army into that island. The conduct of the governor was as pusillanimous in war, as it had been insolent and unjust in time of peace. Being pressed by a siege, three deputies, in the name of the Company, were dispatched to Aurungzebe, who then resided at Jehanabad. They presented themselves in the presence of the offended monarch, with their hands tied before them; and having prostrated themselves

on the ground, they implored his clemency, confessed their faults, and humbly requested his pardon. The Emperor, having severely reprimanded them, contented to withdraw his army, and to renew the Phirman, which they had so justly forfeited, upon condition of their making satisfaction to his subjects at Surat for the injuries which they had sustained.

Soon after these transactions, both at home and abroad, the vehemence of persons injured by the injustice of the Company, and the jealousy of the merchants of London, brought their affairs into public discussion, and under the consideration of parliament. The House of Commons, having examined the subject in three different sessions, had proposed regulations for carrying on, in future, the commerce with the East Indies. But the Company had eluded all the endeavours of that assembly, by procuring a new charter from Queen Mary, who managed the affairs of the kingdom in the absence of King William, in September 1694. The House of Commons having, in the beginning of 1695, detected various flagrant abuses in the management of public affairs, were led to conclude, that the court, the camp, the city, and even parliament, had been infected with one general contagion of bribery, corruption, and venality. The East India Company, having had the influence to remove the consideration of their affairs from the legislature to the privy council, were naturally suspected of having gained the King's principal servants by bribes. The Commons, therefore, ordered a committee to inspect the books of the Company. The abstracts of the sums paid for special services soon led to a discovery. In the reign of James the Second, the annual charges of the management at home had scarcely exceeded 1200l.; but in the year 1693, when the charter was first renewed, they had amounted to 90,000l. Sir Thomas Cooke, the governor of the Company, on whose notes the money

† Hamilton, vol. i.
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had been lent, terrified by a bill of pains and penalties passed by the Commons, made a discovery which was not satisfactory. Ten thousand pounds were, however, traced to the king himself; and other sums to his ministers and principal servants. The duke of Leeds, as being the most obnoxious, was impeached for receiving a gratuity of five thousand pounds; but king William, by putting suddenly an end to the session, quashed at once the impeachment and all further enquiry.

Though the weight of the Crown, and the influence of the Company, as well as those who had received bribes, had quashed the enquiry, in the year 1695, the associated merchants, or, as they were called by the Company, the interlopers, found means to bring the charter obtained in 1694, under the consideration of parliament in the beginning of 1698. Exclusive of the mismanagements of the Company at home and their tyranny in India, together with the general arguments against the expediency and justice of a commercial monopoly, the principal objection offered against the charter, was its not being confirmed by an act of the legislature. Government, standing in need of a supply, had resolved to support the cause of that party which should pay the most for their favour. The Company, apprized of that circumstance, offered 700,000l. at four per cent., upon condition of having the charter confirmed by act of parliament. The interlopers, protected by Mr. Montague, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to advance two millions, at eight per cent., in consideration of an exclusive trade to be vested in the subscribers. A bill was accordingly passed on this affair, notwithstanding the petitions and opposition of the Old Company. The latter, however, obtained in the succeeding year the sanction of parliament to their charter; and thus the nation had two East-India

† Journals, April 1695.
§ Ibid.

Companies
Companies by parliamentary authority, instead of one by preroga-
tive †.

The animosities, which had subsisted for many years between the
Old Company and the interlopers, who had been comprehended in
the New, were increased by mutual jealousies, after both had been
confirmed by the sanction of the legislature. They were now as fo-
licitous for the destruction of each other, as each had before been
for their respective establishment. Having both tasted the sweets
of the East-India commerce, both were inflamed with that envy
and irreconcilable resentment which ambition and avarice never fail
to inspire. In the general elections which happened in the year 1700,
they had been both detected in bribery and corruption. " The
Old began with corrupting members and purchasing voices in the
house. The New, instead of purchasing votes, bought seats; in-
stead of corrupting the representatives bribed the constituents, and
endeavoured to secure a majority in the house." Their feuds and
jealousies in the mean time continued; nor did these in the least
subside till more than two years after the charter of the Old Com-
pany had been confirmed by parliament. Tired, at length, of a
quarrel which might possibly terminate in the ruin of both, they
resolved upon an union of stocks; and agreed that the future ma-
agement of their joint trade should be according to the charter of
the New Company, bearing date the 5th of September 1698.

During these contests in England, the same mismanagements and
the same oppressions continued in the settlements of the Company
in India. The principles of the Company's government abroad,
may be collected from the orders sent by their governor at home.
This commercial despot, in writing to the judge appointed by the
Company for civil affairs, makes use of the following remarkable
words: "I expect my will and orders shall be your rule, and not


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"the laws of England, which are a heap of nonsense, compiled by
a number of ignorant country gentlemen, who hardly know how
to govern their own families, much less the regulating companies
and foreign commerce."—"Having now the power of condemning
the Company's enemies, or such as shall be deemed so, particular-
ly those who shall question the Company's power over all the Bri-
tish subjects in India, I expect my orders, from time to time, shall
be obeyed and observed as statute laws "."

Though the judge, to whom this letter had been written, was
too prudent to promise obedience to the arbitrary mandates which
it contained, the governors of the different settlements seemed to
have thoroughly imbibed the despotic principles of their masters in
England. The profligate Sir John Child had been followed in the
government of Bombay and the generalship of India, by a succession
of petty tyrants. The union of the two Companies brought only a
fresh supply of rapacity and injustice, to the old flock of avarice
and tyranny. In some instances, the oppressed found themselves
oblige'd to strike the reins of government from the hands of their
oppressors. This was the fate of Sir Nicholas Waite, whose loose-
ness of morals, bare-faced perversion of justice, and arbitrary exer-
tion of his authority incensed to such a degree the inhabitants and
soldiers of Bombay, that they seized his person and sent him pri-
soner to England. A train of similar oppressions, joined with other
misfortunes, at length reduced that island to a solitary and dismal de-
fart. War and pestilence had reduced the English inhabitants from
eight hundred to sixty persons. "Still the spirit of injustice re-
main'd, which neither war nor pestilence could subdue. The un-
fortunate few, who survived those dreadful calamities, were de-
nied the liberty of returning to their native country, or even of
removing to other parts of India. They were detained in the

"Company's service, under the hand of authority, infatation, and "oppression, without a glimmering of hope "."

The union of the two Companies in England was found incapable of reconciling their servants in India. The same principle of avarice and self-interest, which had joined the former in one scheme of commerce, increased rivalry, animosity, and injustice between the latter. The heat of the climate seems to have inflamed their rancour, jealousy, and enmity. Those passions had their rise among the leaders of the Companies at home, from the phlegmatic, though vigilant and eager principle of avarice: but in India, self-interest, selfish notions, rapacity, and consequently injustice, became blended, as it were by fermentation, with the whole constitution of the mind. The affairs of the united Company must naturally have languished, as they were conducted by men more attentive to their own mutual destruction, than to their duty to their masters. Neither honour, justice, or humanity were regarded, when any occasion offered, for ruining each other, or enriching themselves*: all was conducted by secret fraud or open force. 

The State, whose correcting hand ought to have been stretched forth to petty despots, whose quarrels and oppressions had disgraced the nation, was too much embroiled at home, to extend its attention to India. A disputed succession, the events, the hurry, the expense of a great war, and, above all, the contests for places, which parties dignify with the name of principle, occupied the whole attention of the great body of the people. Men in office had neither leisure, nor, perhaps, sufficient knowledge of the subject, to rectify abuses in commerce; and thus, whilst the great interests of the nation

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* Harris, Dodfley, &c.

† The instances of rapacity, oppression, and injustice, committed by the superior servants of the Company, are too mean for the pen of an historian; at least, they are too numerous to be comprehended in a disquisition, where brevity is to be studied. Bribery, corruption, and venality seem to be inherent in all the members of commercial bodies; by whom authority never fails to be made the instrument of avarice.

were neglected, the Ministry were engaged in defending their places from the attacks of rivals, and not in executing the duties of their station.

Time, which smoothes down, in its progress, the most furious passions of the mind, extinguished, at length, the jealousies between the leaders of the two united Companies in England. Their common interest created unanimity in their measures; and, in looking back to the conditions on which they had been united, they perceived defects and inconveniences, which they wished to remove. The two Companies, when separate, had been convervant in the means of gaining the favour of individuals with money; but, now, the necessities of the State itself had rendered it an object for bribery. To obtain such a law as would settle their affairs on a proper footing, they resolved, in the sixth year of Queen Anne, to lend to Government, at a stated interest, 1,200,000l. over and above the 2,000,000l. lent, when the New Company was established, about ten years before. The Earl of Godolphin, then at the head of the public finances, seized the offer with all the eagerness of a minister who wants a supply. In consideration of a trivial sum, which might have been borrowed upon common interest from individuals, Parliament was ready to grant to the Company whatever privileges and powers they required, for the benefit of their trade. A bill was accordingly passed, in which the above sum of 1,200,000l. was declared an addition to the stock of the Company, free from all taxes*.

The treaty of Utrecht, which restored peace to England, after a war which had continued, with little intermission, three-and-twenty years, promised to bring back interrupted commerce to her ancient channel. Years of tranquillity succeeding times of trouble and public waste, industry and trade were revived, and the East-India Com-

* Publications of the times.
pany obtained its own share of the general prosperity. The leaders in the Court of Directors, either guided by chance, or swayed by judgment, had sent persons of prudence and commercial abilities, in quality of chiefs, to their settlements, which gave a prosperous turn to their affairs. Envy and jealousy, which tread close on the heels of prosperity, again raised enemies to the Company. Men of eminence and weight joined, in the general cry, against an exclusive commerce. A variety of arguments, plausible, at least, if not just, were urged, with great vehemence, on that head. "The whole kingdom was filled with complaints of the injustice of a monopoly, by which a body of private merchants satiated their avarice, at the expense of all the other subjects of the state*. To obviate the consequences of speculative reasonings, become so general, the Company had recourse to the never-failing argument of the purse. They bribed the State, by what the State, perhaps ignorantly, thought advantageous proposals†; and, notwithstanding the clamours of the people, obtained a perfect security to an exclusive right of trading to the East-Indies.

The East-India Company continued in the same flourishing and secure condition, both at home and abroad, till the war, which was declared between France and England, in the year 1744. The French having failed, for near eighty years, in all their attempts to erect and support an East-India Company, at length accomplished their object about the year 1720. The regular returns made by the French, ever since their complete establishment in India, had been so considerable, that the jealousy of the British Company was raised. Government, entering with some degree of warmth into that jealousy, turned a part of their attention towards the East, when war

* Publications of the times.
† There were 250,000l. as a gratuity, and a reduction of the annuity of 160,000l. upon their capital stock lent to Government, to 128,000l. The reduced annuity to be charged on the same duties and revenues as before.
was likely to arise between the two nations. The French, fearing hostilities, as they were anxious to promote a commerce still in its infancy, had proposed a neutrality between the two Companies, as early as the year 1742. The Court of Directors, at first, accepted and then rejected the proposal; but, whether instigated by Government, or swayed by their own versatility, is uncertain. When, therefore, war commenced in Europe, its flame spread to Asia. Their respective sovereigns assisted each Company; and, thus, the business of commerce yielded to the occupations of arms. New scenes were opened; and events arose, which became the foundation of that state of things, to explain which is the principal object of this work.
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CHAP. II.

Origin of the three Presidencies.—The Conquests of the Mahommedans in the Decan deduced from the earliest Times.

The three British Presidencies, which command the inferior factories in Hindostan, were established under various circumstances, and at different periods. During the vigour of the Mogul empire, the race of Timur, who sat on the throne of Delhi, disdained to permit the appearance of any sovereignty but their own. Even the conquests and forts of the Portuguese in India, had been confined to the dominions of petty Rajahs, to whom the Moguls had never extended their invasions. But as the nature of the commerce of Europeans had placed so much of their property in the hands of the natives, they became, through necessity, entirely dependent on the Government of the country. This circumstance had, at length, so far removed the jealousy of the State, that they were permitted to erect such slight defences, as might protect the persons of their Factors from the insults of invaders or insurgents, without rendering them formidable to the Empire.

Madras, which commands the factories on the coast of Coromandel, owed its origin to the gallantry of Sir William Langhorne; who fixed on a sterile and inconvenient spot, merely on account of its vicinity to the Portuguese settlement of St. Thomas, where he had a mistress. This injudicious choice was made, during the great civil war in England, when the trade to India had languished so much,
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much, that, in the year 1654, it expired, in a manner, by a natural death.

BOMBAY, which has long presided over the factories on the coast of Malabar, was itself formerly dependent on Surat, and governed by a Deputy sent from that settlement. Their naval power enabled the Portuguese to possess themselves of that island, soon after their first arrival in Hindostan. Secured by the force which acquired it, Bombay had scarcely any defences but the sea, by which it was surrounded. Being a part of the portion assigned to the Infanta of Portugal, when she became Queen of England in 1662, it fell into the hands of Charles II. in the end of 1663. That prince, finding that it was not worth its expense to the State, transferred it, in feetail, to the Company, about the year 1669.

The English, extending their commerce to Bengal, under the patronage of Boughton, a surgeon, were permitted, about the year 1640, to build a kind of factory at Hughley, a port on the western branch of the Ganges. But such was the jealousy of the Mogul Government, that, for the space of forty years, the Company were only allowed to retain thirty soldiers and an ensign in their pay, to do honour to their principal agents. The war kindled by Sir John Child, on the coast of Malabar, extending itself to Bengal, the English were obliged to quit Hughley; and, soon after, to retire to Madras. Upon the pacification made in 1669, with the Court of Delhi, the factory was permitted to return, first to Soota-nutty, and afterwards to settle at the village of Calcutta. Upon an insurrection of the Rajahs, on the western side of the river Hughley, in the year 1696, the factory declared for the Mogul Government. The Nabob of Bengal ordered them to defend themselves against the enemy; and they raised walls with a few bastions, which they called Fort William, in honour of the reigning king.

Though the French had made a voyage to India in 1621, the same year in which the English first failed, in the way of commerce, to
that country, they were, for more than a century, unsuccessful in almost all their schemes. A lively nation, without solidity for trade, calculated for sudden exertions, but incapable of perseverance in one determined line of conduct. Perpetually changing the object, without altering their manner, they attempted every thing, and lost all. Their voyages to India were remarkable, only for the singularity of their misfortunes. A company, destitute of resources as well as policy at home, vehement and injudicious, though spirited agents abroad; both ignorant of commerce, and yet too proud to learn.

Having founded a kind of factory at Surat, they quitted that city without any solid reason, and after making an unsuccessful attempt on the island of Ceylon, established themselves, by accident, at Pondicherry, about the year 1670. There they carried on a languid commerce, under the protection of the Mogul government, till Pondicherry was taken by the Dutch in 1693. Though the treaty of Ryfwick restored the place, little advantage was derived from it, till Cardinal Fleury began to support the French interest in India, in an effectual manner. Under the auspices of that minister, men of abilities were appointed to superintend the trade, and to increase the power of the India Company. Having succeeded in the former, they became too attentive to the latter; till, by one of those reverses of fortune to which schemes of ambition are often liable, both objects were entirely lost.

To throw complete light on the subject of this disquisition, it may not be improper to return to events, which, as they are placed far back in antiquity, are perhaps overlooked, though they deserve to be known. Writers, who, by defending the conduct of the Company, admit that it stands in need of defence, have recurred to the ancient history of India, for arguments of exculpation. Though the facts they have chosen to give, may have carried conviction to their own minds, they are too imperfect to guide the judgment of the Public, on an affair, on which the Public ought to decide.
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This defect in the narratives, on which they found their reasoning, we shall endeavour to supply, with all the conciseness consistent with perspicuity. If they have been mistaken in their premises, their conclusions must, of course, have been wrong. If they have decided without evidence, the nation will reverse the judgment.

A thirst for plunder and an avidity for power have ever been motives of hostility and injustice to avaricious and ambitious men. But, from whatever cause war may spring, when it ends in conquest, it invests the victor with all the property of the vanquished.* The best writers on the laws of nature and of nations terminate, at this point, their enquiries into the rights, by which monarchs sit on thrones, or nations possess dominions. To push their examination further, might justly invalidate every claim of a prince and right of a people. Almost every period of antiquity, in every country, owes perhaps its being remembered at all to revolutions accomplished by resentment, ambition, or rapacity. Mankind therefore, being either guilty themselves of this species of injustice, or deriving benefits from it, have uniformly acquiesced in the absolute right, which every man, in a solemn war, acquires in the property which he takes from the enemy; and that without rule or measure†. When, therefore, strangers obtain, either by chance or accident, a settlement in any region, they are not to look back either to the justice or injustice of that force, which originally defined the usages, or established the government of the country, into whose bosom they are received as subjects.

This was certainly the case of the English East-India Company, in those two settlements, the Carnatic and Bengal, in which their servants, aided by the force of the State, have made so splendid a figure for the nation, at least so profitable an adventure for them. 

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† Aristot. de Repub. Lib. i. cap. 4. Xenoph. de Ind. Cyr. l. 7.
selves. In both countries, they owned themselves, and they naturally were, the subjects of the Mogul empire†. They received the phirmans of the Emperor, with every eastern ceremony‡; upon various occasions they voluntarily prostrated themselves, and sometimes with their hands bound, in the presence of that monarch, with all the humility of eastern slaves§; they paid him a yearly revenue; and, to use the hyperbolical language of Asia, they "worshipped the shadow of his greatness, in his lieutenants and governors." The Mogul and his officers considered them, in return, in the light of good subjects¶; and, upon occasions of distress or injustice, interfered in their favour, and protected their persons and property*. To a certain prince, who now complains of their injustice, they expressed themselves, about thirty years ago, "We are at your service, if you can trust us;" words as expressive of their obedience to him, as they are of doubts concerning their own sincerity." 

The history of Hindostan, before the Mahommedans extended their invasions to that country, is either involved in fable, or disfigured by allegories; which, to their natural obscurity, have added the difficulties arising from a language, little studied and less understood. The authority of one monarch is said to have extended itself over all India, in remote antiquity; but, either through the negligence or weakness of the princes who reigned, the Governors of the different provinces, throwing off their allegiance, assumed the titles as well as the independence of sovereigns, about the year 618. In this situation they had continued for some ages, prior to the establishment of a Mahommedan sovereignty at Ghizni, in the mountains to the north-west of the western branch of the Indus. This happened

† Vide Accounts of India passim.
‡ Vide Accounts of India passim.
§ Vide Accounts of India passim.
¶ Vide Accounts of India passim.
* Vide Accounts of India passim.
+ Vide Accounts of India passim.
— Vide Accounts of India passim.
* Vide Accounts of India passim.
+ Vide Accounts of India passim.
— Vide Accounts of India passim.
about the middle of the tenth century, under Abifagi, who had revolted from the kingdom of Bohara; and whose successor Subudagi became the ancestor of a long line of kings.

Several Mahommedans had made predatory expeditions into India, prior to the foundation of the kingdom of Ghizni; but Mamood, the son of Subudagi, was the first who established his authority to the east of the five great rivers, which form the Indus. Mamood mounted the throne of Ghizni, in the year of our aera 997. In his zeal to propagate the faith of Mahommed, but, more probably, prompted by his avarice, he made many expeditions into India; and having retained the places which he had subdued, extended his conquests and dominions to the kingdoms of Ajmere, Guzerat, and even to a part of Malava. Thirteen princes of the family of Mamood inherited his empire, but none of them his talents. Instead of extending, they, at length, lost all their dominions to the petty princes of Ghor, who had been their subjects; and who mounted the throne of the Mahommedan conquests in India, in the year 1184. The dynasty of Ghor, subsisting in the persons and descendants of the adopted slaves of that family, possessed the throne, without extending their dominions, for the space of one hundred and four years.

In the year 1289, Ferofe, the first of the dynasty of Chilghi, having extinguished the race of Ghor, obtained the throne of Delhi. Alla-ul-dien, the nephew of this prince, was the first Mahommedan, who entered the Decan. In a predatory expedition, which he undertook in the year 1293, he surprized Deogire, afterwards called Dowlatabad. The incredible booty which he found in this place enabled him, soon after, by the murder of his uncle Ferofe, to mount the throne of Delhi. Alla-ul-dien held with vigour the

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* Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. i. p. 231.
† Ibid. vol. i. p. 232.
‡ The general name given to all those provinces, which are comprehended in the western peninsula of India.
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Malleck Caffoor, having penetrated the mountains of Bucklana, entered, and reduced into the form of a province, the country of the Marattas; and proceeding to Deogire, received the submission of the Rajah, whom he carried in triumph to Delhi *. Pursuing, in the ensuing year, his good fortune, he entered the province of Tel-lingana, besieged Lidderddeo, the Rajah, in his capital of Arinkil, which he took by assault. The Rajah, driven to extremity, bought his peace with three hundred elephants, seven thousand horse, and money and jewels to a vast amount, agreeing to pay an annual tribute to the Empire †. Encouraged by these repeated successes, Caffoor, resolved to push his conquests to the southern extremity of India, marched, in the year 1310, through Tellingana and Golconda, passed the river Criflina, and entered the Carnatic. Having engaged and taken in battle Bellal-Deo, Rajah of the Carnatic, he ravaged the country, plundered the temples, and, in a mosque, which he built, read the Chutba in his master's name, as sovereign of that extensive province. In a fourth expedition, undertaken in the year 1311, Caffoor seized and put to death the refractory Rajah of Deogire, ravaged the country of the Marattas, and penetrating to the coast of Malabar, reduced several provinces along the shore of the ocean. After this expedition, he took up his residence at Deogire, and, as Nizam or Viceroy of the Decan, raised the annual tribute from the Rajahs of Tellingana, Carnatic, and other conquered provinces §.


Malleck
Malleck Caffoor, upon the death of Alla-ul-dien, having seizd
the throne, was assassinated by some of the officers of the court, and
Mubarie, the son of Alla-ul-dien, and the fourth prince of the race
of Chilli, mounted the throne. During the confusions which
attended the usurpation, the reduced princes of the Decan revolted,
under the conduct of Hirpaldeo, the nephew of the Rajah of Deog
gire. Hirpaldeo being defeated, taken, flead alive, and beheaded
by Mubarie, the provinces of the South returned to their former
dependence on the Mahommedan empire of Delhi. Mubarie,
imitating his father, invested his catamite, Chufero Chan, with the
ensigns of royalty, and sent him from Dowlatabad, with a part of his
army, to reduce the provinces on the coast of Malabar. The im-
mensel plunder acquired by Chufero, in this expedition, encouraged
him to aspire to the throne, which, by the murder of Mubarie, the
last of the race of Chilli, he mounted in the year 1321; but, after
he had reigned five months, he was defeated and slain by Ghazi
Malleck, who became his successor, under the name of Tuglick
Shaw.

The princes of the Decan, still averse to the yoke of the Ma-
hommedans, had revolted during the usurpation of Chufero; and
Tuglick, soon after his accession to the imperial dignity, dispatched
his eldest son, Aligh Chan, to chastise the insurgents. Aligh Chan,
though he failed in the first expedition, by the defection of his
nobles, returned in the succeeding year; and having retaken the
the capital of Tellingana, reduced the revolted provinces. Having,
in the year 1326, succeeded his father Tuglick in the throne, by the
name of Mahommed, he became a great conqueror. Either in per-
son, or by his generals, he subjected all those vast provinces, which
extend from Chittagong, on the eastern shore of the bay of Bengal,

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* Doss. vol. i. p. 296.  † Ibid. p. 298.  ‡ Ibid. p. 308.
to the ocean, which washes the extensive coast of Malabar. Extending his conquests, along the coast of Coromandel, he reduced the Carnatic to Cape Comorin, the extremity of the Decan; and stretching his authority with his arms from sea to sea, made the whole peninsula dependent on the empire of Delhi §.

Sultan Mahommed, having by his wild schemes, ambition and avarice, created a general disgust, many of the nobles, whom he had left in governments in the Decan, confederating under his nephew Kirshafib, arose in rebellion. Kirshafib being defeated under the walls of Deogire, by the Emperor in person, fled to the Rajah of Compala in the Carnatic, who, endeavouring to protect the fugitive, was overcome in battle, and taken prisoner by the Imperialists. Kirshafib having, in the mean time, made his escape, threw himself into the hands of Bellaldeo, Rajah of the whole Carnatic. That prince, acknowledging his own subjection to the Mahommedan government*, delivered the fugitive to his offended uncle, who ordered him to be flead alive, and to be shewn, a horrid spectacle, all around the city of Deogire. Mahommed, in order to retain with more ease his vast conquests in the Decan, resolved to make Deogire the seat of empire; and, to people it with the greater expedition, he ordered Delhi to be destroyed, and the inhabitants to be carried to his new capital †.

The presence of Mahommed in Deogire repressed, for some time, the spirit of revolt, which had so frequently appeared in the Decan. But when disturbances in the North and East, and especially a rebellion in Bengal, recalled him from the southern provinces, a conspiracy was formed, by the principal Hindoos, to recover their independence, by expelling all the Mahommedans from the Decan. Kinfa-naig, the son of Liddendeo, the deposed Rajah of Tellingana,
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joining with Bellaldeo *, the tributary prince of the Carnatic, their united forces drove, in a few months, the Mahommedans from all their conquests, except Deogire or Dowlatabad †. Sultan Mahommed having determined to reconquer the Decan, in the year 1346, divided that vast country into those four provinces, which became, afterwards, four independent Mahommedan sovereignties. He entered into articles with four governors, whom he appointed, and provided with armies, that they should pay annually into the Imperial treasury, near nine millions of our money §. The Hindoos, either terrified or defeated by the Imperial armies, seem to have returned to their former dependence; when a sudden revolution rendered the Decan entirely independent on the throne of Delhi.

The Mahommedan princes, who had already reigned over the greatest part of India, for more than three centuries, had supported their authority among the natives, by the means of hardy troops, called from the provinces beyond the Indus. The chiefs or leaders of those mercenaries had formerly seized the throne, which they had been hired to defend; or, at least, had appropriated to themselves provinces, in the reduction of which they had been employed by the court of Delhi. This injustice, on their part, frequently created jealousy in the mind of the prince whose pay they received. Plots, assassinations, and even massacres had often been the consequence of those passions, when carried to extremes.

Sultan Mahommed, becoming jealous of his Mogul mercenaries, had ordered many of their chiefs to be murdered at a feast to which they had been treacherously invited $. Those who remained, dreading the same fate, revolted, surprized Dowlatabad, and, in the year 1347, invested Ismael Muche, one of their chiefs, with the ensigns of royalty, under the name of Nafir-ul-dien||. This new

* This seems to have been the general name of all the Rajahs of the Carnatic.
† Dow, vol. i. p. 323, 326.
‡ Ibid. p. 329.
§ Ibid. p. 332.
∥ Ibid. p. 332.
monarch was, soon after, defeated in battle, and besieged in Dowlatabad, by Sultan Mahommed. A rebellion in Guzerat having called the Emperor to that province, the vanquished Moguls assembled under Hassen Caco Bernini, defeated the Imperialists who besieged Dowlatabad, and drove them towards Malava. Hassen Caco, under the title of Alla-ul-dien, assumed the royal ensigns, which had been resigned, in his favour, by Nafir-ul-dien. Whilst Sultan Mahommed was meditating an expedition against the rebels, he died, on his march to Tatta on the banks of the Indus, in 1352.

Feroze Shaw, who succeeded his uncle Mahommed in the throne of Delhi, was a good and humane man, but a weak prince. More attentive to the improvement of the dominions, which he possessed, than to the recovery of those, which his predecessors had lost, he emancipated, by a formal treaty, both the Decan and Bengal, from the government of the empire; upon condition of their paying a small annual tribute. The debility of Feroze descended to his posterity and successors, who were engaged in a civil war, which had sprung from a disputed succession, when, in 1397, Timur§, by an invasion of Hindoostan, broke entirely the power of an empire already mutilated and divided. In Mamood, who then possessed the Imperial title, but no authority, the dominion of the race of Tuglick Shaw expired. The family of Beloli Lodi, a noble Afgan, obtained the throne of Delhi in 1450, which they held for seventy-five years; till by the defeat and death of Ibrahim, the third of the race, the empire was transferred to the Moguls, in the person of the great Sultan Baber, lineally descended from Timur*.

Sultan Baber found too much employment, in settling the dominions, which he had wrested from the family of Lodi, to avail himself of the ancient claims of the empire, on the revolted provinces.

\[1\] Dow, vol. i. p. 336.  

* Dying
Dying in the prime of life, in 1530, he was succeeded in the throne, but not in his good fortune, by his son Humaioon; who, after a troublesome and disastrous reign of twelve years, was expelled from his dominions by Shere Shaw, an Afgan, who usurped the throne. Humaioon, after an exile of twelve years, returned to Hindoostan with an army; and, having come to battle with Secunder Shaw, the last Patan possessor of the throne of Delhi, transferred the government, a second time, to the house of Timur. But dying by a fall in the following year, he left the yet unsettled empire to his son Ackbar, who was still a youth.

Though Ackbar, whether we regard his character or his good fortune, was one of the greatest princes who ever sat on the throne of Hindoostan; he neglected, for many years, to revive the pretensions of the empire, to the kingdoms of the Decan.

The internal history of those extensive countries, which form the peninsula of India within the Ganges, still remains involved in the obscurity of an unknown tongue. The eminent writer, who has favoured the public with the history of the empire of Delhi, had also an intention of translating, from the Persian language, that of the Mahommedan sovereignties of the Decan. But other pursuits having prevented the execution of his design, we must content ourselves with the few lights which are thrown on this subject, by its connection with the affairs of the Moguls. The information of travellers, whether they only visited the coasts, or even penetrated the country, gives little satisfaction with regard to such revolutions as happened in former ages. Though worthy of credit in their narrative of transactions which fell within the circle of their personal knowledge, they lose themselves in uncertainty and fable when they recur to ancient times. Where the great line of facts is ascertained by domestic history, we may safely rely on their fidelity relative to

† Dow, vol. ii. passim.  
‡ Colonel Dow.
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

CHAP. II.

Four Mahommedan principalities in the Decan. circumstances; but when we find them without a guide, we are in danger of being led into a region of clouds and darkness.

In the reign of Akbar, the conquests of the Mahommedans in the Decan, were found to have been divided into four principalities, under the posterity of the Moguls, who had revolted from the empire of Delhi, about the middle of the fourteenth century. These were the kingdoms of Chandez, Berar, Golconda, and Bijapour; the latter known in Europe by the name of Vifiapour. Chandez, the capital of which was called Burhanpour, comprehended the extensive countries lying between the mountains near the Nirbidda and the springs of the Ganga. Berar, whose chief town was Ahmednagur, lay between the Ganga and the Soan; and the dominions of the king of Bijapour, who resided in a city of the same name, seem to have extended themselves from the sources of the Crlina, to the southern extremity of the kingdom of Mylore. The territories of the king of Golconda, beginning, on the East and North, on the banks of the Gandevari and Ganga, comprehended the whole coast, from Orissa to Cape Comorin; being separated, on the West, from the kingdom of Bijapour, by the vaff mountains of Gata, which divide the coast of Coromandel from that of Malabar.

The authority, which those princes exercised over the territories, which they affected to comprehend within their respective kingdoms, seems to have been various, both in its kind and degree. Contrary to the usages of other Mahommedans, they permitted honours, governments, and real property to descend, in regular succession, from father to son. Those hereditary chieftains, though they owned themselves subjects, executed all the functions of sovereignty, within their governments. They fortified their places of residence against the tyranny of their prince, as well as against the injustice of neighbours; and they not only made war upon one an-

other, but frequently took up arms against their sovereign. They were bound by their tenures to give an annual tribute to support his dignity; but the regularity of the payments depended on his power to enforce them. The rights of the Mahommedans, in short, differed in nothing from those claimed by the hereditary Rajahs; who, upon agreeing to perform military service, and to pay an annual tribute, were left in the management of their respective dominions. As long as they performed the conditions of their dependence, the prince never interfered with the internal management of their countries; but when they failed in their duty, and he found himself possessed of power sufficient to enforce his authority, either he deprived them entirely of their territories, or made them pay severely for their refractory conduct.

To these disadvantages at home, were added perpetual fears from abroad. The empire of Delhi had never relinquished its pretensions to the sovereignty of the Decan; and nothing had hitherto prevented its enforcing its claims, but the want of power. The martial character of Ackbar had impressed with such terror the mind of Mubarick Shaw, king of Chandez, that in the year 1563 he paid homage at Mendu, the capital of Malava, which the emperor had just reduced into the form of a province*. Though Ackbar always viewed the Decan "with an eye of conquest," an opportunity for hostilities did not offer itself for more than twenty years. In 1585, the brother of Murtiza Nizam, king of Golconda, flying to Agra, prevailed upon the emperor to order the Mogul governor of Malava to invade the Decan; but the princes of that country joining in confederacy against the invaders, the imperialists were obliged to retreat†. In the year 1588, the emperor dispatched ambassadors to the four states of the Decan, lest to gain their favour than to learn their weakness‡; and to derive, from their expected


refusal
refusal of demands, which could not be granted, a pretence for war.

The favourable opportunity so long sought by Akbar, presented itself in the year 1593. A disputed succession had kindled a civil war in the kingdom of Berar, and one party applied for aid to the Mogul. A numerous army laid siege to Ahmednagar, the capital, in 1595; but the views of the emperor were, for this time, frustrated by powerful succours sent to the besieged, by the other princes of the Decan. In the year 1600, Akbar having taken Ahmednagar, the capital of Berar, by his generals, and Afere, in the dominion of Chandez, in person, both kingdoms were reduced into the form of provinces ‡. Ibrahim Adil, king of Bijapour, terrified by the successes and vicinity of the Moguls, solicited peace, paid homage, and subjected himself to an annual tribute to the empire §; upon which Akbar annexed his conquests, in the Decan, to his other royal titles, in a proclamation.

The emperor Akbar dying in 1605, was succeeded in the throne of the Moguls, by his only surviving son Sultan Selim, who assumed, upon his accession, the name of Jehangire. During the first six years of the reign of this prince, the conquests of his father in the Decan remained undisturbed and confirmed in his hands. In 1611, Amar Sinka, chief of the Marattas, distinguished by the title of Rana, setting suddenly on the Imperial troops in the province of Chandez, defeated them ||; and an army sent against him, under Sultan Purvez the emperor’s second son, retreated on account of dissensions among the nobles. Jehangire, alarmed at the progress of the Rana, moved the Imperial standard towards Ajmere, dispatched the famous Mohamet Chan to command the army, and, after him, his third son Sultan Churrum, known better by the name of Shaw Jehan. That prince entered the mountains, defeated the

Rana, in some indecisive skirmishes, took his capital, forced him to throw himself at his feet, and imposed upon him an annual tribute *. Five years after this pacification, Shaw Jehan had the good fortune to intimidate into submission the princes of the Decan, who had confederated against the empire. Some of those princes attended him to the presence of the emperor, and agreed to pay a settled tribute for the future †. In the year 1620, the kings of Golconda and Bijapour refusing to pay the stipulated Peishez, were again reduced to their dependence, by the arms of Shaw Jehan ‡, who forced them to pay the arrears of their tribute, which was settled at the annual sum of fifty-five lacks of rupees §.

Shaw Jehan, encouraged by his successes in the Decan, rebelled against his father; but being defeated by that prince, and afterwards by his elder brother, Sultan Purvez, he retired into the mountains of Ballagat, under the protection of his former enemies, particularly the Rana ||. Driven to extremity by his bad fortune, he solicited and obtained pardon from Jehangire; but he chose to remain in the countries where he had taken refuge, till the death of his father delivered him, from his fears and placed him on the throne. During the latter years of the emperor Jehangire, the princes of the Decan, though impatient of their dependence on the court of Delhi, were restrained from hostilities, by the reputation of those generals, whom the Moguls employed in the conquered kingdoms of Berar and Chandez.

Shaw Jehan, having obtained the throne of Hindostan soon after the death of his father in 1628, became a great prince. His jealousy of Chan Jehan Lodi, one of his principal Omrahs, who was descended from the Patan family, who formerly possessed the empire of Delhi, became the source of a new war in the Decan. Lodi,

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* Dow, vol. iii. p. 41.
† Ibid. p. 50, 51.
‡ Ibid. p. 59, 60.
§ Dow, vol. iii. p. 77.
|| Dow, vol. iii. p. 41.
† Ibid. p. 50, 51.
‡ Ibid. p. 59, 60.
§ Dow, vol. iii. p. 77.

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having taken refuge in Dowlatabad, had the address to unite, in one
confederacy, against the empire, Adil Shaw king of Bijapour, Ni-
 zam Shaw sovereign of Golconda, and Chuttub ul Dien, who styled
himself prince of Hyderabad and Tellingana. Shaw Jehan marched
from Agra on the fourth of February 1631, with 300,000 men;
and having arrived at the capital of the province of Chandez,
he detached armies into the dominions of the confederates. Not-
withstanding the activity and abilities of Lodi, who commanded
the forces of the allies, they found themselves incapable of resisting
the great force of the enemy. Instead of opposing that force in
the field, they shut themselves up in their fortresses. Shaw Jehan laid
waste the country; and a dreadful famine was added to the cala-
mities of war. The vizier Aship Jâh, having ravaged with fire and
sword the kingdom of Bijapour, the sovereign of that country came
into terms, when nothing worthy of defence was left. The kings
of Golconda and Tellingana sued for peace, in the same submi-
sive terms. A peace was granted, upon their paying large sums of mo-
ney, with an annual tribute; the emperor keeping, by way of se-
curity, possession of such forts as had fallen into his hands.

Notwithstanding this pacification, the war was renewed in the
year 1633 by the Imperialists, under the conduct of Mohabet Chan,
governor of Chandez; who, leading an army into Golconda, took
the impregnable city of Dowlatabad, by the treachery of its gover-
nor, the son of Malleck Amber, who had so often signalized him-
self against the Moguls. The old king of Golconda was dead; an
infant had succeeded to the throne, and he was sent in triumph to
Agra, whilst his dominions were reduced into the form of a pro-
vince, and annexed to the empire. The further progress of Mo-
habet, who had resolved to invade the dominions of Tellingana, was

† Ibid. p. 149.
checked
checked by the jealousy of Sultan Suja, the emperor's second son, who had joined the army.

In 1636 Shaw Jehan, having formed a resolution to reduce entirely the Mahommedan sovereignties of the Deccan, marched from Agra, on the first of October; but he did not arrive at Dowlatabad till the latter end of the rainy season of 1637. His forces were so numerous that he divided them into twelve armies, which he sent, under twelve leaders, into the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana. War was, at once, in all parts of the dominions of the two kings. The open country was submitted to fire and sword; the garrisons which resisted were cut off to a man. One hundred and fifteen towns and castles were destroyed in the space of one year. The confederates, driven to extremity, implored for peace, which was granted upon terms suitable to the necessity of their condition. They were re-established by commissions from the emperor, as hereditary governors of their own dominions, upon agreeing to give an enormous annual tribute; the first payment to be made at the signing of the treaty. They were, besides, to acknowledge the emperor and his successors, lords paramount of their countries; and to design themselves, in all their public deeds, the humble slaves of the empire of the Moguls.

To awe the tributaries into an observance of the treaty, Shaw Jehan occupied with garrisons all the places, which he had taken in Tellingana and Bijapour. Several years of tranquillity succeeded a war, which had effectually broken the spirit of the vanquished. The tribute, which they had undertaken to pay, and which they durst not evade, lay heavy upon their finances. They resolved, therefore, to search for resources beyond the limits of their immediate dominions, and to extort from their tributaries those sums which they were obliged to pay to the empire. The most wealthy, and

† Dow, vol. iii. p. 142, et passim.

‡ Ibid.

†† Ibid.
consequently the most powerful, of those tributaries was the Rajah of
the Carnatic; a country then better known by the name of Bigen-
agur. The Rajah had furnished a pretence for war, by refusing or
neglecting to send, as tributary, the stipulated succours, upon the
requisition of the king of Bijapour, when the emperor Shah Jehan
invaded his dominions*.

To explain this subject, it is necessary to recur to a period of
more remote antiquity. When the Mahommedans penetrated into
the Carnatic, under the conduct of Malleck Caffoor, in the year
1310†, Bellaldeo, king of that country, was sovereign of the king-
doms of Canara, Myfore, and Travancore, together with Tanjore,
Marava, and Madura‡. To secure his wealth and family in the
mountains, whilst he opposed the Mahommedans in the plain
country, he built the city of Bigenagur §, about a hundred and
eighty geometrical miles to the south-east from Goa||.

The new city, becoming the capital, communicated its name to
the dominions of Bellaldeo; which, for some centuries, were distin-
guished by the title of the empire of Bigenagur. When the Decan
was lost to the crown of Delhi in 1347, the dependence of the tri-
butary Rajahs passed to the new sovereignties, erected by the Mogul
mercenaries, who had revolted. The intermediate history of the
Carnatic, between the revolt and the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury, is involved in darkness, which has not hitherto been pe-
nerated. In the year 1565, Bigenagur was attacked, by the united
force of the four Mahommedan princes of the Decan¶. Having
defeated the king in battle, they entered and plundered his capital;
and though they did not retain their conquests, the divisions
which followed their victory broke the empire to pieces, and di-
vided the country among many chiefs, who assumed the indepen-

* Thevenet's Travels, part iii, &c.
† Dow, vol. i.
§ Dow, vol. i.
|| Lettres Edifiantes, tom. xxiii.
¶ De Faria, p. 252.
dence of sovereigns *. But notwithstanding this temporary dissolution of the empire, all its provinces seem to have been united under one king in 1597. This prince, whom we only know by the disfigured name of Wentakapati, kept his court at Kande-Gheri †, three miles from the famous Pagoda at Tripeti, and fifty-three to the north-east of Arcot. His ancestors were said to have comprehended within their dominions all the countries from Goa to Cape Comorin; but it appears that, lately, the Naigs of Travancore, Madura, Tanjore, and Gingee, had thrown off the yoke of their sovereign, the king of the Carnatic ‡.

Nothing of importance is recorded concerning the Carnatic from this period forward, till its entire conquest by the Mahommedans, about the middle of the seventeenth century. The kings of Bijapour and Golconda, offended with the Rajah for refusing succours against Shaw Jehan, and desirous to supply the want made by the war in their own treasuries by the wealth of the Carnatic, invaded that country with all their forces. The king of Bijapour, having entered it through the mountains, seized Velore, which was then the capital, and having taken Gingee and several other places of strength, penetrated as far as Porto Novo and the cape of Negapatam. The famous Amir Jumla, who made afterwards so great a figure under the emperor Aurungzebe, led the troops of Golconda, and seized the provinces along the coast of Coromandel. The war began in 1650, and lasted six years, before the Mahommedans reduced the Carnatic and its dependencies, with all their strong fortresses, into the form of a province.

In his expedition into the Carnatic, and the conquest of that country, Amir Jumla acquired much wealth for his master, but more for himself. Cuttub, wishing to possefs a larger portion of

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* Caesar Frederic's Voy. apud Purchas, Letters, p. 7—c—856.
† Vide Lettres Edifiantes, passim.—Jesuit's Collect. p. 774—803.
‡ Epist. de Heb. Japan. et Indic. ab Hayo

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the spoil, had raised the fears of Jumla, who prudently gained the
friendship and claimed the protection of Aurungzebe, who com-
manded for his father Shaw Jehan in the neighbouring countries.
When Jumla withdrew himself from the service of Cuttub, that
prince imprisoned his son, as the best hostage for his father's return.
The influence of Jumla turned the arms of the Moguls against his
old master. Mahommed, the eldest son of Aurungzebe, was en-
trusted with the management of this war; a brave, a haughty, and
an obstinate youth, not to be swayed from his purpose, either by
argument or fear. He entered the dominions of Cuttub, who in-
stantly paid the arrears of his tribute, and released the son of Jumla;
but the wealth of that lord he still retained. Mahommed stormed
Hydrabad. He defeated Cuttub before the old city of Golconda.
Cuttub threw himself in vain at the feet of the victor, till he pro-
duced his daughter Rizia. Her beauty softened the rigour of Ma-
hommed; and a peace was concluded which scarce left any thing
but the title of prince to the unfortunate Cuttub *.

Whilst the sovereign of Telltingana was reduced to this abject con-
dition, a similar fate hovered over the head of the king of Bijapour.
Upon the death of Adil Shaw, his son, without asking the permis-
mision of his lord paramount, mounted his father's throne. This
conduct was highly resented by Shaw Jehan, who considered Bijapour
as an appendage of his empire. Jumla, who had been appoint-
ed vizier, was ordered with an army to depose the son of Adil. Au-
rungzebe, who commanded in the province of Chandez, joined the
vizier with his forces. That prince took the strong city of Bider
by assault, where he found all the wealth of Bijapour. He de-
feated the young king before Kilburga; he besieged and took the
place by assault. The young king threw himself at the feet of the
victor, who permitted him to remain governor of his own domi-

nions, upon paying the expences of the war, together with a settled annual tribute, amounting to 1,875,000L. of our money; and, to secure the allegiance and tribute of Bijapour, Mogul garrisons were placed in all the strong places within the kingdom *. Aurungzebe had settled the affairs of the Decan with such prudence and ability that the southern provinces remained quiet under the government of his second son Mahommed Manzim, during the civil wars, which ended in placing him on the throne of the Moguls.

At this period of the history of the Decan, we are left to wander without a guide, or to the uncertain light furnished by travellers, who had neither leisure, nor, perhaps, abilities to inquire into past revolutions. The peace concluded with Mahommed, the son of Aurungzebe, in 1656, had been so humiliating and unfavourable to the kingdom of Tellingana, that the monarch was strip of authority in his own dominions, and his country exposed to invasion. The ambassador of Aurungzebe, at the court of his tributary, assumed the state, and possessed the power of a sovereign. He commanded, threatened, inflicted punishments, gave passports, without either measure or fear of control. The spirits of Cattub having fallen with the loss of his authority, he abandoned the reins of government, and shut himself up in his palace; being unwilling to expose to public view that wretched figure, a king deprived of all influence and power. This seclusion of the monarch brought distress upon his people. The tyranny of the nobles was without control; the additional imposts, on account of the heavy tribute to the Mogul, the disadvantages of a government which oppressed, without being able to protect, the subject, had rendered the people melancholy and discontented, "breathing after nothing but the just, at least firm and equal government of Aurungzebe †." The kingdom of Bijapour had been reduced to the same wretched state.

† Bernier's Hist. of the Mogul Empire, p. 60.
of dependence in the year 1657, retaining nothing but the name of a state; its strong-holds in the possession of the Moguls; and the country, besides the usual revenue paid to its prince, groaning under a tribute of near two millions sterling, no part of which ever returned.

In 1667, Adil *, the king of Bijapour, made a feeble effort to extricate himself from the yoke of the Moguls, and the unsupportable tribute which he paid. Defeated in the field, and besieged in his capital by Dilère Chan the Imperial general, he was on the point of surrendering, when the jealousy which Shaw Allum, the eldest son of Aurungzebe, entertained against Dilère, saved the unfortunate Adil, for the time, from destruction †. But the peace which succeeded threw him back into his former intolerable condition, under which his kingdom languished, till it was relieved, near twenty years after, by an absolute conquest. Aurungzebe, more to keep his army in action, than on account of any fresh efforts made by the wretched Adil, to render himself free, deprived him, in the year 1686, of the shadow of sovereignty which he had left him near thirty years before. Golconda shared the same fate in 1687. Both kings being brought prisoners to the Imperial camp, their kingdoms were annexed, as provinces, to the empire.

* This was the general name of the whole Mahommedan race, who reigned at Bijapour.
† Dow, vol. iii. p. 385, 386.
C H A P. III.

A Summary of the History of the Carnatic and its Dependencies, from 1686 to 1756.

The conquest of the kingdoms of Bijapour and Golconda, together with their dependencies, invested Aurungzebe with the sovereignty of the whole peninsula, as far as Cape Comorin; so that his empire had no other boundary, but the ocean, towards the south. The petty states and provinces of the Decan were either tributary or subject to one or other of those kings, whom he had subdued; and, by the right of absolute conquest, he became the heir of the allegiance of their dependents and subjects. There were some Rajahs, in the vast mountains, which separate the two coasts, who still governed their own people; yet it is doubtful, whether they owed their security more to the inaccessibleness, than to the poverty of their dominions. The princes, who possessed the plain country, had been greater objects of plunder, and had left the means of defence. Where they happened to be near the seat of the governments established by the conquerors, they were sometimes deprived of all authority in their dominions, which were reduced to the form of provinces. Where they lay at a distance, they were permitted to govern their people, upon paying a settled tribute, performing military service, and owning themselves, in all public deeds, dependents and subjects.

* Harris, vol. ii. p. 65c.
† Ibid. During
During the remaining part of the reign of Aurungzebe, the Deccan enjoyed its proportion of that regular and firm government, which the great talents and authority of that prince had established, in his extensive dominions. He seems to have passed the greatest portion of his time, within the limits or on the frontiers of his new conquests; and, from a jealousy of the ambition of his sons, to have spent his old age in the field. On the 21st of February 1707, he died at Ahmednagur, in the province of Dowlatabad, after he had lived ninety and reigned fifty lunar years. Imitating the Mahomedan kings of Golconda, who, laying claim to the sovereignty of all the Deccan, had assumed the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, or "Regulators of the Country," he dignified his governor-general of the southern provinces with that pompous name; and his youngest son Mahommed Cambucksh appears to have enjoyed it at his death.

The death of Aurungzebe opened a fresh scene of contest for the throne of the Moguls. His eldest son, Mahommed Mauzim, then between seventy and eighty years of age, having defeated Azim Shaw the second son, who was sixty-seven, assumed the imperial dignity, under the title of Bahader Shaw. Soon after the accession of this prince, he marched to the Deccan; and defeating his youngest brother, who had acted as Nizam or governor-general of that country, took him prisoner in Hyderabad, where he died of his wounds.

Upon the death of Bahader Shaw in the year 1712, his eldest son, Jehandar Shaw, having, by the aid of Zulfikar Chan, overcome his brothers, mounted the throne. But, being murdered by the famous Seids, within the year, he was succeeded by his nephew, the son of Azim-ul-Shaw, who assumed the title of Mahommed Ferochesere. In the reign of this prince, Cutulich Chan, better known to Europeans by the title of his office, the Nizam, seems to have obtained the Su-

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bailship of the Decan, upon the death or removal of Daood Chan; and this government, or rather sovereignty, he held for more than thirty years. Ferochfere, after a reign of six years, being confined and murdered by the brothers, who had raised him to the throne, was successively followed by two other unfortunate princes of the race of Aurungzebe $. The first of these had scarcely tasted of royalty, before he fell a sacrifice to the jealousy and ambition of the faction, who had placed him on the throne; and the second may, perhaps, be said to have only escaped the hands of the assassins, by dying a natural death, a few days after his accession †.

Mahommed, the son of Jehan Shaw, grandson of Bahader Shaw, and great-grandson of Aurungzebe, mounted the throne of Delhi, in the year 1718. Having cut off the two Seids, who had raised, dethroned, and murdered so many princes, instead of endeavouring to restore the vigour, which the empire had lost, he resigned himself to indolence and the enervating pleasures of the Haram. An unsettled succession, and the confusions arising from so many revolutions, encouraged the Nabobs of the remote provinces to pay little attention to the mandates of a government, which possessed neither steadiness nor strength to enforce its own commands. The most powerful, the most artful, and, perhaps, the most ambitious of those governors, was the Nizam, who had, for several years, commanded all the provinces of the Decan. Being sensible of the debility of the empire, he maintained a great standing army, under pretence of avenging the Marattas; but his real design seems to have been, to found an independent kingdom for himself, in the southern provinces, after the example of Haffen Caco Bemini, who mounted a throne at Kilburga, in 1347 $.

† Raffilul-Dijat and Raffilul-Dowlat. † Dow’s Decline of the Mogul Empire, p. 4.
1 Dow’s Decline of the Mogul Empire, p. 7.

The
The Nizam, though bent upon royalty, was too prudent to break forth into open rebellion, till time and circumstances should render the power of the declining empire still less formidable. He, therefore, preferred art to force. Having failed in his schemes of becoming sole minister to Mahommed, he invited the famous Nadir Shaw to Hindoostan. The misfortunes, distresses, and calamities, which that fierce invader brought upon an empire already hastening to its decline, are foreign to the purpose of the present disquisition. The artifice of the Nizam succeeded to the utmost extent of his design. When Nadir Shaw evacuated Hindoostan, the management of affairs fell entirely into his hands. He nominated his creatures to the governments of the various provinces. He continued the Vizir, as he was connected with his family by double ties of affinity; and he raised his own son, Ghazi-ul-dien Chan, whom he had left in the government of the Decan, to the office of captain-general of the Imperial armies. Without the name, he possessed the power of king, whilst the indolent Mahommed languished under the faded ensigns of despised royalty.

Whilst the Nizam carried every thing before him at Delhi, some revolutions in the Carnatic, which had partly sprung from his own intrigues, turned his eyes towards his government, on which that province of the empire was immediately dependent. To explain the causes of those revolutions, which formed the foundation of the power and influence of the British nation in Hindoostan, we must recur to facts, further back in point of time, than some of those already related.

The Nizam or Viceroy of the Decan, being accountable to the empire for the whole government of that extensive country, was invested with a power of appointing deputies in the various provinces.

* Dow's Decline, passim.
It appears, however, that Aurungzebe had retained, during his reign, that prerogative in his own hands, with respect to the Carnatic. The first Nabob he appointed was Zulfukar Chan, who afterwards obtained the high office of Baskhi, or paymaster-general of the forces, under the Emperor Bahadur Shaw. Zulfukar was succeeded in the government of the Carnatic by Daood Chan. In the year 1710, Sadatulla Chan obtained the Nabobship, which he held, with reputation, till his death in 1732†. Having no issue male, he adopted the two sons of his brother; Doost Ali, who succeeded him in the Nabobship; and Bakir Ali, whom he had appointed to the government of Velore, which had been the capital, when the province was conquered by the kings of Bijapour and Golconda. When Doost Ali acceded to the government, upon the death of his uncle Sadatulla, his son Sipadar Ali was arrived at man's estate; and, to strengthen the ties of blood by those of affinity, he gave one of his daughters to his nephew, Mortaz Ali, the son of Bakir Ali; and another to Chunder-Saheb, a near but more distant relation.

In the Carnatic, as well as in every province of the Mogul empire, the conquerors had left, in possession of their territories, several Rajahs and petty chiefs, who, upon paying an annual tribute, and owning themselves subjects, were permitted, not only to govern their people, but even to entertain a standing force, to add authority and dignity to their government. The most considerable of those dependent chieftains, were the Rajahs, or rather the Naigs*, of Trichinopoly and Tanjore. The chief of the former dying in the year 1736, a dispute arose about the succession; and, to settle it, the Nabob sent an army, under the conduct of his son Sipadar Ali, and his son-in-law and relation Chunder Saib. The latter, having seized the capital by a stratagem, extinguished the power of the natives; and, having assumed the government in his own per-

† Orme, vol. i. p. 37.  
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

Chap. III.

The Nabob, Dooft Ali, defeated and slain by the Marattas.

1740. May 20th.

The Marattas bribed to retreat.

They return and take Trichinopoly.

Son, but in the name of the Nabob, fortified himself against the power of a master, whose authority he still pretended to own.

Things remained in a state of tranquillity, for three years; but in 1740, new and dangerous enemies appeared upon the frontiers of the Carnatic. These were the Marattas, being privately urged against Dooft Ali by the Nizam, whom the troubles of the empire and an attention to the preservation of the power, which he had acquired in the management of affairs, had detained, for several years, at Delhi. Dooft Ali, endeavouring to oppose the enemy in the palaces of Damal-cherri, was defeated and slain, together with his son Hasslen-Ali. The eldest son of the Nabob, Sipadar Ali, who had not been present in the action, retired to Vellore; and Chunder Saib, who had entertained hopes of the government, shut himself up in Trichinopoly. The enemy ravaged the country, without controul; till they were bribed to retreat by Sipadar Ali, with the promise of one hundred lacks, to be paid at stated times. As a security for the payment of this enormous sum, it was privately stipulated, that they should be put in possession of the fort and territory of Trichinopoly, which Chunder-Saib then held, as a kind of property.

Six months after their retreat, the Marattas returned to the Carnatic, in consequence of the private article in the treaty with Sipadar Ali, which had ceded to them Trichinopoly. Chunder-Saib, having sustained a siege of three months, was obliged to surrender at discretion, on the 26th of March 1741. Sipadar Ali, in dread of the Nizam, the determined enemy of all authority, assumed without his consent, took up his residence at Vellore, then possessed by his cousin Mortaz Ali, as the heir of his father Bakir Ali. The Nabob, by alluring Mortaz Ali, with a part of the ransom due to the Marattas, had imprudently alarmed the avarice and roused the resentment of that profligate man. The consequence was, that on

† Orme, vol. i. p. 58. † Dow's Decline of the Moguls, p. 31.
the 2d of October 1742, the unfortunate Sipadar Ali was affi- 
nated, by the procurement of Mortaz Ali, who proclaimed himelf 
Nabob of the Carnatic. But a general mutiny arising, the murderer 
was obliged to fly, in a female dress; and Mahommed, the son of 
Sipadar Ali, though still an infant, was raised to the government.†

The Nizam, routed, at length, by these revolutions, quitted Delhi, 
and arrived at Hydrabad, the seat of his government. Marching 
from that city, with a powerful army, he entered the Carnatic, 
seized the person of Mahommed, nominated Abdalla Chan, general 
of his forces, Nabob of Arcot, obtained possession of the city of 
Tritchinopoly, by means of a sum of money paid to the Marattas; 
and entirely settled the affairs of the Carnatic, without drawing the 
sword.§ The new Nabob, having left one of his dependents in the 
government, accompanied the Nizam to Golconda. Preparing to 
return in March 1744, he was found dead in his bed. Anwar-ul- 
dien, father to the present Nabob, who succeeded Abdalla in his 
government, has been accused, by some malicious writers, of having 
been accessory to a death, by which he profited. The asperion 
seems to have had its sole foundation in the idle tales of a suspicous 
vulgar. These tales, however, have been since imposed upon the 
world, as matters of fact, by the enemies of the family of Anwar-
ul-dien; who, either swayed by interest, hired by party, or 
warped by passion, revenge themselves of the living, by raking up 
the ashes of the dead.

Anwar-ul-dien was far advanced in years, when he received the 
government of Arcot, from the hands of the Nizam. To advan-
tages, seldom found among those Mahommedans, who make a 
figure in the courts of the East, he added nobility of birth, and 
experience and valour in war. His family, lineally sprung from

§ Dow and Orme, ubi supra.
Omar,
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

CHAP. III.

Omar †, the first Caliph, had signalized themselves in the service of the princes of the Mogul race, before they descended from the mountains of Afganistan into the plains of India. His father, having distinguished himself, by his erudition and piety, acquired the favour and experienced the munificence of the Emperor Aurungzebe †; who gave him a considerable estate, and conferred upon him the office of Duan of the province of Patna. He himself had passed, in the course of a long life, through various important trusts and public employments. He had successively held the governments of Kurra-Jehanabad, Cambay, and Putlad; and he had been Nabob of the provinces of Yalore and Raja-Mundrum, for many years *

The Nizam was so far from suspecting Anwar-ul-dien of having been instrumental in the death of his predecessor, that he committed to his guardianship and care, Mahommmed the young son of Sipadar Ali, the late Nabob. That youth, as the descendant of Sadatulla, was so much beloved in the provinces, which his family had so long governed, that the Nizam had probably designed to appoint him to the Nabobship after the death of Anwar-ul-dien, then in the decline of life. The Nabob arriving in his government, in the month of April 1744, placed Mahommmed in the palace of Arcot, where he was treated with kindness, and maintained with splendor. He had scarce remained two months in that happy situation, when a band of discharged Patans, either by the procurement of Mortaz Ali, who had murdered his father, or rather exasperated by affronts, received from Mahommmed’s attendants, put a period to his life, by assassinating him in the hall of public audience. The Nizam, soon after the death of Mahommmed, invested Anwar-ul-dien with all the legal authorities of government, by sending him a full and regular commission

† Nabob's Account of his Family.  † Orme, vol. i. p. 52.  * Ibid. p. 53.

5
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

for the Nabobship of Arcot †, under the sanction of the Court of Delhi §.

Having explained the general state of the Carnatic, and enumerated its general revolutions, it may not be improper to deduce, from former times, some facts relative to the dependent provinces, situated within its bounds. The country of Trichinopoly with its capital, and Madura, as depending upon it, with its territory, though formerly tributary to the Mahommedans, had not fallen entirely into their hands, till the year 1736, as has been already related. The next, in situation and extent, is the province of Tanjore, which has been, of late, as much the source of altercation among party-writers, as it has been an object of contest between parties. A brief state of the history of that country will throw light on a subject, which, though it has been much discussed, is hitherto little known.

The province of Tanjore forms the figure of a triangle, one side of which stretches itself for seventy miles, along the western shore of the bay of Bengal. The river Coleroon, the name given to the largest branch of the Cavery, delineates the northern boundaries; and its limits are terminated on the south, partly by the sea, beyond Cape Negapatam, and partly by the country of the two Marawars. Near the western angle, within twenty miles of Trichinopoly, is situated the capital, bearing the name of the country; which, like many other places of strength in India, was originally no more than a fortified Pagoda. The river Cavery, rising in the mountains of Malabar, and after a course of four hundred miles, passing near Trichinopoly, is divided by art, and not by nature, into numerous branches, and having watered the country, falls, by many mouths, into the bay of Bengal. This circumstance, which gives fertility to Tanjore, must have always rendered it dependent on its neighbours; as the artificial bank, near Coiladdy, which diverts the Cavery from

† Orm.; vol. i. p. 60.  § Nabob's Papers, p. 115.
its natural course, into other channels, lies beyond the limits of the province.

The province of Tanjore formed anciently a part of the extensive kingdom of Bigenagur, a name imposed upon the Carnatic, in the fourteenth century of our æra *. An inferior officer, by the title of Naig, governed the country. When the power of the kingdom of Bigenagur was entirely broken, and its capital taken, towards the end of the sixteenth century †, by the united force of the Mahommemedan princes of the Deccan, the Naig of Tanjore, together with those of Madura, Trichinopoly, and Gingee, revolted from their ancient lord ‡. But in the year 1597, we find the provinces of Bigenagur united again under one monarch §; so that the revolted Naigs must either have been entirely reduced, or, at least, have become tributary to their former master.

In this state Tanjore seems to have remained, till the entire reduction of the Carnatic, by the Mahommededan kings of Bijapur and Golconda, in the year 1650 ||. Adil Shaw, crossing the mountains with his army, feized Vellore, and then Kande-gheri, the capital, together with the strong fortress of Gingee. Pursuing his conquests, he took all the places of strength, between Gingee and the Coel-room, and, passing that river, feized Tanjore, reducing the whole country, from Porto Novo to Cape Negapatam ¶.

Notwithstanding this conquest, the Naigs seem to have been indulged, as feudatories, with the possession of their former governments; which, by the same tenure, they transmitted to their posterity. When Aurungzebe conquered the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda, in the years 1686 and 1687, the allegiance of their de-

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* Dow, vol. i.
† About the year 1565.
§ Vide J. Justi Epistles, p. 5.
¶ The war continued till 1656. Dow, vol. iii.
pendents, and, among others, that of the Naig of Tanjore, was or ought to have been transferred to the empire of the Moguls.

Some time after the reduction of the kingdom of Bijapur, one Ecko-ji, and other Marattas, servants to the dethroned king, fled, with a few troops, from the persecution of the Moguls, and estab-
lished themselves at Gingee, in the Carnatic. Some differences subsisting, at that time between Wagira, the Naig of Tanjore, and Trimul, Naig of Madura and Trichinopoly, the former applied to Ecko-ji for assistance. But the treacherous Maratta seized the go-
vernment, which he had been called to defend. The unfortunate Wagira was forced to fly and to take refuge in Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore *. This revolution, in the government of Tan-
jore, happened about the year 1696 †.

Ecko-ji, not content with his acquisition of Tanjore, began to extend his territories, and to give assistance to rebels, against the Empire ‡, though he owned himself its subject. His death, which happened about the year 1702, transferred the vengeance, prepar-
ing for him by the Moguls, to his son and successor, Shaw-ji or Sahu-ji. Aurungzebe, resolving to bring the Carnatic to an entire subjection to his government, ordered his youngest son Mahommed Cambucksh, Asfād Chān, who became Vizir in the next reign, and Zulfukar Chān, whom he appointed Nabob of the Carnatic, to march into that province, to appease tumults, to expel the Marattas, and to establish regular government in the country. The Mo-
guls, having taken Gingee, Velore, and all other places of strength to the north of the Coleroon, Zulfukar Chān, with a part of the army, carried the war into Tanjore. Shaw-ji, with his capital, fell

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* Wagira had a son Chimgul Muklās, whose son, the grandson of Wagira, the expelled Naig, is still living in, or near, Seringapatam.
† Authentic MS. Account of Tanjore, taken on the spot, and now in the hands of the Author of this Disquisition.
into the hands of Zulfukar. But a fortunate incident restored him
not only to his liberty, but to his government*.

The death of Aurungzebe, which happened at Ahmednagar, on
the 7th of February 1707, involved the Empire in a civil war.
Two of his sons Mahommed Mauzim, who afterwards assumed the
title of Bahadar Shaw, and Mahommed Azem, disputing for
the succession, took the field with two powerful armies. Zulfukar
Chan, Nabob of the Carnatic, favoured the claim of Mauzim, who
raised him to the office of Buckshi, or paymaster-general of the
forces, when he acquired possession of the throne†. The Nabob,
willimg to join the arms of his patron, resolved to-release Shaw-ji,
and to replace him in his government, upon paying large presents
to himself, as well as considerable sums to the State.

The otsensible conditions, on which Shaw-ji was restored, are
contained in a paper, already in the hands of the Public‡. He
agreed to pay, according to the custom of India, the expenses
of the war, and an annual tribute of thirty lacks of rupees§; twenty
lacks to be paid down at the signing of the agreement, together
with jewels and elephants. He was, at the same time, obliged to
deliver up all the forts and districts, which he had taken from his
neighbours. In consideration of the submission, tribute, and pre-
sents of Shaw-ji, he was, for the first time, dignified with the
title of Rajah; an honour conferred upon him, by the Emperor.
He received, besides, a legal confirmation of the Zemindary of
Tanjore‖, which he had wrested, by treachery, from the former Naig.

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 70.
† Gemeli.
‡ Culnamma, Nabob's Papers, vol. i. Appendix.
§ 375,000 l.
‖ Culnamma, ubi supra.
MS. History of the Revolutions of Tanjore.
In all the countries and provinces of India, it
is a fixed custom, among the great Rajahs, to
put the title of Rajah on their chaps; but nei-
ther Ecko-ji nor the other Maratta Naigs of
Tanjore ever put that title on their chaps. In
the country of Tanjore, and even in the Naig's
own family, from Ecko-ji to Tuljagee, who has
been lately restored, their own people called
them only Deans, or collectors of the revenue.

Though
Though Shaw-ji, the eldest son of Ecko-ji, enjoyed the ensigns of government, he possessed not the whole territories of Tanjore. These were divided between him and his brothers Shurfa-ji and Tucko-ji. Shaw-ji held the capital and its district; Shurfa-ji possessed Madeopatnam; and Tucko-ji, Punda Nellore. Upon the death of Shaw-ji, without issue, his brother Shurfa-ji obtained the title of Naig, and the dominion of Tanjore; but his brother Tucko-ji, by his intrigues, kindled the flames of a civil war. Both the brothers died soon after; Shurfa-ji, without lawful issue; but Tucko-ji left a son, Baba-Saib, who succeeded to the government of Tanjore. Baba-Saib did not long survive his accession to that dignity, and, having left no issue, and the son of his brother Nana, being still an infant, his widow was dignified with the titles of government, whilst Seid, the commander of the fort, possessed the whole power. But she was soon divested of even the appearance of authority, and thrown into prison. Seid raised a real or pretended son of Shurfa-ji, to the office of Naig; but that wretched figure soon fell a sacrifice to the rage or convenience of his maker. Sahu jee, the son of Tucko-ji, was then placed in the government; but either his own incapacity, or the jealousy of Seid, deprived him of his authority. Seid sent for Pretaupa-Sing, natural son of Tucko-ji, who lived in a distressfed condition at Madeopatnam, and placed him in the government, in the year 1741. One of the first acts of authority executed by Pretaupa-Sing, was the assassination of the man to whom he owed his elevation.

The internal troubles, arising from these disputed succeffions, did not prevent the persons, who happened to be in possession of the government, from paying regularly the tribute to the Nabob of Arcot, or from executing their duty, as feudatories of the empire. During the Nabobship of Daood Chan, and the long government of

* Revolutions of Tanjore, MS.

Sadatulla,
Sadatulla, they conducted themselves, in every respect, as dutiful subjects. In the Subahdarry of Dooft-Ali, the Tanjorines exhibited a spirit of refractoriness and disobedience. He, therefore, ordered his son, Sipadar-Ali, to proceed, with a large force, against them. Having first broke down the mound near Coiladdy, which turns the waters of the Cavery, from their natural course, into the province of Tanjore, he marched into that country, seized the capital, imprisoned the Naig, placed the government in the hands of his own preceptor, Meer Asfud, and garrisoned the place with a force, under the command of Sheik Lutfulla. But that officer, terrified by the defeat and death of the Nabob, Dooft-Ali, which happened on the 20th of May 1740, restored Tanjore to its former masters. When the Nizam came to settle the affairs of the Carnatic, in 1743, he sent a detachment of his numerous army, under Abdulla, whom he had made Nabob of Arcot, to take Tanjore; but Pretaupa-Sing bought his peace with a sum of money, upon agreeing to increase his annual tribute to fifty lacks of rupees.

The preceding chain of facts has, it is hoped, rendered more clear a subject hitherto very imperfectly understood. It appears, that the Mahommedans acquired that most indisputable of all rights, the right of conquest, in a regular and solemn war, to the Carnatic and its dependencies. That the province of Tanjore had always been considered a division of the Carnatic, and an appendage or rather a part of its sovereignty. That the Naigs of that country had been originally the subjects of the kings of the Carnatic of the Indian race. That their allegiance had been transferred, by a particular as well as a general conquest, to the kings of Golconda and Bijapur. That the Moguls, as the conquerors of those princes, acquired an undoubted general title to all their claims of dominion, over their dependents. That, in enforcing that title, they had acquired the still

† Fouz's Appendix, No. VI. p. 70.  † 625,000 l.
more incontestible right of particular conquest to the territory of Tanjore. That the present race of Rajahs obtained, by treachery, and not by war, possession of that country, several years after the Moguls had acquired a right of conquest to the Carnatic and its dependencies. That the seizure of Tanjore by Ecko-ji was considered, as it actually was, an invasion of the rights of the Moguls. That the emperor, in asserting those rights, stript the son of Ecko-ji of his government. That his receiving back that government, upon the conditions on which it was received, was establishing a constitution and tenure, rendering him, his posterity and successors, vassals of the empire. That, by breaking the conditions upon which that constitution and that tenure were founded, subsequent Rajahs had been subjected to punishments, to fines and even to deprivation. That they owed the continuance of their authority and government to favourable accidents, and neither to any acquiescence in their rights, or opinion of their power.

It has, upon the whole, appeared, that the Rajahs of Tanjore of the race of Ecko-ji were, in the strictest sense of the word, feudalatories, liable to lose their territories to their sovereign, upon any breach of their duty, as subjects. It has been shewn, that the emperor of the Moguls was their undoubted sovereign, who governed them through the medium of his deputy, the Nabob of the Carnatic. It has been proved, that the emperor possessed various and irrefragable titles to their allegiance. That he had been lord paramount of their territories, before they wrested them, by injustice and treachery, from the hereditary Naig. That he had acquired a fresh right to their duty, as subjects, in a regular war, which terminated in conquest. That they themselves had placed that right beyond the power of cavil, in written testimonies of their " humiliation, submission, penitence, and dejection." That, whilst they acknowledged the condition of subjects, they had performed their duty...
duty as such, without murmuring, for more than thirty years. That, when they deviated from their obedience, they were deprived of their lands, and even subjected to corporal punishment. That they were so far from assuming the state and independence of sovereignty, that they solicited and obtained, from the emperor, the title of Rajah for their family; and that, by this act, they not only acknowledged their dependence on the empire, but likewise, that, neither by birth nor acquisition, they had any right to that dignity.

Such was the real state of Tanjore in the year 1744; though some late writers, blinded by zeal, misled by faction, or swayed by interest, have creted that province into a kingdom, and encircled the brows of its Naig with a crown. The truth is, that there was no acknowledged, no effective, no independent, no sovereign power in the Carnatic, at that time, except the Mogul, who had delegated his authority, in a regular and legal manner, to the Nizam. That viceroy, according to the constitution of the empire, had invested Anwar-ul-dien, in the same regular and legal manner, with the government of the province. All persons of every nation, and of every degree, who held lands or pursued trade in that province, were therefore subject to his authority, according to the tenures, by which they held their possession, or the privileges, by which they carried on their commerce. Being invested with all the authority of the crown, the Nabob had a right to enforce the performance of all the duties which subjects owe to the sovereign power; and, in the execution of that high privilege, he naturally involved the prerogative of making peace and war. Every hostility, committed without his consent, must, therefore, have been an act of rebellion.

The servants of the East-India Company had not yet extended their ambition to the renown attainable by feats of arms. Confined within the circle of a few miles of a sandy beach round Madras, the presidency neither created jealousy, nor commanded respect. Though
they had been indulged with the privilege of fortifying themselves, they had neglected that first of all duties, self-defence. They had works, but such as seemed rather built by chance, than design. They had bastions, but they were placed contrary to all rule; and the curtain was no better than a long, unflanked garden-wall. Ill-provided with implements of war, yet destitute of skill and even courage to use the few they possessed, they naturally trusted their protection to the Moguls, under whose government they had lived so long in security. They, therefore, congratulated, with sincerity, Anwar-ul-dien, on his arrival in his government. They praised his valour, celebrated his wisdom, and hoped every thing from his justice; and they thought themselves favoured by Almighty God, by his sending them so good and just a governor.

The intriguing abilities of M. Dupleix, who governed for the French East-India Company at Pondicherry, had already begun to plan or to foresee the disturbances, which soon after followed, on the coast of Coromandel. The circumscribed circle of commerce was too narrow for his talents, too confined for his ambition. Perceiving the declining state of the empire of the Moguls, he wished and hoped for a share of its spoils. With a self-sufficiency, which is too often blended with good parts, he foreflew no difficulties which he thought he could not surmount. Converfant in the character of the Indians, he had imbibed their spirit for management and intrigue; and, by combining the informations he had received from various quarters, he hoped to obtain a principal influence in the affairs of Hindostan. A desire to gratify his excessive vanity had tainted his mind with avarice; and the vehement demands of his ambition had unfettered his mind, from those ties of sincerity and honour, which bind more moderate men. But the passions, as well as the talents of M. Dupleix, lay hitherto concealed within the walls

* Commodore Barnett's Account.  
† Rous's Appendix, No. I.
of Pondicherry; where he brooded over his mighty schemes of conquest, with scarce three hundred men to defend the place.

War had been declared between Great Britain and France in 1744; but its operations were not extended to India, till the ensuing year. Some actions, which happened at sea, like most encounters on that element, were attended by no decisive consequence; and nothing was attempted by land, between the two nations, till September 1746. On the third of that month *, a body of French troops, under M. de la Bourdonnais, landed near Madras; and, on the tenth, the town surrendered, without killing a man to the enemy, and without losing but five lives, and that by accident, within the walls. The Nabob, who, as disposer of peace and war in his own government, had forbidden hostilities by land, was so much offended at the capture of Madras, that he besieged the place. The French, by a spirited effort, defeating his army at St. Thome, drove them from the field; and, thus, gained the first decisive advantage obtained by Europeans, against the troops of the Mogul empire, in the space of one hundred years †.

The Nabob, irritated at the defeat of his army, resolved to recover the laurels, which his troops had lost. The French, encouraged by their victory, determined to pursue their advantage, by attacking the British settlement of Fort St. David. Two bodies of the Mogul forces took the field, under the Nabob's two sons. These were Mapheus Chan, and Mahommed Ali; the latter defined by the Nizam and the court of Delhi, to succeed his father in the government of the Carnatic. The first, setting upon a body of French, defeated them near Sadas ‡. The latter, with a still more fortunate effort, surprised and routed their army on its march to besiege Fort St. David. Their baggage, with some trophies of war, fell into the hands of the victor; and their whole force retreated, with disgrace and loss,
to Pondicherry *. Another attempt on the settlement of Cuddalore, was disappointed, by the determined adherence of the Nabob to the Company's cause †. To form a diversion for the troops of the Carnatic, the French carried fire and sword, from Madras, into the defenceless villages around. But, in this expedition, they lost honour, and gained nothing but plunder. The Nabob's troops still remained at Fort St. David; and the mind of that prince "was more exasperated than before," against the French cause ‡.

Notwithstanding these obvious, great, and decisive services rendered, by the Nabob, to the Company, his conduct has been much misrepresented by the prejudices of individuals and the malice of party. Some profligate writers, either inflamed by passion themselves, or hired by others to inflame and deceive the public, have not scrupled to affirm, that Anwar-ul-dien was throughout INIMICAL § to the British nation. They say, that "he prohibited the British fleet from acting in the Carnatic:"—He was the governor of that province, and the guardian of its peace. "He permitted the French to take Madras:"—Yet he sent a messenger to M. Dupleix "expressing his great surprize at the presumption of the French in attacking Madras, and threatening to send his army thither, if the siege was not immediately raised ||."—Finding that the town had been unexpectedly and even shamefully surrendered, he resolved to retake it by force; and, being disappointed, he gave that effectual assistance, which, by saving Fort St. David, preserved the very existence of the Company on the coast.—The same writers affirm, that the Nabob declined "to assist the English, in the defence of Fort St. David, till they had stipulated to pay the ex-

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† Ibid. p. 84.
‡ Ibid.
§ This awkward, unanalogical word seems

\[ K \]
pences of his army:”—Yet the authority, which they cite for this
affirmation, says, “the Nabob readily engaged to send his army to
Fort St. David, on condition that the English would furnish a
part of the expense*.”—And why not? was not the war their
own?

The managers of the Company’s affairs at home, having neglecded
to send any assistance whatsoever to their servants abroad †, their
affairs wore a very gloomy aspect, on the coast of Coromandel, in
the beginning of the year 1747. The king’s squadron, which had
performed no service of importance, in the preceding year, had
quitted the coast on the 23d of August 1746; and there was no
appearance of its return. The French, to separate the Nabob from
the British interest, had carried a destructive war into the defence-
less parts of his dominions; while, at the same time, they endeav-
oured, by management, misrepresentation, intimidation, and pres-
fents, to gain his neutrality. The tranquillity of his government
was the great object of Anwar-ul-dien. Though the affairs of the
British Company were not entirely desperate, there was no proba-
bility, without assistance from Europe, of restoring them to their
former prosperity. He, therefore, listened to the proposals of the
French; and, having received near 20,000 l. as an indemnification
for losses sustained, he concluded a treaty of peace, in which it was
“expressly stipulated, that the French should give no further mo-
lestation to the British at Fort St. David ‡.” The French, faithless
to their stipulation, prepared to attack that fort, in the beginning of
March 1747 §; but they retreated, upon the appearance of the
British squadron, which, being reinforced from Europe, had re-
turned from Bengal ||.

* Orme, vol. i. p. 79.
† Ibid. p. 85.
‡ Roux’s Appendix, No. 1. p. 13.
§ Ibid. p. 20.
|| Orme, vol. i. p. 87.
The Nabob, highly incensed at the flagrant breach of a treaty so lately concluded, had already begun to make preparations for chastising the French*. His son Mahommed Ali, the present Nabob of the Carnatic, expressed that attachment, which he has uniformly exhibited, ever since, to the British cause. He affirmed, that it was the delay of the return of the squadron, that induced his father to conclude the treaty of neutrality. He was incensed at the breach of it; and declared, that, “as the French had transgressed his orders, and proceeded against Fort St. David, he would chastise them and send a force to assist the British, if they required it †.” The presidency of Fort St. David were so sensible of the sincerity of Mahommed Ali, so grateful for his offered assistance, that, in the person of their president, they returned thanks, in words expressive of their thorough persuasion of his good intentions to serve the British nation ‡.

During the remaining part of 1747, the war between the two Companies remained suspended on the coast of Coromandel. The squadron, under Commodore Griffin, being superior to that of the French, and the force at Pondicherry too weak to encounter the united power of the Nabob and the Company, both sides remained quiet, expecting succours from Europe. The succours, however, did not arrive; and more than one half of the year 1748 passed in the same state of suspended hostilities. But on the 29th of July §, admiral Boscawen arrived from England, with a reinforcement of land-forces, and with a squadron of ships of war; which, when joined to those already on the coast, formed the greatest marine force, that had ever been seen in the East Indies. The admiral, possessing a decided superiority, immediately began to act offensively, and laid siege to Pondicherry. The negligence of the Company's

† Rous’s App. ubi supr.
‡ Ibid.
§ Universal Hist. vol. x.
agents in gaining the necessary intelligence, the ignorance of the engineers, and, perhaps, of the admiral in military operations by land, with various untoward accidents, defeated the success expected from so great an armament. The siege was raised on the 30th of September *. The British retired to Fort St. David; and the French magnified the disappointment of their enemies, into a victory obtained by themselves †. The treaty of Aix la Chapelle had put an end to hostilities in Europe, in the month of April; and intelligence of that event arrived in India in November, which terminated the war between the two nations.

Admiral Boscawen remained on the coast, for several months, after news of the definitive treaty arrived. In February 1749, Shaw-ji, or Sahu-ji, the lawful son of Tucko-ji, and grandson of Ecko-ji, who had been expelled from the government of Tanjore by his illegitimate brother, the noted Pretaupa-Sing ‡, made application to Boscawen, as general of his Majesty’s forces in India, to restore him to his right. He had also made a similar application to the Company’s president at Fort St. David §. The offer of terms he offered, was the fort and territory of Devi-Cotah, and the expenses of the war, should it be attended with success. An expedition was undertaken, but the first operations were directed against Devi-Cotah; the object of the war being more the possession of that place, than the restoration of Shaw-ji. A first attempt, in May, 1749, failed; another succeeded in the month of June. Pretaupa-Sing, trusting to negotiation more than to the sword, soon detached the Company’s servants from the cause of the wretched Shaw-ji. He ceded to the Company Devi-Cotah, with a territory of the annual value of 9000 pagodas. He promised to reimburse the expenses of the war. The Presidency, to save appearances, had requested a

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* Universal Hist. vol. x.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 106.
‡ Roul’s Appendix, No. V. p. 28.
§ ibid. ubi supra.
pension of about 400l. a year, for "the right and lawful king" of Tanjore *. This they thought a handsome annual allowance for their royal ally †. But they seem afterwards to have lost sight of even this wretched pittance, in the attention to their own interest, and—that of the Company ‡. This was the first sample of the Company's wars in India. They began hostilities under a pretence of doing justice to another; but they put an end to them, when they obtained the object destined for themselves. His dethroned Majesty, however, had a very lucky escape. Pretaupa-Sing had insinuated strongly on his being delivered into his hands §. But when the Presidency hesitated on this point, the honour of Admiral Boscawen interposed; and insinuated on their refusing the modest demand of the reigning King of Tanjore. But neither the honour of Admiral Boscawen, nor any regard for their own, could induce the Board to reject, with spirit, the insolent demands of Pretaupa Sing. On the contrary, they gratified his resentment and pacified his fears, with a breach of public faith, scarce paralleled by any instance in history. It was stipulated by a secret article, that "they should prevent the Pretender," the very person, whom they had

* Rous's Appendix, No. V. p. 28.
† Ibid, p. 31.
‡ Ibid. p. 33. Where Shaw-jij is not mentioned, at all, in the article, agreed upon, between Major Lawrence and Pretaupa-Sing.
§ Extract of Fort St. David Confrontations, 30th June, 1749.

The President having received a letter from Major Lawrence at Devi-Cotah, in answer to the proposals sent him the 28th instant, to make to the ambassadors towards forwarding a peace, which were rejected by them; that they were highly incensed at the article of allowing a maintenance for the support of Sahajee Rajah, and insinuated strongly on his being delivered up to them; but that after a long conference they had offered the following proposals, which Major Lawrence writes the President he be laves to be the least terms they can be brought to:

To pay one lack of rupees on account of the expenses of the expedition.

To give a grant of the fort of Devi-Cotah to the Company for ever, with lands about it to the yearly value of 9000 pagodas.

Upon the receipt of the above letter, he laid the same before General Boscawen and Mr. Prince; and Major Lawrence writes that it is his opinion no better terms could be obtained, and those made being very advantageous to the Honourable Company, it was agreed upon by them to accept the same, and a letter was wrote to that purpose to Major Lawrence last night,

called
called in a solemn treaty "the right and lawful king" of Tanjore, "from giving any further molestation to Pretaupa Sing; to ensure "which, it was necessary to secure his person." The wretched Shaw-ji having found means to escape, from the hands of his faithful allies, they seized his uncle and, by a strange perversion of justice, detained him a prisoner at Fort St. David, for nine years, till he was released by the French, when they took the place, in 1758.

Though courage was none of the virtues possessed by Pretaupa-Sing, the terms he granted were not the effects of his fears from the British arms. A storm, which threatened more serious consequences, than the efforts for the pretended restoration of Shaw-ji, had been advancing, for some time, and had partly fallen already in the neighbourhood of Tanjore. Mahommed, emperor of the Moguls, having languished upon his throne, ever since the villainy of his servants and the violence of Nadir Shaw broke the power of the Empire, had died in the year 1747. His death was soon after followed by that of the Nizam, who had arrived, notwithstanding the anxieties and inquietudes arising from a life of intrigue, iniquity and ambition, to the amazing age of one hundred and four years. The reverence impressed by great age and long continuance of power had effectually established his authority; and, as he had, in a manner, outlived the memory of half his crimes, he was much respected throughout an empire, which his villainy had ruined.

The Nizam left five sons, some of whom inherited his talents, but all his crimes. When he moved the whole machine of government at Delhi, after the departure of Nadir Shaw, he obtained the office of Captain-general of the Imperial troops, for his eldest son, Ghazi-ul-din, who had remained at the capital, disturbing, by intrigue and faction, the government of the prince, whose commission

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he bore. Nazir Jung, the second son, had accompanied his father to the Decan, and had borne a part of the weight of his government. The other three sons passed their time, in their father's court or camp, in that unimportant obscurity, which ever attends princes, who are not employed in public affairs. The absence of the eldest son at Delhi had encouraged Nazir Jung to expect the government of the Decan, after his father's demise; but the inclinations of the Nizam, for he had no constitutional power to dispose of the succession, seem to have leaned to his grandson, Muziffer Jung, the son of Nazir. The latter, possessing himself of the Nizam's treasure, seized, with facility, his government; whilst the former, who had magnified his grandfather's affection into an actual disposal of the Decan by will in his own favour, retired to the countries west of Golconda, where he kept the field with a considerable army.

Chunder-Saib, who had been taken by the Marattas in Trichinopoly, in March 1741, had remained, for six years, prisoner at Sattara. Having, at length, obtained his enlargement, by the promise of a considerable ransom, for the payment of which M. Dupleix had pledged his word, he collected an army, and joined himself to the fortunes of Muziffer Jung. In concert with the councils of the French, the united force of the two adventurers, consisting of forty thousand men, moved towards the confines of the Carnatic, where they were joined by four hundred Europeans, and two thousand disciplined sepoys, at the instance of M. Dupleix. Anwar-ul-dien, Nabob of the Carnatic, receiving intelligence of the invasion, had encamped with twenty thousand men under the fort of Amour, about fifty miles west of Arcot. On the 23rd of July 1749,

† Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 52. Orme says, that Muziffer, to whom he gives the name of Marzafa, was the Nizam's grandson by a daughter. But, on the internal state of India, we choose to follow the authority of Mr. Dow.

‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 125.

§ Ibid. p. 220.

* Ibid. p. 129.
he was attacked in his camp, first by the French, then by the troops of Chunder-Saib; and, after exhibiting proofs of spirit and personal valour, he lost his life and the field to the enemy. His eldest son, Mapheus Chan, was taken prisoner; but his second son, Mahommed Ali, the present Nabob, found means to escape to Trenchinopoly, where the treasure of his father lay §. The victors took possession of Arcot, where Muziffer assumed the title as well as the title of Nizam. Proceeding from thence to Pondicherry, he appointed, at that place, his friend, Chunder-Saib, Nabob of the Carnatic †.

While the French, led by the spirited counsels of M. Dupleix, were establishing their influence in the Carnatic, by accomplishing a revolution in its government, the servants of the English Company were negligent and idle spectators of a scene, which involved their interests, if not their very existence, on the coast of Coromandel. In vain did Mahommed Ali solicit their aid to overturn the fabric which their rivals had erected, and to restore the authority of his family ‡. Either excess of caution or fear had restrained those vigorous resolutions, which their state required ¶. They only sent a hundred and twenty Europeans || to the assistance of Mahommed Ali; and though Admiral Bofcawen, perceiving the dangerous crisis of affairs, had declared, that, upon a proper requisition from the Presidency, he would remain on the coast, they suffered the fleet and troops to return to Europe, on the 21st of October 1749 *.

Chunder Saib, having acquired the title of Nabob of the Carnatic, began to exert the authority annexed to the office. The resources of Muziffer Jung, as well as his own, being exhausted, he resolved to supply the want in their treasure, by the wealth of the

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† Major Lawrence's Narrative, p. 4.
¶ Orme, vol. i. p. 185.
|| "Per force Assured, Caw's defeat, his son, Mahommed Ali, had defined our assistance. It was necessary to put a stop to the progress of the French, whether in justice to assist the beneficent prince against rebels, or as an act of self-defence," &c. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 5.

O. m. ubi supra.

Rajah
Rajah of Tanjore. Pretending an illegality in all acts of government, ever since the murder of Sipadar Ali, in 1742, he made a demand of the arrears of tribute, and marched with his army to support that demand. Pretanpa-Sing, terrified by the invasion, yet unwilling to pay so large a sum, endeavoured to protract affairs by negotiation. He corresponded, in the mean time, with Mahommed Ali at Trichinopoly; and both joined in exhorting Nazir Jung at Golconda, to come in person, after the example of his father, to settle the affairs of the Carnatic. Chunder-Saib, but especially his French auxiliaries, tired by this studied delay, attacked and carried one of the gates of his capital; and, though they were prevented by strong retrenchments, from entering the town, Pretanpa was so thoroughly intimidated, that he agreed to pay 875,000 l. to Chunder-Saib, as Nabob, and 25,000 l. to the French troops, as his auxiliaries *. But a sudden change in the state of affairs saved his money to the Rajah, excepting an inconsiderable sum, which he had immediately paid.

The Emperor Mahommed had been succeeded in the throne of Delhi, by his son Ahmed, a weak, irresolute, and unfortunate prince. Ghazi-ul-dien, the eldest son of the late Nizam, had obtained from Ahmed the government of the Decan. Nazir Jung, hearing of his brother's appointment, had marched with a great army from Aurungabad towards Delhi; not on pretence of war, but to pay his respects to the Emperor. Ahmed, dreading this ceremonious visit, confirmed Nazir Jung in his usurpation by a formal commission †; and that viceroy had just returned to his capital, when intelligence of the progress of Muziffer Jung and Chunder-Saib arrived from the Carnatic. Having left Golconda with an army, which increased on its march to three hundred thousand men, with eight hundred pieces of cannon, and thirteen hundred elephants, he arrived in the province, in the month

of February 1750. Mahommed Ali, as Nabob of the Carnatic †, had been summoned to attend his superior, with his forces; and he accordingly joined him at Waldore, about fifteen miles from Pondicherry, with six thousand horse, together with the few British troops, whom he had in garrison at Trichinopoly.

Major Lawrence, with six hundred Europeans from Fort St. David, joined Nazir Jung, on the 22d of March, just as that viceroy had come in sight of the army under Muziffer and Chunder-Saib. A mutiny arising among the officers, the French troops, with Chunder Saib, retreated to Pondicherry. The army of Muziffer was routed and dispersed. He himself submitted, and, having implored the mercy of Nazir Jung, remained a state prisoner in his camp §.

Nazir Jung, in consequence of his victory, was acknowledged everywhere Viceroy of the Decan, and his acts of government were consequently legal. M. Dupleix, whose schemes were rather retarded, than frustrated, by the apparent ruin of his allies and friends, wrote him a letter of pretended submission; though he had the presumption to insist, that none of the family of Anwar-ul-dien should ever govern the province of Arcot †.

This insolent requisition neither deserved nor received any answer. Nazir Jung, in the mean time, retired to Arcot, where he resigned himself to his favourite pleasures of the Haram and hunting. Without abilities and destitute of application, he suffered his ministers to propose measures, upon which he instantly decided without examination, or any regard either to their justice or iniquity. The absurdity of his conduct offended his friends; and his inattention to all business raised the contempt of his enemies. The number of the latter was great, within his camp and near his person;

† It appears from Rous’s Appendix, that Mahommed Ali had, in his father’s life-time, obtained, from the old Nizam, the reversion of the Nabobship of Arcot. Though this grant might not have been strictly legal, yet it furnished a claim to preference in the eyes of Nazir Jung, who was actually the legal Subah, by a commission from the reigning Mogul.

§ Lawrence’s Narrative, p. 7.

† Ibid. p. 8.
and, having formed a secret design against his life and government, they held a correspondence with M. Dupleix and advised him to proceed to open hostility. The French, accompanied by Chunder-Saib, took the field. Mahommed Ali opposed them, in conjunction with the British troops; but his treasury being exhausted, he could neither furnish those troops with pay, nor provide magazines †. They were, therefore, ordered to quit his standard. The next night, after this defection, the French surprized the Nabob in his camp; and, with little loss to themselves, routing and dispersing his undisciplined army, forced him to fly to Arcot *. Pursuing their victory, they took Gingee by assault; which, at length, roused Nazir Jung from that dream of pleasure, which he had indulged ever since the defeat and imprisonment of his son. Having, therefore, assembled a considerable army, in the end of September 1750, he moved his standards, from Arcot, towards Gingee †.

Nazir Jung's taking the field was the great point, towards which the conspirators had turned their eyes, for accomplishing, with certainty and security, his destruction. Whilst he remained in a settled place of residence, the pomp and numerous attendants surrounding his person rendered any attempt upon his life doubtful in the execution and dangerous to the assassin, should he even succeed in his design. But, in any expedition, the conspirators, from their rank, were certain of commanding one half of his army, and they had it in their power to make the events of war subservient to their views. The most considerable of those, who were engaged in the plot, were the Nabobs of Cuddupa and Canoul, who had attended Nazir Jung, in his expedition to the Carnatic, from their respective governments. Both were Patans by birth, and both led their native troops; a race of men, though fierce and bold, less remarkable for valour against declared enemies, than for treachery to those who hired their service.

The unwieldy army of Nazir Jung, being obstructed, in its march, by the rains, which set in at that season of the year, was forced to remain in a camp, within sixteen miles of Gingee. Whilst he suffered himself to be amused by a negociation, which was carried on with M. Dupleix at Pondicherry, the conspirators had settled their plan of operations, which was to be carried into execution, in concert with the French at Gingee. Things being, at length, prepared, M. de la Touche, who now commanded the troops, marched from Gingee with eight hundred Europeans and three thousand sepoys. With this small force, he surprised, in the night, the camp of Nazir Jung, who expected nothing less than hostilities from a nation, with whom he had just ratified a treaty. The immense rabble, rather than army, which were next the enemy, were soon thrown into confusion. Riding on an elephant, to bring up the Patans, who were in his rear, to action, the Subah questioned harshly the Nabob of Cuddupa; who answered him with his carabine, and shot him with two bullets through the heart. He had scarcely fallen to the ground, when his head was severed from his body, fixed on a spear, and carried to Muziffer Jung; who was instantly released, and declared Nizam, amidst the shouts of the whole army.

Though such revolutions are not uncommon, in the annals of the East, the French, with their usual vanity, magnified an event accomplished, by mere assassination, into one of the most brilliant actions that had ever happened in war. M. Dupleix, whose reputation seemed to require, that the part he had acted, in this disgraceful businesfs, should remain concealed, formed a plan for perpetuating the memory of it to future ages. He proposed to build a city on the spot, under the name of Dupleix-Fattcabad*; thus branding, by excessive vanity, his own name to posterity, by connecting it with a detestable murder. To those, who may chuse to consider this subject

* The city of Victory.
with attention, it will, perhaps, appear that events, which became afterwards destructive in their consequences, proceeded more from British negligence, than French valour. Had the Presidency accepted the offer of Admiral Boscawen, in the preceding year, the influence of the nation, and the interests of the family of Anwar-ul-dien, might have been supported without the aid of Nazir Jung. Had Major Lawrence accompanied that viceroy to Arcot, according to his most earnest desire, he should not have fallen by French perfidy. Had the Presidency not recalled the British troops from the aid of the Nabob, the French could not have obtained the victory at Trivadi; which enabled them to give a Subah to the Decan, and a Nabob to the Carnatic. But it would appear, that Major Lawrence suffered his own gallant spirit to be cramped and confined, by the narrow councils of a commercial Board.

The murder, which raised Muziffer to the Subahship of the Decan, subjected him to the insolence of those, to whom he owed his power. Though assassination was but a light crime in the eyes of the Patan Nabobs, they valued its reward at a high rate. That reward they instantly asked, in terms more suited to create terror than to excite gratitude. Having evaded, without refusing their demands, Muziffer entered Pondicherry, on the 15th of December, whither he was followed, the next day, by the clamourous Nabobs. They explained to M. Dupleix the promises of Muziffer, and their own claims, which were a remission of all past arrears, a total exemption from future tribute, and an augmentation of territory, with one half of the treasure of Nazir Jung. Finding that M. Dupleix was determined to support Muziffer, they suppressed their resentment, for the time, acquiesced, in appearance, to his proposals, and swore allegiance to the new Subah.

* Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, Private Information, p. 175.

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Though the Patan Nabobs complained of Muziffer’s deficiency in gratitude, he seems to have carried that virtue to a degree of extravagance towards M. Dupleix and the French nation. He raised the former to the regency of the whole country, between the Krishna and Cape Comorin; he ceded to the latter considerable territories in the Carnatic, together with the city of Mafulipatnam in Golconda. Chunder-Saib obtained the Nabobship of Arcot, in subordination to M. Dupleix; and others were rewarded in proportion to their merit in the late revolution. As the personal safety of a prince, who owed his power to the intrigues of M. Dupleix, and the arms of the French, was a matter of the last importance, a body of French troops, under M. Buffy, was ordered to attend the new Subah to Golconda. It consisted of three hundred Europeans, and two thousand Sepoys, with ten field-pieces; and, under this escort, Muziffer left Pondicherry, on the fourth of January 1751*.

In the beginning of February, Muziffer Jung, with his unwieldy army, had advanced as far as the province of Cuddupa, the government of his predecessor’s murderer. Some irregularities committed, by a few licentious horsemen, brought, at once, to view, a conspiracy that had been long formed. The Nabobs of Cuddupa, Canoul, and Savanpore, joining their forces, under pretence of repressing the depredations of the horsemen, attacked the rear-guard of the Subah; and, being repulsed, occupied a defile in his front. Driven from thence by the French artillery, they were pursued with too much eagerness by Muziffer Jung; who, coming up with the Nabob of Canoul, was slain by that chief in single combat. The revolted Nabobs were all either killed or wounded mortally in the action, which cost his life to the Suba; and thus, in less than two months after the assassination of Nazir Jung, the four principal conspirators fell by each other’s swords. M. Buffy, to preserve the in-

* Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, Private Information, passim.
fluence of his nation, by creating a new Subah, raised to that dignity Sullabut-Jung, third son of the old Nizam; who, with two of his brothers, was a prisoner in the camp, when Muzaffer was slain.

The same languor which had seized the English Presidency, after the retreat of Lawrence from the army of Nazir Jung, when that Subah marched to Arcot, in the preceding year, still benumbed their councils; if they can be said to have had any councils at all. The retreat of their troops, from Trivadi, though the immediate cause of all succeeding misfortunes, was only a continuation of those narrow and undecisive measures, which had uniformly marked their conduct, ever since the commencement of the disputes, which had involved the Carnatic in all the horrors of a civil war. Major Lawrence, though not remarkable for political abilities, was a man of spirit and a good soldier; but so little impression had the uncertainty of public events made upon the Presidency, that they permitted the officer to return to Europe, in October 1750, on his own private affairs. The assassination of Nazir Jung, the elevation of Muzaffer, the influence acquired by the French, in not only disposing of the provinces, but even the empire of the south, instead of rousing the minds of the Presidency, to a sense of their own danger, depressed their spirits with astonishment and fear.

Chunder-Saib, by the authority of Muzaffer Jung and under the protection of the French, exercised all the functions of government at Arcot, as Nabob of the Carnatic. The fort of Trichinopoly remained only to Mahommed Ali; for Madura, which depended upon it, had been seized by one Allum Chan*, who had declared for Chunder-Saib.

† It is generally believed, by the best informed natives of Hindostan, that M. Buff compared himself to the conspiracy, which deprived Muzaffer of his life and government. That acute Frenchman foresaw the advantages, which were likely to arise to himself, from having it in his power to make a new Subah; and winking, perhaps, at a conspiracy, which he might have defeated.

Unaffected by the English, whose interest was involved in his cause, without treasure, and consequently without an army, oppressed by the defection of his friends, and awed by the apparent superiority of his enemies, the Nabob began to despair of his own affairs. Under an apparent impossibility of recovering the whole province, together with the improbability of being even able to keep what he possessed, he opened, by the advice of the Presidency, a treaty with his rival; offering to relinquish his claim to the Carnatic, upon condition of being permitted to keep the quiet possession of Trichinopoly and its dependencies. In vain had the court of Delhi espoused the cause of Mahommed Ali, by sending him Sunnuds for the government of the Carnatic. Troubles at home had deprived them of the power of quieting disturbances abroad.

Fortunately for the interests of Great Britain, as well as for those of the family of Anwar ul-dien, Chunder Saib, but more especially the French, who had proscribed that family, treated the proposals made by the Nabob, under the sanction of the Presidency, with the highest contempt. This peremptory refusal was the first thing, which roused the servants of the Company to a sense of their own danger. In the end of January 1751, they sent a strong detachment to support the Nabob in Trichinopoly. In the beginning of April, upon intelligence that Chunder-Saib and his allies, the French, intended to besiege Trichinopoly, considerable force took the field under Captain de Gingins. But they were defeated at Volconda; and retreated to Trichinopoly, which was invested by the enemy in the end of July. Instead of attacking the place in form, they contented themselves with a useless cannonade, which they adorned with all the terms of a regular siege.

A successful diversion made, on the side of Arcot, which place was surprized by Captain Clive on the first of September, formed
the most splendid part of a campaign, little distinguished by im-
portant events. Chunder-Saib, having weakened his army by a
detachment sent to retake Arcot, lay inactive in his camp, before
Trichinopoly. The negotiations of the Nabob had raised new allies to
support his cause. The troops of the Rajah of Maffore had marched
from Seringapatnam, the capital, in the end of 1751, upon a pro-
nounce of extravagant terms for their aid. A body of Marattas, a na-
tion accustomed to sell their valour to the highest bidder, had already
penetrated the mountains, in favour of the Nabob; but, with the
usual caution of Indian mercenaries, they remained inactive, till for-
tune should incline the scale; being determined to join the strongest,
and so partake of the advantages of victory, without the dangers
of war.

The Rajah of Myfore, being a minor, his troops were commanded
by his uncle, who arrived, with a considerable force, at Trichinopoly,
in January 1752. The mercenary Marattas, under the command
of Morari-row, an enterprising partizan, at the same time joined
the Nabob. These junctions induced the Rajah of Tanjore to listen
to the requisitions of that Prince and to the solicitations of the presi-
dency, to send two thousand foot, with three thousand horse, under
the command of his General, Mona-jì. Whilst the event remained
doubtful, he was cautious of declaring for either side. He per-
mitted the British and the French troops to march indiscriminately
through his country, to the scene of action. Though he possessed
a natural aversion for Chunder-Saib, he was not a friend to the legal
Nabob. His object, at least his wish, was to see both reduced to a
state of weakness, which might prevent the victor from enforcing the
payment of the tribute, which the troubles of the times had enabled
him to keep in his own hands.

† Lawrence, Orme, India Papers, passim.  † Orme, vol. i. p. 182.

M Major
Major Lawrence arriving from England, at Fort St. David, on the 15th of March, took the command of a party, ready to march to Trichinopoly, on the 17th, which place he reached on the 29th of the same month §. A detail of military operations is foreign to the design of this disquisition. It is sufficient to observe, that Chunder-Saib and his allies, the French, became inferior in conduct, as well as in number, to their enemies. Inclosed in the island of Seringam, which is formed by the divided streams of the Cavery, near Trichinopoly, their army was reduced, at last, to the greatest extremity. Chunder-Saib, without money to pay his troops, found them more dangerous enemies, than those whom he opposed. Deprived of reflection, by his misfortunes, he entered into a negociation for protection with his greatest foe, Mona-ji, the commander of the troops of Tanjore. Vainly hoping, that the gratifying his avarice would suppress his resentment, he advanced the last poor pittance of his treasure to Mona-ji. But, though that chief had promised and even sworn, to permit him to escape, through his part of the camp, the perfidious villain put him in irons, the moment he was in his power ||.

A dispute arose between the allies about the possession of the unfortunate prisoner. The Nabob wished to secure the person of a rival, who had been, and still might be dangerous, to his own power. The Mysoorcan, inveterate against Chunder-Saib, for endeavouring, under the government of Dooff Ali, to enforce the claims of the Carnatic, on the dependence of his country, breathed nothing but revenge. Morari row, who commanded the Marattas, wished to convert the captivity of the wretched prisoner, to his own profit; and Mona-ji, remembering his repeated attacks on Tanjore, hoped to gratify his master, with the possession of his ancient enemy.

§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 21, 22, 23.
|| Ibid. p. 28.

Finding
Finding that the power of the competitors would effectually defeat his designs, he resolved to finish the contest, by putting an end to the life of the prisoner *. To execute his purpose, he employed a Patan, who found the wretched old man, in fetters, stretched on the floor, and rendered unable, by the infirmities of sickness, to rear himself from the ground †. Having stabbed him to the heart, the assassin carried his head to Mona-ji ‡, who afterwards sent it, according to the custom of the East, to the Nabob.

The death of Chunder-Saib, instead of putting an end to the troubles, which his ambition had raised, sowed the seeds of a new war. The Nabob, when deserted, or rather feebly assisted by the servants of the Company, in the year 1751, had obtained the aid of the Myforeans, upon terms so extraordinary, that both parties had an interest in keeping them concealed. These were no less than thecession of Trichinopoly, with all its dependencies, to the Rajah of Myfore, for the assistance of that prince, in putting Mahommed Ali in possession of the Carnatic. When Chunder-Saib was removed and his army dispersed, the Myorean insisted, that his part of the agreement was fully accomplished. But the Nabob insisted, with more reason, that the wages ought not to be paid, till the service was effectually performed. Much yet remained to be done. The French and the adherents of Chunder-Saib were still in possession of several places of strength §; and many chiefs, taking advantage of the public confusions, maintained several large divisions of the Carnatic, in defiance of both the rivals for its government. He argued, that it was neither agreed, nor in itself reasonable, that Trichinopoly,

‡ Thus did Chunder-Saib pay the just price of his ambition and presumption. In private life he is said to have been a man of great benevolence, humanity, and generosity. With regard to his public character, in this country, ambition being a venial fault, every man who succeeds is a great man; if he fails, he is only reckoned unfortunate. Lawrence's Nar. p. 32.
§ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 52.
poly should be the price of its own relief; for that should he be deprived of that place, without being put in possession of any other dominion, it was indifferent to him, whether it fell to his enemies or to his pretended friends †.

These reasonings had so little effect on the Myeforean, that though he did not break forth into open hostility, he declined to appear as the Nabob's ally in the field. He still continued in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, with the Marattas, whom he had gained over to his views; and, taking possession of the pagoda of Seringam, was himself safe against insult, whilst he watched every opportunity to seize the city, which, he affirmed, was his right, as the reward of the aid he had already bestowed. The remaining part of the year 1752 was distinguished, by various events. The British were repulsed in an attempt on the fortress of Gingee. They defeated the French at Bahoor ‡. M. Dupleix, forging Sunnuds from Delhi, invested himself with the governments of all the countries to the south of the Crìftna. In his quality of pretended Subah, he first raised and then displaced the son of Chunder-Saib, as Nabob of the Carnatic. He conferred that title on Mortaz-Ali, hereditary governor of Vellore; but it was to obtain money from that wealthy chief. Having inflamed the discontent of the Myeforean, by his artifices and promises, he had the address, before the end of the year, to turn, against Mahommed Ali, those very arms, which had come to his aid the preceding year*. But the intrigues of M. Dupleix only suspended, but could not alter the fate of the

† Lawrence, p. 20. Orme, vol. i.—Private Information, India Papers, paliim.
‡ Orme, vol. i. p. 256, 257. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 36.
* M. Dupleix, paliim.

In October 1752, Ghazi ul-din, the eldest son of the old Nizam, marched from Delhi, with an army of 150,000 men, to take possession, by a royal Sunnud, of the Subahship of the Decan. When he had advanced to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, his brother Sul-habat Jung, the reigning Subah, prevailed with one of Ghazi ul-din's wives to take him off, by poison, which put an end to the contest. Dow's Decline, p. 52.
The very war, which he had first fomented and had continued so long, deprived him of resources for carrying it on, either with vigour or with success. The chiefs, attached to the family of Sadatulla had contributed to the expense, as long as Chunder-Saib lived. But they had withdrawn their supplies, on account of the weakness of his son. Mortaz-Ali, whom M. Dupleix raised to the titular office of Nabob, could neither be trusted nor supported by the friendship of his family; and the only appearance of virtue he possessed, was a diffidence of himself. The Marattas, whom M. Dupleix had gained to his aid, were scarcely less dangerous, as friends, than they had been, as enemies. His acquisition of the Myforeans, though it gave trouble to his opponents, brought no benefit to himself. Their commander was weak, credulous, and undecided; mistaking perpetually his own interest, and, instead of giving aid, standing always in need of support. His obstinacy, however, supplied, in some degree, the place of firmness. Determined to obtain an object, which would ruin him in the possession, he remained three years, in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly; and nothing but a serious invasion at home, could recall him, at last, from his wild schemes abroad. Having remained, in a manner besieged, in the island of Seringam, till the 14th of April 1755, he suddenly decamped, after having lost his time, his treasure and many troops, in pursuit of a chimerical advantage.

Weak, however, as the conduct of the Myforean was, and wild and impracticable, as the ambitious schemes of Dupleix had been, they created much trouble to the English and much anxiety and loss to their ally, the Nabob of the Carnatic. During the doubtful events of war, their pretended friends proved faithless to the former; and his vassals to the latter. The Rajah of Tanjore, in particular, whose money and whose power ought to have turned the scale, in favour of the Nabob, amused him with insidious promises of aid *, at a time, he

* Lawrence's Narrative, p. 41.
actually corresponded and treated with his enemies. Whilft the Marattas aided the French with cavalry, the want of horse was the principal obstacle to the progress of the Nabob's affairs. The Rajah could supply cavalry; but his aid was required and solicited in vain. In February 1753, at the earnest request of the Presidency, he ordered his horse to march; but he recalled them, before a junction could be made. This heavy disappointment obliged Major Lawrence to remain inactive in his camp, "contemplating the situation of the enemy, and fretting at his incapacity to attack them" — "whilst (says the Major) the enemy were so superior to us in cavalry, that we were often obliged to march our whole body, to escort stores and provisions from Fort St. David to our camp; always harassed more or less by the Marattas." 

In April 1753, the garrison of Trichinopoly was driven to the last extremity for want of provisions. Major Lawrence, accompanied by the Nabob, resolved to march to its relief. To encourage and, if necessary, to awe the Rajah, he directed his route, through the neighbourhood of the capital of Tanjore. Pretaupa Sing met the Nabob and the commander of the troops, with great ceremony and splendour, accompanied by three thousand horse and two hundred elephants, in rich trappings. He seemed, in appearance, to be convinced, that it was his own interest, as it certainly was his duty, to support the Nabob. He accordingly gave orders to his horse to accompany him to Trichinopoly. But faithless was the Rajah to his professions, or his troops to his commands, that they left both the Nabob and Major Lawrence, the very next day. They remonstrated; they pressed; they entreated their junction; but in vain. The cavalry retreated to Tanjore, promising, however, to

\[\text{\footnotesize CHAP. III.}\]

He promises allegiance, then recalls it.

His conduct obstructs the progress of the war.

He again deceives the English and the Nabob.

Infamies of his decep-

tions.

May 5th.

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\small OF HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF}}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\small return}}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Orme, vol. i. p. 231. Lawrence, passim.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Orme, vol. i. Lawrence says, 'They came on some part of the way, but think-

\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize ing us in a bad condition, they amused us only with promises; and obliged our party to return to the army without them.' P. 41.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Orme, vol. i.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Narrative, p. 41.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Orme, vol. i. p. 231.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Lawrence's Narrative, p. 44.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize \footnotesize Ibid.} \]
return soon §. The Major, justly suspecting, that the Rajah wanted only to amuse the Nabob and his allies ||, proceeded to Trichinopoly, with troops dispirited by disappointment, and decreased, in their numbers, by fatigue and sickness ⁴.

A conduct so faithless to his superior and so adverse to the English cause, rendered the Rajah justly suspected, of a correspondence or even a treaty with the enemy. The truth is, that, at the very time Pretaupa Sing paid his respects to the Nabob and the English commander in chief, he entertained an agent from the My foreans, at Tanjore. That agent, having bribed the minister with money, and wrought upon the fears of the Rajah, gained both to the interests of his master ⁴. But to provide against a reverse of fortune, the latter palliated his refusal of assistance to the Nabob and English, with specious pretexts of losses sustained, from the My foreans and their allies the Marattas. He alleged, that the detachments of the latter had already destroyed to the value of 100,000 l. in his country. But "this pretended mischief was no more than what all other parts "of the country had suffered from the Marattas, who, in their pre- "datory excursions, made no distinction between the territories of "friends and foes ⁴." The consequence of this duplicity of the Rajah was, that all supplies of provi sions from Tanjore were stopt. Instead of being able to form magazines, the army near Trichinopoly and the garrison within that place found great difficulty in procuring grain, for immediate consumption. In this distressful situation Major Lawrence was obliged to remain inactive, for five weeks; whilst the French daily expected reinforcements from the coast ⁴.

An undecisive action, the increasing number of the enemy, the want of provisions, and, above all, the want of cavalry, convinced

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|| Lawrence's Narrative, p. 44.
⁴ Ibid.

C. I. A. P. III.

| Subjected by Major Lawrence.
|
| He privately corresponds with the enemy.
|
| He entertains their agent at his capital.
|
| Attempts to amuse the English and the Nabob.
|
| By pretended losses sustained from the enemy.
|
| He hopes provisions from going to the English army.
|
| D. Concentrates their operations.

June 26, 1755.*
Major Lawrence, that a reinforcement of troops was necessary to turn the scale of the war. The Rajah of Tanjore, defirute of every sense of duty and deaf to intreaty, was to be fwayed by nothing, but personal fear. The Major, accompanied by the Nabob, resolved to move towards Tanjore; and by mixing threats with persuasion, to endeavour to induce him to fend the affistance, he had so often promised in vain. On the 2d of July 1753, the troops encamped, about half-way between Trichinopoly and Tanjore. The approach of an army soon determined Pretaupa Sing to fend the affistance, they were coming to demand. The instances of Mr. Palk, who had been, previously, sent to Tanjore, began to have effect, when there was danger, in refusing his request. The Rajah ordered three thousand horse and two thousand sepoys, under the command of Mona-ji, to join the army; which, when the object of the expedition was, thus, obtained, returned to Trichinopoly.

But this extorted aid was almost immediately recalled, by the verfatility of Pretaupa Sing; for the Tanjorines returned home as soon as the setting in of the Monfoon obliged the Nabob and Major Lawrence to canton their troops. A sum of money, sent by the Myso-reans, and threatened by Dupleix, he is on the point of signing a treaty with them.

He again recals his troops.

Being bribed by the Myso-reans, and threatened by Dupleix, he is on the point of signing a treaty with them.

But this extorted aid was almost immediately recalled, by the verfatility of Pretaupa Sing; for the Tanjorines returned home as soon as the setting in of the Monfoon obliged the Nabob and Major Lawrence to canton their troops. A sum of money, sent by the Myso-reans to Succo-ji, the Rajah’s favourite, a threatening letter from M. Dupleix to the Rajah himself, together with a rooted averfion to the caufe of the Nabob, and a distrust of his allies, the English, determined the faithlefs Tanjorine to break all his engagements.

He was even upon the point of signing a treaty with the French and their allies and of taking an active part in the war; when an unsuccessful attempt on Trichinopoly, in the end of November 1753, terrified him from his intended French alliance.

† Lawrence’s Narrative, p. 48.
§ Ibid.
|| Orme, vol. i. p. 296.
¶ Lawrence’s Narrative, p. 48.
† Ibid. p. 54.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 375.

“ The
"The French finding that their misfortune produced a change in his intentions," and that he began to "repent, that he had shewn so much inclination to abandon the Nabob and the English," resolved to waste no more time in negociation, but prepared to send a party of Marattas to ravage his country §. Pretaupa Sing, having intelligence of their design, ordered a body of troops against the Marattas; but pretended that the object of assembling those troops was to join the English †. He was soon deprived of this assumed merit; for the Tanjorines refused, upon the requisition of Major Lawrence, to join the army ‡.

The Marattas, having penetrated into the province of Tanjore, had, from their ignorance of the country, entangled themselves between two impassable branches of the river Coleroon. Pent up in that disadvantageous situation, by a superior number of Tanjorines, under the command of Mona-jî, eight hundred of them were killed, and the rest taken prisoners and impaled alive *.

The Nabob and his allies had formed hopes, that this success would induce the Rajah to send his troops to join them; but they were again disappointed. Attached to the enemies of the Nabob, nothing but a turn of the scale of fortune in favour of that prince, could induce Pretaupa Sing even to pretend that he was his friend. When any misfortune happened, he flew off to the interests of the enemy. Upon the defeat of the English convoy at Kelly-Cotah in the month of February, he prevented his merchants from supplying Trichinopoly with more provisions ||. When, on account of the necessity of "recovering the Rajah to the Nabob's interest," Mr. Palk was sent to Tanjore, in April 1754, he found him of difficult access †. His minister was devoted to the interests of the French and Myso-
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

reans. The Rajah himself was wavering and irresolute; one hour seemingly convinced by Mr. Palk's arguments, the next listening to his minister, and approving his advice: upon the whole determining nothing. But, though Mr. Palk prevented him from signing the treaty with the Mysores, he could not induce him to send his troops to join the English.

Though the French, under M. Maissin, had wantonly attacked the Rajah's country; though they had broken down the mound at Coiladdy, which diverted the streams of the Cavery into the province; though their allies the Marattas had cut to pieces twelve hundred of his horse, under his uncle Gauderow, though Major Lawrence, to work upon his fears, had marched to Tanjore; Mr. Palk and Captain Caillaud found some difficulty in persuading him of his imprudence, in withdrawing his assistance from the English and his superior, the Nabob. Terrified by the army, under Major Lawrence, and frightened by his own misfortunes, Pretaupa Sing ordered new troops to be raised; and a considerable body, under Mona-jî, joined the English at Atchempettah on the 27th of July 1754. To save his country from the depredations of the Marattas, who had lately cut off so large a body of his horse, he agreed, on the requisition of the Nabob, to furnish the money demanded by those marauders, for evacuating the Carnatic.

Some late writers, who call fiction to the support of their party, where truth fails, have, from one of the authorities so often quoted, framed a tale very different, from the facts we have stated above. Contempt is too slight a punishment, for men, who wilfully deceive. Had the intelligent historian, on whom they rested their falsehoods, written ambiguously on the character and conduct of

1 Lawrence's Narrative, p. 64.
3 Poos's Appendix, No. VI. p. 64.
4 Vide Orme and Lawrence, p. 348. The sum was three lac of rupees; little more than 30,000 l. and it is even doubtful, whether the money was ever paid, Morari now having quit the Carnatic in July 1754.
5 Mr. Orme.
Pretaupa Sing, the world might be induced to ascribe their errors to zeal, and their misrepresentations to prejudice. But what judgment are we to form of their candour, what opinion of their morality, when we find that the very pages, which they cite, present irrefragable proofs of their perversion of truth? Common prudence ought to have supplied a want of principle, in this respect; for the aversion of the Public to an investigation of Indian transactions, is too slight a security against detection. But they wrote for the purpose of the day; and they hoped, that, on a fugitive subject, bold assertions might have a chance of passing for facts. Fortunately for the memory of the late General Lawrence, they seem to have known nothing of his narrative of his own campaigns; otherwise that gallant officer might have been raised from the dead to support falsehoods, which his honest heart abhorred, when alive.

A change, which happened, in the government of Pondicherry, on the 2d of August 1754, put an end, in its consequences, to the Mysoor war, which had been so long carried on, in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly; and the Carnatic was restored to a kind of temporary tranquillity. The British ministry, upon the complaints of the East-India Company, had made remonstrances to the court of France, against the troubles raised and continued, by the French nation, on the coast of Coromandel. To give weight to those remonstrances, a squadron of men of war, with some troops, were ordered to the East-Indies; and the French court, unprepared for a general war, resolved to exhibit a mark of their pacific intentions, by removing M. Dupleix from the government of Pondicherry. His successor, M. Godeheu, arriving at that place, on the 2d of August 1754, opened his administration, by communicating to the English Prefidency, his earnest desire, for an immediate termination of hostilities between the two Companies. A suspension of arms took place, on the 11th of October, and a provisional treaty was concluded, on the 26th of December 1754.
The Mysorean, supported only by his own obstinacy, continued a kind of war, in the environs of Trichinopoly, for the first three months of the year 1755. An invasion by Sullabut Jung, the Subah of the Decan, who had marched with an army to enforce the payment of the tribute due by Mysore, to the empire of the Moguls, recalled him, in the month of April, to defend his own country. Disappointed, in all his views, from his long expedition, he left the French the heirs of his claims on the Carnatic*. In the month of July, Mahommed Ali was requested, by the English Presidency, to take up his residence at Arcot, being now *de facto* what he had been long *de jure*, Nabob of the Carnatic. Several Polygars, possessors of forts, and refractory renters of districts, were either reduced by force, or intimidated into a submission, by the joint arms of the English and the Nabob. Though some disturbances still continued, in the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, they submitted in general to the government of Mahommed Ali; who found himself acknowledged, before the end of 1755, from the river Pennar to Tinnevelly.

*Orie, vol. i. p. 389.*
CHAP. IV.

Transactions on the Coast, from 1756, to the Conclusion of the Treaty, between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, in 1762.

When the English and French were contending, about the establishment of a governor, over one of the Mogul provinces, the Mogul empire was hastening to that termination of existence, to which human institutions, like man himself, seem to be destined by fate. The weak Ahmed Shaw, having sat near seven years upon the throne of Delhi, without either exertion or authority, was deposed and deprived of sight, in the latter end of the year 1754*. He himself was the author of his misfortunes; but the actor, in the melancholy scene, was Shab-ul-dien, son of Ghazi-ul-dien and grandson of the old Nizam. That lord, though still a youth, possessed all the abilities, courage and villainy of his family. Having imprisoned his master, he raised Alumgire II. the son of Moaz-ul-dien and grandson of Bahader Shaw, the son and successor of Aurungzebe, to the vacant throne. But this unfortunate prince, being as weak as his predecessor, was but little calculated to restore the empire to its former splendour†.

All the provinces, except those which lay between Delhi and Lahore, had been in fact dismembered from the empire, though they paid a nominal allegiance. The Decan had been usurped, by

* Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 55.  † Dow's Decline of the Empire, p. 59.
Lawrence's Narrative, p. 58.
the family of the very person, to whom Alumgire owed his throne. Guzerat was entirely lost; the three provinces of Bengal had submitted to the government of a mean Tartar adventurer and his successors; Malava was divided among petty Rajahs; and Ajmere owned the authority of an independent prince. Most of the provinces, which had been formerly subject to the empire, were involved in all the horrors of a civil war. "Villainy was practised in every form; all law and religion were trodden under foot; the bands of private friendships and connexions, as well as of society and government, were broken; and every individual, as if in a forest full of wild beasts, found no safety, but in the strength of his own arm." 

Affairs of the Sullabut Jung, whom the French had raised to the office of Subah of the Decan, upon the death of his nephew, Muzaffer Jung, in the month of February 1751, still possessed the dignity of Nizam, in opposition to the court of Delhi. Supported by the arms of those, to whom he owed his power, he held a considerable degree of authority in the provinces, which lay nearest to his capital. The Marattas, who had been formidable, for many years, to the whole empire, had torn several large districts, from the dominion of Sullabut Jung; and his friends the French had obtained, from his favour, or rather extorted from his fears, the four maritime provinces of Muslaphanagur, Valore, Rajamundrum and Chicacole. These acquisitions, together with the province of Condavir, put the French in possession of "the sea-coast of Coromandel and Orissa, in an uninterrupted line of six hundred miles, from the Gondegama to the famous Pagoda of Jagganat." This extensive territory, yielding annually more than half a million sterling, was the greatest dominion, hitherto, possessed by Europeans in Hindostan. In return for cessions so valuable, the French lent their arms to the Subah, to re-

* Dow's Decline of the Empire. † Crome, vol. i. p. 329. ‡ Ibid. p. 334. 335.
cover the tribute due to the empire, from the rich and extensive province of Myfore. It was his march into that country, which delivered the Carnatic, in April 1755, from the troublesome, though ineffectual, war carried on at Trichinopoly by the Myforean regent.

The conditional treaty concluded in 1754 had introduced a suspension of hostilities between the English and French, not only as enemies to one another, but as allies to the country-powers. Mahommed Ali, now acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic, was still far from professing that decisive authority over the country, which the nature of his office implied. The Zemindars of the province of Madura, and the Polygars of Tinnevelly raised disturbances in the south; and though the Polygars of the north had made some compensation, for the tribute, which they had retained during the late civil war, their submission had only the appearance of being temporary, as they were not deprived of the means of supporting future disobedience. Mortaz-Ali, the Phoulidar of Velore, was not only a powerful, and, therefore, a dangerous dependent; but had even been, and still might be, the rival of the Nabob, as governor of the country, should the present state of the English influence suffer any change. When a force had marched from Arcot, to demand the customary tribute, the interference of the French, in favour of Mortaz-Ali, had convinced the Nabob, that they only waited for a future opportunity to renew their former exertions against his title and power.

To add to his embarrassment, the Rajah of Tanjore, whom he had a right to consider as a vassal of the empire, accountable for his conduct to him, as Nabob of Arcot, had not only shewn an attachment to his enemies in the late war, but had, now, without his authority, kindled a war of his own. This war was carried on, against Tondiman, a Polygar, whose allegiance had been transferred to
to the Moguls, as a dependent on Trichinopoly, when that city and province came under their power. His territories lay between Tanjore and Madura, bordering, in part, to the north, on the province of Trichinopoly, to the Naig of which the Polygar had been subject, from the earliest account we have received of the affairs of the Carnatic *. Faithful to his duty, as a vaalâl, he not only sent a body of four hundred horse and three thousand Colleries to the aid of the Nabob, when besieged in Trichinopoly in 1752; but had, during the war, supplied the army with provisions †; when, at the very time, the Rajah of Tanjore prevented his merchants from carrying any to the camp or city. Against this useful and faithful vaalâl, Pretaupa-Sing proceeded to hostilities. The pretence of war marks the character and injustice of the Rajah. Having ceded Kelliy-nelly-cotah and its districts to Tondeman, for services performed, in a season of distress, he disavowed the cession, when that distress was removed. Mona-jî, who was, at the time, general and minister of Tanjore, enraged at his master’s perfidy, “purloined the use of the seal, and delivered the patents, thus apparently authenticated, according to promise.” Captain Calliaud, who commanded at Trichinopoly, by working on Pretaupa Sing’s natural timidity, suspended hostilities, but could not induce the Rajah to lay aside the design of war ‡.

In May 1756, war was declared between Great Britain and France. But the two Companies, on the coast of Coromandel, had so much weakened their respective forces, by detachments, to other parts of India, that both seemed averse to commit hostilities, for some time after the advices of a breach, between the two nations,

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* Rous’s Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 941.
† Orme, vol. i. p. 172, 237, 293, 294, 343, 344, 351. This Polygar, Tondeman, still remained a friend to the Nabob. He sometimes sent his troops, and all our provisions came from his country. Lawrence, p. 45. Vide Cambridge’s Transactions on the Coast, p. 78.
arrived. Though they took the field, at last, nothing remarkable happened during the year 1757. The disturbances of the Carnatic still continued. Two of the Nabob's brothers, aiming at independence, took arms in the two extremities of his government. Ma-phius Chan, employed in the reduction of the Polygars, in the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, having obtained a complete victory, held the city of Madura, in opposition to the Nabob and his allies; whilst Nazeabulla, his natural brother, became refractory in his government of Nellore. To add to the public calamities arising from this double rebellion, the Marattas invaded the Carnatic to demand the Chout, which had not been paid ever since the defeat and death of Anwar-ul-dien in 1749. But their retreat was purchased with the trifling sum of three lacks of rupees.

Though Captain Calliaud had, by his spirited conduct, suspended the war between Pretaupe-Sing and Tondiman in 1756, the Rajah had resumed his hostile intentions in the beginning of 1757. Kellynelly-cotah, the object of contest, was taken by Mona-ji, the general of Tanjore, in the month of January. But though Calliaud made a journey to Tanjore, as well to re-establish peace, as to obtain troops, from both the contending parties, to assist in the reduction of Madura, he failed, in all his efforts, and found the difference between them irreconcilable. Both promised fair; but Tondiman only adhered to his word. A thousand of his horse and one hundred Colleries joined Calliaud at Anwafshul. Five hundred horse were expected from Tanjore; but none came. Calliaud "being convinced that the Rajah, notwithstanding his promises, did not intend to send any, made a merit of rejecting what he was not likely to obtain." Yet a late writer dogmatically affirms, from the historian just cited.

† 37,500 l.

|| Ibid.

O that
that Pretaupe-Sing "had attached his self to the cause of the English, had supported their ally, had fought his and their battles."

On the 28th of April 1758, a considerable reinforcement of troops arrived at Pondicherry, under the command of the Count de Lally. The known superiority of the French on the coast, prior to the coming of this force, had determined the English Presidency to suspend all operations in the field, and to distribute the troops in the different garrisons. On the very evening of Lally's landing at Pondicherry, he ordered one thousand men, under Count d'Estaign, to march towards Fort St. David; but it was the 26th of May before he opened his batteries against the place. On the first of June the fort surrendered, after a feeble resistance; and Devi-Cotah was evacuated before the enemy marched that way.

Nothing less than the total expulsion of the British from the coast of Coromandel, if not from all India, was the object of the French; who were, now, possessed of a greater force of Europeans, than was ever before, at one period, in that country. Madras was the next object, after the taking of Fort St. David. But the superiority of the British squadron rendered it difficult, if not impracticable, to transport, by sea, the necessary stores from Pondicherry for besieging the place; and Lally had neither money nor influence in the country, to enable him to carry them by land.

The wealth of the Rajah of Tanjore had rendered him a fit object of plunder; and, besides, the French government at Pondicherry were possessed of such a claim as might give a colour of justice to demands upon that wealth. When, in the year 1751, Muzziffer-Jung, as Subah of the Decan, and Chunder-Saib, in quality of Nabob of Arcot, had reduced Pretaupe-Sing to extremity, he compounded the arrears of tribute, from the death of Sipadar Ali in 1742, at 5,600,000 rupees. Unable, or rather unwilling, to pay this

\* Defence of Lord Pigot, p. 42.  \* Cambridge, p. 123.  \* 632,500l.
fum, he had given his bond to Chunder-Saib; and Chunder-Saib had transferred his property, in that deed, to the French government. To add political importance to this kind of private claim, the Count de Lally, in imitation of the English in 1749, espoused the cause of a pretender to the government of Tanjore. The wretched figure, whom he resolved to raise, on this occasion, to favour his views, was one Gatica, the uncle of Shaw-ji, whose pretensions the English Presidency had asserted, where they suffered themselves to be purchased from his cause by the cession of Devi-Cotah. His honourable allies had agreed to detain Shaw-ji, in prison, when they settled matters with his rival; but the unfortunate man found means to escape from their hands. In revenge for his flight, or to secure his inactivity, they threw Gatica into the fetters from which his nephew had extricated himself. With Fort St. David, he fell into the hands of Lally, who produced him at Pondicherry, "with much ostentation and ceremony," to raise the apprehensions, and consequently to open the treasure, of Pretaupa-Sing to his intended demands.

The preparations and intentions of Lally having reached the ears of Pretaupa-Sing, he solicited the aid of the Nabob and the protection of the English. Though his former conduct had given him no claim to assistance from either, they were both willing to give, from policy, what he had no right to ask from their gratitude. They, therefore, authorized Captain Calliaud, who then commanded at Trichinopoly, to act as occasion might require. But that officer, from his personal knowledge of the character of the Rajah, together with "the continual and authentic accounts, which he obtained of the duplicity of his councils," was afraid of "sending succours, which might be betrayed to the enemy." He was apprehensive,

† Orme and Lawrence, passim.
§ Ibid.
on the other hand, that his with-holding assistance might furnish the 
timidity of Pretaupa, with a pretext to make terms with the 
French. " He, therefore, at all risques, detached five hundred 
Sepoys with ten European artillery-men, and three hundred Col-
leries," to Tanjore. This force, he deemed, was sufficient to 
keep up the hopes of the Rajah of receiving more; having pru-
dently resolved to accommodate his own future aid to the conduct 
of Pretaupa; which, as he had reason to distrust it, he gave direc-
tions should be narrowly watched.

Lally, marching from Pondicherry on the 18th of June, arrived 
on the same day of July, within six miles of Tanjore. Pretaupa-
Sing, having endeavoured to amuse the French in their march with 
negotiation, their commander, with a precipitate folly, inseparable 
from his character, exposed his own incapacity of enforcing any 
terms, by the nature of those he proposed. Having reduced his 
claim of more than five millions of rupees, to one million; he in-
sisted upon receiving ten thousand pounds weight of gun-powder. 
Though the want of an article, so necessary to the operations of war, 
might be thought a sufficient encouragement against all treaty, the 
feeble spirit of Pretaupa gave way, upon the arrival of some bat-
tering cannon, from Karrical. "He conferred in earnest with 
Lally, and concluded a treaty, the terms of which were founded on 
that commander's declaration, that he intended to march from Tan-
jore against Trichinopoly." To aid the French against his supe-
rior, the Nabob, as well as the English, the allies of that prince, whose 
troops were actually defending his capital, the treacherous and timid 
Pretaupa "agreed to lend three hundred of his best horse, to furnish 
one thousand Coolies and Mattockmen, and to supply the French 
army with provisions during the siege." He also consented "to

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 322.  † Ibid.  † Ibid. p. 324.  § Ibid.  ¶ Ibid.
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deliver two respectable hostages, and to give five hundred thousand rupees *, to be paid, at different periods, and upon the execution of stated terms $.

The languor, with which his part of the treaty was executed by Pretaupa Sing, inflamed the irascible spirit of Lally, into a renewal of the war. The puerile threats of that officer improved the natural timidity of the Rajah into despair. He resolved to defend himself to the last extremity. He redoubled his solicitations for aid from Trichinopoly. Captain Calliaud, who was no stranger to the late negociations, "had hitherto thought it unsafe to trust any more troops in the Rajah's power, whilst making engagements to assist the French, in the reduction of Trichinopoly †." But, being convinced, from this last rupture, that the time of negociation was past, he detached on the 6th of August a considerable reinforcement to Tanjore. Lally, having opened his batteries on the 2d, had on the 7th made a breach in the wall. But, having expended his ammunition, and being also terrified, by the defeat of the French squadron, on the coast, he called a council of war, in which it was resolved to raise the siege ‡. In his retreat he was harassed by the Tanjorines; and, thus, ended an expedition, undertaken through distress, carried on in folly, and defeated by passion and impatience.

Though the ineffectual hostilities against Tanjore had demonstrated, that the French were destitute of the means of war, as well as of an able commander for carrying it on, their superiority in numbers still induced the British to confine themselves within their forts. The Count de Lally, with all the intemperance and impatience of his violent mind, quarrelled with his friends, whilst he made rapid preparations for attacking his enemies. His disappointment, rather than defeat, before Tanjore, had roused his indignation, as having

† Orme, Cambridge, India Papers, passim.

He raises the siege.

The French superior in force to the English.

proceeded
proceeded from a contemptible enemy; and he resolved to recover from a more respectable foe, the laurels, which his own precipitate folly had lost. Having taken the field, in the end of September, he took possession of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, on the 4th of October, with all the ostentation natural to excessive pride.

On the 12th of the same month, a considerable reinforcement, from the French settlements in Golconda, having crossed the mountains, behind the pagoda of Tripetti, arrived at Arcot. This additional force escorted a considerable sum of money, which, with supplies of the same kind from Mauritius, enabled Lally to prosecute the war, with vigour.

The Presidency at Fort St. George, no longer in doubt concerning Lally's intention to lay siege to that place, began to prepare for a vigorous defence. An officer of the most distinguished merit, Colonel Lawrence, commanded the garrison; but the nominal "defence of the siege" was committed, by a vote of the Council, to Mr. George Pigot, then President for the Company, at Madras. This gentleman, though bred to trade, was possessed of personal resolution; and he had once seen the face of an enemy, about seven years before. "Every good officer being in the field," in the middle of July 1751, Mr. Saunders, then Governor of Fort St. David, ordered Mr. Pigot, one of the Council, to conduct a convoy of stores to Verdachellum, a fort to the north of the river Coleroon. This service he performed, without loss; but being attacked, upon his return, by the troops of a Polygar, with match-lock guns, Mr. Pigot had the good fortune to save himself, by the speed of his horse. The vote, which conferred upon Pigot "the defence of the siege," directed him to consult Colonel Lawrence, on all occasions.

Orme, India Papers, passim. 11 Orme, vol. i. p. 181.
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fions, and on extraordinary emergencies to assemble a council of the superior officers of the garrison]. Mr. Pigot, during the subsequent siege, exhibited resolution and activity. He visited the works every day, encouraged the garrison, and rewarded their services, with money. But the most commendable part of his conduct was his attention to the provisions, which were plenty and good in their kind.

To these arrangements, within the walls of Fort St. George, preparations were made, without, to disturb the siege, with which it was threatened. The garrison of Chingleput was reinforced. Captain Calliaud, with a party, was ordered from Trichinopoly, upon which the command and protection of that city were committed to Captain Joseph Smith, who has since made such a distinguished figure, on the coast of Coromandel. That officer had, by orders from the Presidency, detached two thousand Sepoys, from his garrison, on the 21st of November. The Rajah of Tanjore, the Marawar, and the Polygar Tondiman, who had so freely and so faithfully given aid, in the Myorean war, gave assurances and was really collecting some troops. But the Marawar returned no answer, either to the requisitions of the Nabob, or the solicitations of the Presidency. The Rajah of Tanjore, notwithstanding the late injuries he had sustained from the French, and the late aid he had received from the English, expressed himself in equivocal terms. To overcome his obstinacy and, if possible, torouze his gratitude, Major Calliaud was sent, on the 30th of November, in a common maffoola, to Tranquebar; from whence he was to proceed to Tanjore, "to convince the Rajah of the impolicy of his indifference."
Major Calliaud, after having encountered various difficulties and overcome many interruptions, arrived at Tanjore, on the 17th of December. Prior to that officer's arrival, Captain Joseph Smith at Trichinopoly had "closely pressed" the Rajah, to furnish the thousand horse requested by the Presidency *. But he pleaded the ravages committed by the French, as an excuse, and "demanded two hundred thousand rupees † beforehand;" at length he plainly said, that he thought the English did not care what befell the territories of their allies, provided they could defend their own. But as he could not allege this indifference to himself, when attacked by the French, he cited the unconcern, with which they had suffered "that nation to take every fort belonging to the Nabob, and even his capital of Arcot, without making any efforts to protect them;" yet "he knew the Presidency had not the means, and with the Nabob's were losing their own revenues ‡." Colonel Calliaud found the Rajah so preoccupied of the decline of the fortune of the English, that he neglected the customary attentions to himself, as their representative; for, instead of allotting to him a house, he permitted him to reside in a common choultry, the usual receptacle of the meanest travellers §.

To add insult to his want of attention, the Rajah permitted the two French hostages, whom he had detained, ever since Lally's ineffectual siege, to depart, as it were, in Major Calliaud's sight. In a conference with the Major, he alleged, that he had sufficiently exposed himself to the resentment of the French, by having already sent three hundred horse to the assistance of the English. Yet these horse were not furnished by the Rajah, but hired in his territories, by the Nabob's agents ||. The Rajah, knowing that Calliaud could raise no money, on the credit of the Company, in the present gloomy state of their

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† 25,000 l.
§ ibid. p. 438.
affairs, offered four hundred horse, provided he would discharge
their arrears. In vain did Calliaud apply for money at Tanjore, at
Negapatam and even at Trichinopoly. The agents, who had
been accustomed, in the first of those places, to give money, for bills
on the Presidency, were either intimidated by the Rajah, or terrified
by the untoward aspect of the times. The Dutch of Negapatam,
though they proffered a loan, took such advantage of the state of
things, that they demanded a discount of 25 per cent. upon bills;
and the Shroff at Trichinopoly “retracted his promise, and refused
to supply money, upon any terms.” But though Mr. Norris, a
member of the Council, who happened to pass through Tanjore, on
his way to Trichinopoly, advanced ten thousand pagodas; and,
“by this supply obviated the pretexts of delay,” the Rajah broke his
promise with regard to the horse. This dishonourable and evasive
conduct forced Major Calliaud to quit Tanjore, expressing at his
departure his utmost indignation, which he intended should be con-
veyed to the Rajah’s ears. Terrified by the disgust, resentment and
abrupt departure of Major Calliaud, he ordered, at length, the de-
manded cavalry to march; but having, perhaps designedly, broke
his promise of paying their arrears, they proceeded slowly, re-
luctantly and uselessly, on their way.

The Rajah’s treachery to the English was accompanied by in-
flicts to his superior the Nabob. Under the uncertainty of the safety
of the fort, Colonel Lawrence had prevailed with that prince, to
leave Madras, with his family, on the 20th of December. After a
short, but tempestuous passage by sea, he arrived at the Dutch set-
tlement of Negapatam, on his way to Trichinopoly. His wife
had been brought to bed on board; and had fallen into a dangerous
illness. The retreat of the Nabob, from Madras, under the cir-

cumstances, which attended it, convinced Pretaupa Sing, that both he and his allies despaired of being able to keep the place. The Nabob announced by his agent, that he intended to come into the city of Tanjore, on his way to Trichinopoly; and that he expected, as usual, to be met by the Rajah on the road. But the Rajah, "either from the malignant pleasure of insulting his superior in distress," or from his dread of the French, refused either to admit the Nabob into the city, or to pay him the customary visit, without the walls. He paid no attention to the representations of Major Calliaud, "who endeavoured to correct his contumacy." The Nabob, having arrived on the 5th of January 1759, at a village within seven miles of Tanjore; Major Calliaud, having visited that prince, went afterwards into Tanjore; and by exhortations, but chiefly by the appearance of his escort, prevailed on the Rajah, to visit his superior in the customary manner.

During these transactions at Tanjore, the French army were preparing to press Fort St. George with a siege. The operations of war form no part of the design of this essay. It is doubtful whether the ignorance of the enemy in the science of attack, or the spirit of the besieged in defence, contributed most to save the place. The trenches were opened on the 2d of January 1759; and the French quitted them with precipitation, on the appearance of a reinforcement, on the 17th of February. In a rally conducted, with more spirit than judgment, the famous Count d'Eflaing was taken. The loss of that active partisan, together with the death of Saubinet, an able officer, ruined the exertions of Lally, who seemed to have had none of the requisites necessary to constitute a general, except enterprise and courage. The repulse of the French diminished their military reputation and increased that of the English. The Rajah of Tanjore, in subserviency to this change of fortune, congratulated

† Ibid.  
‡ Ibid.  

the
the success at Madras, with a discharge of his guns*. The Presidency, encouraged by his professions†, proposed to him to assist them in surprizing the fort of Karrical. But Pretaupa, or his minister in his name answered, that the last hostilities of the French had ruined his country; that, as the English had driven the French from Madras, they should drive them also from Pondicherry, “when Karrical would fall of course ‡.” The Presidency then requested, that he would permit beesves to be purchased in his country as provisions for the squadron §. Regarding this demand, as an insult upon his religion, he would not suffer the interpreter to go on, in reading their letter ||.

The reinforcement, whose arrival had induced Lally to raise the siege of Madras, rendered the English equal, in number of Europeans, to the French on the coast. But the want of bullocks, coolies, and other necessaries prevented their taking the field till the first week in March ¶. The gallant Colonel Lawrence, worn out by the infirmities of age and by disease, found himself obliged to relinquish a service, in which he had made such a conspicuous figure. Colonel Draper, the next in command, whose health was impaired by the climate, found himself obliged to quit the coast. Major Calliaud succeeded the first, in the command of the Company’s troops; and Major Brereton the latter, at the head of those of the king. After some movements of no consequence, the two armies, as it were by mutual consent, remained inactive during the greatest part of the summer. The English waited for reinforcements; the French were mutinous, for want of clothing and pay. About three hundred men having arrived from Europe at Madras, in the beginning of September, Major Brereton, as commander in chief, took

† Rous’s Appendix, No. V. p. 46.
|| Ibid.
¶ Cambidge, p. 197.
the field; but being repulsed at Wandewash, he sent the troops into
cantonment near Conjeeveram. Lieutenant-Colonel Coote arriving,
in the mean time, from Europe, took the command of the army.
But the year 1759 closed, without any action of much consequence
or great renown.'

The year 1760 opened with an action, which, in its consequences,
decided the fate of the war on the coast of Coromandel. The English,
having taken Wandewash in December 1759, had revived the reputa-
tion of their arms in the eyes of the country powers; and the pos-
session of that place was of so much importance to the French,
that they sat down before it in the month of January. Lieutenant-
Colonel Coote, in relieving Wandewash, defeated the whole force
of the enemy in a regular battle. Having lost near eight hundred
dead and wounded in the action and left all their cannon and other
trumpets and spoils of war on the field, they were obliged to shut
themselves up in Pondicherry. Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic,
fell into the hands of the victors in the month of February. The
French, in consequence of their defeat, recalled their troops from
the island of Seringam, near Trichinopoly, which had been relinqu-
ished to them, by the regent of the Mysore, in the year 1755. The
forts of Permaoil, Alamparva, Karical, and several other places of
strength, fell, one by one, into the hands of the English; and lieutenant-Colonel Coote took measures, in the beginning of
April, to block up Pondicherry itself by land. During these transac-
tions, in the Carnatic, the Nabob remained, in the fortresses of Trichinopoly. On the 30th of January, he re-
cieved the news of the battle of Wandewash; upon which he pitched
his tent, displayed his great standard and declared his intention of
returning to the centre of his government. Solicitous to make his

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4 Cambridge, p. 256.
5 Cambridge, p. 269.
appearance with pomp and figure, he requested Captain Joseph Smith to go and ask five hundred horse of the Rajah of Tanjore. The cavalry, which the Rajah had granted, the year before, to the threats of Major Calliaud, had returned home, in the month of April, without having performed any service. After the battle of Wandewash, changing with the current of fortune, not only the Rajah had sent horse and foot, but even the two Marawars their Colleries to the Nabob at Trichinopoly. But Pretaupa-Sing, with his usual versatility, soon withdrew his troops. When Smith arrived at Tanjore, the Rajah, who either was, or pretended to be, indisposed, with difficulty admitted his visit. He recommended him to his Dubbeer, or treasurer; but that officer, "notwithstanding the late success of the British arms, insisted that the Nabob should furnish the pay and the expences." This, he knew, would be refused; "and Captain Smith returned, without obtaining a single horseman." 

The blockade of Pondicherry employed the arms of the English, during the remaining part of the year 1760. M. Lally, to extricate himself, from his distressed situation, had entered into a treaty with the Myforeans, with whom the French had maintained a correspondence, ever since the war; they had jointly carried on, from 1752 to 1755. A revolution had happened in MyFORE, by which Lally had hoped to profit. Hyder-AIi, a Mlhammedan partizan, who had distinguished himself in the service of the Rajah of MyFORE as a soldier of fortune, had found means to become his minister. Having displaced the uncle of the young prince, he seized the reins of government; but to provide against a reverse of fortune, he was anxious to acquire a place of retreat. Such a place Lally promised to procure for him in the Carnatic; which, together with other terms, beyond the power of the French to fulfill, induced the new regent to send troops and provisions to Pondicherry. But the first soon failed;
and the latter, with the usual fickleness of Aziatics, retired. The

town reduced, at length, to the last extremity by famine, surrender

dered at discretion on the 16th of January 1761.

With Pondicherry, the power of France, on the continent of In-
dia, expired. Some forts of little consequence, in the center of the
Carnatic, were garrisoned by French troops; but when the trunk
was cut down, the branches soon decayed. Thiagur surrendered,
in February, to Major Preston, at discretion; and the almost im-
pregnable fortress of Gingee could only secure the honours of war
to its garrison, which capitulated to Captain Smith on the fifth of
April. The fall of that place terminated the war which had con-
tinued, with little intermission, for fifteen years, between the Eng-
lish and French, on the coast of Coromandel. The same current of
misfortune had overwhelmed the latter, in every other part of In-
dia. Their government and commerce were extirpated in Bengal.

They had lost the northern provinces, which had been their reward
for the murder of Nazir Jung, the untimely death of his son Mus-
ziifer and their support of his brother Sullabut, as Subah of the
Decan. A few military adventurers of their nation had retired to
Myfore, in pursuit of fortune and subsistence; and these, with some
trading houses on sufferance at Surat and Calicut, became a kind of
insult on the former power of the French, by connecting its memory
with misfortune.

Though the hostilities, between the English and French Compa-
nies, had become a part of the war between the two nations, as each
was assisted by its respective sovereign, they were both, strictly
speaking, but auxiliaries to the rivals for the Nabobship of the Car-
natic. The English, at least, considered themselves, as only con-
tending for the legal government, under which they had so long
flourished, against usurpers, either created or supported by the in-

* Cambridge, Orme, India Papers, passim.  † Governor Saunders’s Letter to the French
trigues and arms of the French. The former, acknowledging the
authority of the Mogul, "from whom they had received Phirmans,
for their settlements and trade, and lived under the protection of his
governors," considered their support of his officers necessary, on
every principle of justice and gratitude*. They knew that the fa-
mily of Anwar-ul-dien were the undoubted representatives of the
emperor in the Carnatic; and their President scrupled not to affirm,
in a public deed, that the French had violated the fundamental laws
of the country, and had actually rebelled, in opposing the legal de-
puties of the empire †. He supported the assertion with indisputable
facts. Anwar-ul-dien was the acknowledged, undoubted, and legal
Nabob, when the French killed him in battle, supporting rebels
against his authority. Nazir-Jung was governor-general of the
Decan, the acknowledged representative of the Mogul, when he was
assassinated, by the intrigues of the French; and they continued their
rebellion against the Mogul, in the person of his undoubted repre-
sentative Mahommed Ali, as his rights to his government had not
only been derived from a legal viceroy, but had also been approved
by the court of Delhi ‡.

The French, on the other hand, had uniformly supported ufur-
pation, rebellion, and assassination. Having contributed to the
murder of Nazir-Jung, the lawful viceroy of the Decan, they raised
Muziffer-Jung to the vacant Mufnud. This Suba, whose only title to
office arose from murder, appointed Chunder-Saib, his deputy, in the
Carnatic. The usurpation of Muziffer terminating with his life, scarce
two months after his elevation, the French created another fictitious
vice-roys in the Decan. Under this illegal viceroy, they obtained some
provinces for themselves and disposed of the governments of others,
by his illegal commissions. Notwithstanding the declining state of
the empire, and the weakness of the prince, who sat upon the throne,

* Cambridge's Appendix, p. 34.  
† Ibid.  
‡ Ibid, p. 35, &c.  
§ They thought it their duty to support its officers.
the court of Delhi could never be persuaded to give validity, by commis- sions, to such daring invasions, upon its authority. Upon the death of Nazir Jung, his eldest brother Ghazi-ul-dien was appointed governor-general of the Deccan; and when that viceroy was poisoned, by the procurement of Sullabut Jung, his son of the same name was nominated to his vacant office. The elder Ghazi sent his Saneds * to Mahommed Ali, for the government of the Carnatic, which were, afterwards, confirmed by the younger Ghazi, as vizier of the empire. The Mogul himself, in proof of his full approba- tion of the appointment, was pleased to send his own phirman to the Nabob; and to order the English to support him, against all the enemies of his authority ‡.

It appears, by the acknowledgment of the President, acting in his public capacity and negotiating a solemn treaty, that the English, settled on the coast of Coromandel, owned themselves, on all occasions, the faithful subjects of the Mogul empire ||. It appears also, that they considered the French, who were on the same footing with themselves, with regard to the empire, as actually rebels, on account of their opposing the rights and authority of Mahommed Ali, the lawful representative of the Mogul in the Carnatic †. The inferences to be drawn from the whole are, that the English were subjects of the Mogul empire; that, as such, they acknowledged, supported, and ought to have obeyed the Mogul governor of Arcot; that Ma-

* "We wrote to the Mogul of the revolu- tion, and our attachment to the Circar, and defined his orders, that we might act in obedience to them. He was graciously pleased to send Nabob Mahommed Allie a phirman for the Carnatic, to appoint Gauzedey Cawn vicer- 
y of the Deccan, who likewise granted Na- bob Mahommed Allie a Saned, and gave us orders to support him. This phirman from the Mogul, this saned from Gauzedey Cawn, have never been revoked; from which it is ob-

‡ Governor Saunders to the French Deputies, Feb 15th, 1754, passim.

|| ibid. p. 36.

† ibid. The Mogul of the revolu-

uation, and our attachment to the Circar, and defined his orders, that we might act in obedience to them. He was graciously pleased to send Nabob Mahommed Allie a phirman for the Carnatic, to appoint Gauzedey Cawn vicer-
y of the Deccan, who likewise granted Na- bob Mahommed Allie a Saned, and gave us orders to support him. This phirman from the Mogul, this saned from Gauzedey Cawn, have never been revoked; from which it is ob-

uous, that Nabob Mahommed Allie Cawn's title is just, and that we have acted according to the fundamental laws of the country,"—Governor Saunders's Letter, p. 16, ubi supra.
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hommed Ali was that governor; that the war, which terminated in the expulsion of the French, as rebels, was his war; and that the Company, instead of being principals in it, were scarcely allies, as they only performed their duty, as subjects. It must be owned, that they executed, with so much spirit and so effectually, that duty, that they deserved every reward, consistent with their original condition and fundamental tenure, in the empire.

There is, however, great reason to believe, that the war, which was brought to such a happy conclusion, by the spirit of the British, had originally sprung from the "adherence of the family of Anwar-ul-dien, to their cause. Had the Nabob continued to observe the treaty of neutrality, concluded with the French, in the end of 1746, M. Dupleix would not, probably, have had recourse to a prison at Satarah, to raise a rival, for the government of the Carnatic. But when Fort St. David was threatened, in March 1747, the Nabob, studious to preserve the peace of the province, made preparations, which plainly indicated his determined resolution, to support the English interest, then greatly on the decline, on the coast. His son, the present Nabob, with whom and his brother the French had settled the treaty of neutrality, made no secret of the indignation, which the conduct of that nation had excited in his mind. To these sources ought, perhaps, to be traced, the extreme animosity, which the French exhibited, upon every occasion, against the family of Anwar-ul-dien. Be that as it will, it is certain, that the present Nabob ascribed all the succeeding wars with the French, the death of his father, and the ruin of all his fortune and country, to

† Such seem to have been the ideas of Governor Pigot. "It is my sincere wish, that your highness should be firmly established in the seat of government, with every honour and advantage polished by your ancestors, and that you may enjoy the "cible Carnatic; and that the Company may carry on their business, under your highness's protection, as they did under that of former Subahs."—Pigot to Nabob, A. D. 5 h, 1759. Vide the same to the same, June 25th, 1759. The same to the Begum, July 10th, 1760.

† Vide Dupleix's Letter to Nazir Jung.

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The zeal, which he himself had shewn in favour of the English, in the years 1747 and 1748. This circumstance occasioned no diminution of that gratitude, which he owed to their successful exertions in extricating him and his family, from the difficulties, in which they had been involved, by their attachment.

When the French were inclosed within the bound-hedge of Pondicherry, in 1760, the Nabob began seriously to think of forming a new government, or rather a new constitution, between himself and his successful allies. The ravages of the French, Mysoreans and Marattas; the public calamities inseparable from a long series of hostilities; the refractory conduct of Rajahs, Polygars and Kille-dars, in not only with-holding their just tribute, but even aiding the enemies of the lawful government, had impoverished the country, and ruined the finances of the prince. The treasure of Anvar-ul-dien had been long exhausted, by the misfortunes of his family. The precarious revenue, irregularly collected, from such districts, as had not been entirely ruined, by the depredations, or possessed by the power of the enemy, had been expended, as soon as received. But the late defeat of the French, and the almost certain prospect of their being driven entirely from the country, seemed to promise times of tranquillity and prosperity, which, with proper management, might supply the waste made by a war of near fifteen years.

On the 13th of June 1760, the Nabob wrote a letter to Mr. Pigot, the Company’s President at Madras, containing terms, which, though less than his gratitude wished to give *, were greater than his abilities. His propositions were, that twenty-eight lacs of rupees, charged upon the gross revenue of the Carnatic, should be paid per annum to the Company, till his debts should be extinguished: That this annual allowance should commence, on the 11th of July 1760: That, besides the sum mentioned, which was to be paid at Madras,

* Nabob’s Papers, passim.

Terms of that agreement.
the Nabob should advance annually three lacks of rupees to the paymaster at Trichinopoly, "for defraying the expence of the Company's people in that garrison." That should Pondicherry be reduced, the whole money, due to the Company, should be paid, in one year, provided the English should add a proper force to the troops of the Nabob, to bring to account such vassals of the Carnatic, as had with-held their tribute and allegiance, during the late troubles *. That, as the sum reserved for the expenses of his government was the least, to which those expenses could be reduced, he expected, in case any of the districts, between Nellore and Tinnevelly, should either be lost to himself, or plundered by the French or Marattas, the amount of such loss, being fairly and reasonably settled, should be deducted from the twenty-eight lacks, assigned to the Company.

In return for this large assignment on his revenues, the Nabob declared, that he expected the Company were not to countenance the refractoriness of dependents, Kiledars or Polygars. That the English officers, in the different garrisons, should not interfere in the affairs of the country, nor the disputes of the inhabitants. That the Prefidency should write to such chiefs as depended, by different tenures, on the Carnatic, announcing the present agreement. That the Company should aid, upon requisition, the different renters, in the collection of the revenue. That they should not employ, in their service, any person in an office of trust, under the Nabob's government. That the Nabob's flag should be hoisted, in the different forts, instead of that of the English. And to conclude the whole, the Nabob desired, that the friendship between him and the Company should be transferred, after his death, to his children and continue, as long as Madras should remain. Mr. Pigot, in the most explicit manner, agreed to all these articles; and declared, "that he made the agreement, in full hopes, that it will for ever remain

* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 23d, 1760. Nabob's Papers, vol. iii. p. 44, 45.
“firm, and be truly performed by both parties, as long as the English shall remain in Hindostan. By the blessing of God,” continues the President, “the Company will never fail to give proofs of their friendship and sincerity to you and your family, and will be firm in supporting you and your posterity, in the Subadary of the Carnatic.”

Notwithstanding this solemn agreement, the President and Council, soon after, applied to the Nabob, for fifty lacks of rupees, instead of the sum specified in Mr. Pigot’s letter of the 23d of June 1760. Driven to extremities, by the earnest instances of the Presidency, he was obliged to borrow money from individuals, to silence the clamorous demands of the government. Hence first proceeded that enormous weight of debt, under which he has ever since groaned; and, from which he has, now, little hopes of ever delivering himself. The expenses of the siege of Madras in 1759, he had cheerfully undertaken to pay; “as it was,” to use his own words, “the residence of his friends.” But those friends charged him also, with the expenses of the siege of Pondicherry, as it was “the residence of their own enemies.” To this demand he also agreed, upon condition of receiving the stores which should be taken in the place. When the place was taken, notwithstanding their agreement, the Company’s servants took the stores to themselves; but they promised to allow a certain sum for them, in the Nabob’s account. The Presidency, accordingly, made an allowance in their books; but the Court of Directors sent orders to charge again the sum allowed, to the Nabob’s account.

Soon after the taking of Pondicherry, the Nabob made a requisition of the aid of the Company, to bring to reason those dependents on the Carnatic, who had either joined his enemies, during the late

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* Pigot to the Nabob, June 23d, 1760.  † Sir John Linslay’s Narrative, October 13, 1770. Secretary of State’s Office.
war, or had taken advantage of the public disturbances to with-hold the customary tribute. As the Presidency had, upon every occasion, especially during the war, which terminated in 1754, owned themselves the subjects of the Mogul empire *, and had supported its authority, against the French and "other rebels," it was no matter of wonder, that the Nabob, as the representative of that empire, considered himself entitled to the obedience of all the other dependents on his government. But though the most powerful and most hostile of those dependents were expelled, there were other chiefs and feudatories, who, taking advantage of the late disturbances, had withheld the duties of their tenures, and even fortified themselves against his power. The most considerable of those were the three great Polysgars of the north, Mortaz-Ali governor of Vellore, in the heart of the Carnatic; and, in the south, the greater and lesser Marawars, together with the Rajah of Tanjore, more wealthy, and consequently more powerful, than them all †. Mortaz-Ali had not only excluded the authority of the Nabob, from his own government; but had even usurped his title to the Carnatic. The two Marawars, though always dependent on Madura, had with-held their tribute and their service; and the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore had been so uniformly evasive, versatile, and even treacherous, that it was plain, he wished for nothing less, than the prosperity of the affairs of the Nabob and of those, who had supported his cause. The Nabob, therefore, requested and expected, that the army, after the necessary repose, would accompany him, to subdue by force, or to terrify, into reason, those refractory dependents ||.

The attention of the Presidency, being turned to other objects, they insinuated their incapacity, for undertaking, with effect, the expeditions, which the Nabob required. But, in testimony of

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* Vide Governor Saunders's Letter to the French Deputies, p. 171.
|| Ibid.
their sense of his decided right to the allegiance, tribute, and feudal duties of all the chiefs, from Nellore to Tinnevelly*, and their own resolution, upon a proper occasion, to support him, in those rights, they had directed Governor Pigot to write a circular letter to those chiefs, expressive of their sentiments. They informed the Rajahs, Hamildars, Killedars, and Polygars, among others the Rajah of Tanjore, that "by the blessing of God, the whole country of the "Carnatic, from Nellore to Tinnevelly †, is fallen under the govern-"ment of Mahommed Ali, and is obedient to his Highness's "orders. You are, therefore, implicitly to obey his orders and "commands, which will be for your advantage ‡." Governor Pigot, in his private capacity, expressed the sentiments, which he, now, enforced, in his public character. In his letter to the Nabob's wife, dated the first of July 1760, he says: "The Company has, "with great pleafure, agreed to all his Excellency's business, agree-"able to his desire; and they most cordially with prosperity to his "affairs, BEING OBEdIENT TO HIM §." Having expressed the purport of the general letter to the chiefs of the Carnatic, he says: "By the blessing of God, the whole Carnatic is entirely and "firmly established in the Nabob and his posterity. As long as "the English settlements remain in the Decan, Bengal, and Hind-"oofhan, the Company's people are diligently to use their endeavours "in promoting and affifting the affairs of the Carnatic, in its obe-"dience to the Nabob, and in maintaining firm friendship and re-"gard ‖."

The unwillingness of the Presidency, to send their army, to enforce the Nabob's authority over his vassals and tributaries, seemed

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† Pigot's General Letter, ubi supra.
‡ Pigot's Letter to the Nabob's Wife, dated July 1, 1760. Nabob's Papers, vol. i.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
to have subsided, in the summer of 1761. That prince, therefore, renewed his requisition of assistance, in the month of August, by laying before them an account of the tribute, which had been withheld, from his government, during the late troubles. The infamous Mortaz-Ali, who had murdered two princes of his own family, and usurped the title of Nabob of the Carnatic, still remained in possession of the strong fortresses of Velore. Having, not only, refused his tribute, but even the very show of obedience, though within a few miles of the capital of the province, he was the first of the refractory vassals of the Carnatic, who was called to account. The reduction of his fort employed, for three months, the exertions of the army *. As the obstinacy of this dependant, if permitted to compromise matters, might furnish a dangerous example to other vassals, the Presidency resolved, that no terms should be granted, short of absolute submission to the mercy of the victors. He was, accordingly, reduced; but the trouble and time, which the conquest cost, furnished the President with a specious excuse †, for a change of sentiment, no less sudden than it was, at that time, unaccountable.

The Nabob, in his letter in the month of August 1761, had explained his claims on the Rajah of Tanjore, as a vassal of the Mogul empire, accountable to him for his tribute and feudal services, as Nabob of the Carnatic, by the fundamental laws of the empire. He said, "that Sadatulla Cawn, during his government, had only received annually ten lacks of rupees, from the Rajah; but that his nephew Dooft-Ali, who succeeded him in the government, obliged him to pay ninety lacks at one time. That Sipadar Ali, the son of Dooft-Ali, having obtained the Nabobship, upon the defeat and death of his father, in the month of May 1740, not only obliged the Rajah to pay eighty lacks, but, upon his continuing refractory,
feized his capital and person, placed a garrison in Tanjore, and gave
the management of civil affairs to one of his own officers. That
when the Marattas took Chunder-Saib and Trichinopoly, in March
1741, Preetaupa-Sing, recovered, by their means, his liberty and
government. That, when the Nizam came to regulate the affairs
of the Carnatic in 1743, Coja Abdulla, whom he had appointed
Nabob, received fifty lacks, from that Rajah. That Anwar-ul-dien,
who obtained the government, upon the death of Abdulla, settled
the tribute, at the annual sum of seven lacks, together with two
lacks more as presents and Durbar charges; which was one lack
less, than the Rajah's predecessors had paid, under the regular and
peaceable government of Sadatulla. That, as the Rajah, neglected
or postponed the payment of his tribute, Anwar-ul-dien had been
obliged to march an army against him, three different times. That,
the last of those times, the Rajah had amicably paid a part of his
tribute, and granted a bond for seven lacks, to be paid with interest.
That the Rajah, taking advantage of the civil wars, had neglected
for the last fourteen years, to pay his tribute to the lawful go-
vernment; but the Nabob, at the same time, owned that Muziffer
Jung and Chunder-Saib had received eleven lacks, out of seventy
which the Rajah had promised, when they besieged Tanjore*. As a
deduction from the sum due for tribute, the Nabob acknowledged,
that, during his distress when Trichinopoly was besieged, the Ra-
jah had obtained some exemptions in the arrears, to induce him to
give heartily his assistance †.

If Governor Pigot returned any answer to this letter, it was
such, as neither the Company ‡, nor the defenders of his conduct§,
have chosen to lay before the public. Intimidated by the obstinacy
of Mortaz-Ali or persuaded by Preetaupa-Sing, he opened the year

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* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 50.
‡ Ibid. p. 51.
§ Defence of Lord Pigot.
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1762 ||, with a recommendation of negotiation, rather than force, in settling accounts, with the "principal powers," he should have said vassals, of the Carnatic. As for pitiful Killedars or petty Polygars, he configned them, without distinction, to the discipline of the sword †. But he declared, "that he thinks it proper to try what can be done with the king of Tanjore, by way of treaty." In pursuance of this peaceable system, Mr. Pigot forgot his former professions and his present station. Though he actually was, and had owned himself a subject of the Mogul empire, and consequently promised obedience to the Nabob of the Carnatic *, the legal representative of the emperor, he assumed the functions of sovereignty; and, without consulting the Nabob, whatever he might have done, with regard to the Rajah, stepped in between them as a mediator to prevent a war ‡. To explain the nature of the office, thus arbitrarily assumed by Mr. Pigot, a short disquisition may be necessary.

Though the terms mediator and arbitrator are sometimes indiscriminately used by writers, who have treated on the law of nature and nations, there seems to be an essential difference, in point of degree, in their meaning. When two states, independent of each other, enter into disputes, which may terminate in a war, they may choose another power, as an umpire to decide their differences; and that umpire is properly called a mediator. When two private men mutually refer the decision of their disputes to a third person, that person is rightly named an arbitrator. In both cases, the consent of the parties is necessary, to constitute not only the power, but even the very existence of the mediator or arbitrator. This regular appointment to the office invests it with decisive authority; "for every man makes him the supreme judge of his own cause, whom
whom he has chosen umpire."

It must be owned, that when two sovereign states quarrel about their respective rights and possessions, a third frequently interposes and endeavours, by authority, by argument, and even by intreaty, to bring them to terms of accommodation. But the interposing state is not properly a mediator. In this case, the decision of the self-created mediator is not binding on the parties; as any one of them is at liberty either to accept or refuse the offer.

Many necessary qualifications were evidently wanting to Mr. Pigot, to give him a title to the character of mediator between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Rajah of Tanjore. The quarrel was not between two independent states. Had that even been the case, Mr. Pigot was neither an independent prince himself, nor the representative of an independent state, to give him a colour of right to interpose. The Rajah was a tributary, a feudatory, a vassal, to the Mogul empire; the Nabob was the deputy of that empire in the Carnatic, the mediate power, to whom the Rajah was accountable, for his duty to the throne. The Nabob, finding that the Rajah had failed in that duty, had an undoubted right by his office, to require the performance of the terms of his tenure. Should the Rajah's obstinacy render hostility necessary, it could not be called a war, but a rebellion, on his part. Should even the demands, made by the Nabob, have been unjust, he was alone accountable for his conduct to the emperor, his sovereign, and not to Mr. Pigot, who was himself an inferior subject to the Mogul. The truth is, the Nabob had no right, strictly speaking, to diminish, either by treaty or compromise, the tribute or the feudal duties, which the Rajah owed to the empire; and had he even consented to Mr. Pigot's mediation, the latter, by accepting that office, would have infringed

† Pufendorf, lib. v. cap. 15. § 7.
‡ Ibid.

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the prerogative of his sovereign the Mogul, who was the sole judge of the inherent rights of his own crown. But as Mr. Pigot created himself a mediator, without the consent of the Nabob, he actually assumed the character and invaded the personal rights of his sovereign, the Mogul; and committed a species of treason against his authority.

But whatever title Mr. Pigot might have had to the office of mediator, he resolved to exert it, as a matter of right. His often-fidel letters to the Rajah, though encouraging with regard to the Nabob's claims, were couched in terms, which implied that everything depended on the mediator. In proportion as the correspondence advanced, Pretaupa Sing rose gradually in the esteem of the Governor. This lucky change, in his favour, could not possibly have proceeded from the elegance of his sentiments; at least, not from the truth of his assertions. His account of past transactions, in his letter of the ninth of March, is as false, as his allegation of great merit towards the Nabob and English, during the late war. But he had an agent at Madras, who it seems explained matters, in such a satisfactory manner, to the President, that, in the short space of four months, the latter was induced, no doubt, from a thorough conviction of his former mistakes, to contradict his own letters to the Rajah. On the 30th of January, he writes to Pretaupa Sing, "It will always give me very great concern to be obliged to spill human blood, or forcibly to dispossess any prince of his country; "but rebels must be punished, if they will not hear reason.""

* The fundamental laws of the country are to acknowledge the Grand Mogul for first Sovereign, the Governor-General of the Decan, for his representative in that country; and the particular governors appointed by the Governor-General, as holding their authority from him, (p. 51.)—M. Duplex, in open violation to the fundamental laws of the country, rebelled against Nabob Anasterdy Cawn, the legal representative of the Great Mogul; an obedience which you have laid down, as the fundamental laws of the country, and consequently ought to obey. Governor Saunders's Letter, p. 34. ubi supra.  
† Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 56, 57.  
‡ We have already stated the Rajah's conduct, during that period, from the most indubitable authorities.  
§ This was the noted Samboji Pant, well known to the Members of the Council, as well as to the President.  
¶ Rous's Appendix, p. 57.
In a letter to the Nabob, dated May 31st, the President says, "The
settling all affairs, in this part of the country, has been left en-
tirely to you. The present case is different. I consider the king
of Tanjore as a sovereign prince." To this opinion of the
political character of the Rajah, and the tenure by which he held his
government, Mr. Pigot adds a specimen of his own knowledge of the
law of nations. "It is a custom," says he, "when two states dis-
agree, to call in a third, to judge between them. I offered
myself as such, and, therefore, the treaty must be conducted by
me. I act as mediator, the affair cannot, according to custom,
be discussed in your durbar."

Though there is some impropriety in calling one's self a state,
the language of the President is truly princely, in the preceding
quotation. The dignity of the diction is not, however, more re-
markable than the alteration in the sentiments of the writer, since
the preceding year; when he declared, in his public capacity, the
Company's, and consequently his own "obedience" to the or-
ders of the Nabob. Pursuing the same regal language, which
the idea of a mediator suggested, the President announced
to the Nabob, that he had chosen an agent, for both, to
proceed to Tanjore. "I desire you," says Mr. Pigot, "to give
your instructions to Mr. Du Prê, whom I have appointed to re-
present me."—At the same time, that the mediator wrote so au-
thoritatively to the Nabob, he used the like freedom, with the Rajah
of Tanjore. Though Sambo-ji Punt had convinced the President,
that his master was a "sovereign prince," he had neglected to ad-
advance arguments of still greater weight, to support his claims. The
Rajah was, therefore, reprimanded, threatened, soothed, and en-
couraged; every expedient, in short, was used to induce him to

* Rous's Appendix, p. 59.  † Mr. Pigot to the Nabob's Wife, July 1, 1760, ut supra.
‡ Ibid. p. 59, 60. § Rous's Appendix, p. 60.
trust his affairs entirely in the hands of the mediator, who failed not to impress his mind with his own importance. "My troops," says the chief agent of a mercantile factory, "are peaceably can-" toned at Chillumbrum, and I send to you Mr. Du Prè, one of "the gentlemen of my Council, to pay my compliments to you, and "to assure you of my regard *.

The event shewed, that the President assumed no greater power, than he actually possessed. The Nabob's representation of the rights of his predecessors at length convinced him, by its want of success, that he could not enforce his own. In vain he requested, that the discussion of a point, which he perceived was to be interpreted against his claims, should be postponed. The President was bent on a treaty, and a treaty was consequently made. Mr. Du Prè, a gentleman of address and abilities, had been sent to Tanjore, as joint agent from the Nabob and Mr. Pigot. Having examined the allegations of both parties, he found that neither was free from error. It was proved, that the Rajah had fallen in arrear, for the tribute of many years; but it also appeared, that the Nabob had relinquished, in his distress, his claim to the sums payable for ten of those years; as an inducement to the Rajah to give his assistance in the late war; which, however, he never heartily gave. The Nabob affirmed, that the Rajahs of Tanjore, had paid annually twenty lacks, during the Nabobships of Sadatulla and Dooft-Ali. He owned, however, that his father, the late Nabob, had settled it at seven lacks, with two lacks of Durbar charges. Pretaupa Sing, on the contrary, alleged, that though large sums had been extorted by force, the stated and regular Peishcuish was no more than two lacks, per annum, to the Vogul, and two to the Nabob of Arcot, as a customary present †.

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 62. † Idem, passim.
It is impossible to reconcile so wide a difference, in a manner consistent with veracity, on both sides. The probability is, that the tribute was much larger, even in peaceable times, than Pretauppa Sing chose to own. That it was settled at nine lacks, in the Nabobship of Anwar-ul-dien, is proved by many persons in India, whose memory extends to the times||; as well as by public records†. The sums paid to Sipadar Ali, to Chunder Saib, to Coja Abdulla, and other Nabobs, ought not to form precedents, as they were rather fines for disobedience, than arrears of tribute. Besides, when refractory subjects in India force the sovereign to have recourse to arms, he obliges them, when reduced, to pay the expenses of the war; and these sums have frequently been confounded, with the arrears of the regular tribute. The revolutions of Tanjore, its being repeatedly conquered by the Moguls, its situation in the heart of one of their provinces, its absolute dependence on the possessors of the rest of the Carnatic, with regard to the waters of the Cavery, its fertility, its wealth, render it highly improbable, if not impossible, that the conquerors of India would accept a sum little more than 40,000l. from a country, which yielded annually near a million ‡.

But neither these reasons, nor the positive affirmation of the Nabob, had any weight with the President. To prove how little he favoured that prince, he entered into a paper war against his claims *. In his letters on the subject, he employed expressions, no less unsuitable to his own station, than they were degrading to that of the Nabob. On the 20th of September 1762, the treaty dictated by Mr. Pigot was concluded; which, though forced upon the Nabob, as he afterwards acted under it, became binding with respect to tribute, as long as the Rajah performed his part of the agreement. The heads of the conditions were, twenty-two lacks, at five different payments, as arrears of tribute; four lacks, as Peisguish and Durbar
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Charges, to be paid annually in the month of July; the cession of the districts of Coiladdy and Elangad to the Rajah; and the restoration of Trimulrow, the displaced Kiledar of Arni, for whom Pretaupa Sing had interested himself†. The Rajah had also agreed to give five lacks more, as a present; but one lack was to be deducted, from that sum for his own officers‡. The President and Council of Madras made themselves guarantees, in the following words, annexed to the treaty: "We do hereby promise, as far as in us lies, that in case either party shall fail, in the performance of the articles, he hath thereby undertaken to perform, or any part thereof, we will, to the utmost of our power, assist the other party to compel him, who shall fail to fulfil his agreement, and to render due satisfaction for his failure therein."

This treaty, when written out fair, was carried by the President to the Nabob; but that prince refused to subscribe to terms, to which he had never given his consent. Mr. Pigot feized the Nabob's chop, and put it, with his own hand, to the paper*. M. Dupré, who had negociated the terms, was dispatched, with this forced treaty, to Tanjore. Though Pretaupa Sing was too prudent to refuse his signature, to concessions so favourable to himself, he had scarce affixed his seal to the treaty, when he made new demands, which, if granted, would enable him to evade the payment of the paltry Peishcuih, he had agreed to give. But Mr. Pigot had already done so much, that he could not decently do more. In his answer to the Rajah's 'friendly letter," by the hands of Sambo-ji Punt, he says: "I looked upon the treaty, as it now stands, to be so favourable to you, that I really flattered myself, that you would have been well satisfied

† Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 79, 80.
‡ Ibid. p. 8.
* Nabob to Mr. Palk, October 8th, 1776.
General Lawrence, Mr. Bourchier, and particularly Colonel Call and Mr. Palk, were either present at this transaction, or were convinced of the truth of it from the incontestable information, given by others as well as by the Nabob; who made heavy complaints to them of the President's conduct.
“with it, and particularly the article of future Peishcuifh. I need “not recall to your remembrance, the transactions of former go- “vernments; a very slight reflection must convince you, that in “this article you are highly favoured. It has cost me a great deal “of trouble to reduce it, to the sum stipulated, and I should be really “ashamed to ask the Nabob to make any abatement ‡. It appears, “from the passage cited, that the very man, who made the treaty, thought it more favourable to the Rajah, than to his superior the Nabob. That the Peishcuifh had been reduced, from what it had for- merly been; and that Mr. Pigot himself was convinced, he had already used so much freedom with the claims of the Nabob, that “he should be ashamed” to encroach further on his rights.

The Presidency were themselves sensible, that the treaty, which had been forced on the Nabob, was so inadequate to his just claims, that they shewed an inclination to excuse it to the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 9th of November 1762. Instead of urging the right the Rajah had to such favourable conditions, they pleaded their own inability to bring him to justice, as their chief motive to the treaty †. Their want of a sufficient force, the expense of an expedi- tion, the danger of raising other enemies, in case of a rupture with the Rajah, the incapacity of the Nabob to recover a single ru- pee, without the assistance of the Company, were the arguments produced, to justify their conduct ||. But what necessity was there, for making any demands, as they own they could enforce none? The Nabob wished to postpone the business, till a more fit opportu- nity. Pretanpa Sing would have been glad to have retained the pal- try sum, he advanced. The best, and perhaps the only reason, for precipitating the measure, is mentioned by the President, that he himself “had thoughts of leaving India shortly §.” The event

‡ Rous’s Appendix, No. VI. p. 81, 82. † Ibid. || Ibid. p. 83. § Ibid. p. 74.

shewed,
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flowed, that neither arguments nor reasons were necessary, to convince the Court of Directors. That respectable body, with the true spirit of their institution, instead of being anxious about the justice of the transaction, wished to partake of its profit. Having understood, that in addition to the twenty-two lacking, obtained as arrears of peiheush, four lacking had been given, as a present, the honourable Court say, in their letter of the 30th of December 1763:

"Now if this last named sum was given as a present, it seems as if the Company ought to have it for their interposition and guarantee of the treaty. We shall be glad to have this affair explained to us, that we may know the real state of the case, with respect to that donation."*

Such is the history of the treaty of 1762, faithfully extracted from the papers, which the Court of Directors have published, in justification of their own conduct. It has appeared, that the Presidency, instead of aiding a friend and ally, in the recovery of his just demands upon a vassal, depending on his government, supported that vassal, in his refractory conduct, though he had uniformly acted, during a long series of hostility and public calamity, an undutiful part towards his superior and had been treacherous to themselves. That, when they ought to have made him pay his proportion of the expences of a war, which protected him and his dominions, they not only permitted him to "sit rent-free," but had reduced his customary tribute, to less than one-half of the sum usually paid, in the most regular and peaceable times. That, though he was bound, by the nature of his tenure, as well as the laws of self-preservation, to give his assistance in the war, they allowed him to set off against the unsettled arrears of his tribute, a kind of exemption, which he had extorted from the Nabob in his distress; and that merely as an in-

* Rous's Appendix, No. VI. p. 87.

† Mr. Pigot's expression, in his letter to the Appendix, p. 55.

Recapitulation of facts, concerning the treaty of 1762.
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document to do his duty, which he otherwise refused to perform. That, when they (ripped smaller delinquents, though possessing equal rights with him by the constitution of the country, of their territories, and deprived them of their liberty, theyfoothed, flattered, and favoured Preetuoa Sing, more guilty—but more wealthy than them all. That the President, either ignorant of the nature of his station, or assuming powers, to which he had no title, had arbitrarily taken to himself the office of mediator, without any authority from the parties, upon whose differences he was to decide. That, under this usurped character, he concluded a treaty, without either the communication or consent of the Nabob; and that to give it validity, he had forcibly seized the chop of that prince, and affixed it to the paper, with his own hand.

But though the treaty of 1762 was evidently forced upon the Nabob, as he afterwards acquiesced under the terms, he was certainly bound to pay attention to its due performance on his part. This circumstance neither he himself, nor any who has espoused his cause, has ever once denied. The treaty had but two objects, the liquidation of past arrears of Persian, and the settling the amount of the future tribute. The very gentleman, who negotiated the treaty itself, has declared, that it “related only to matters of account,” and could not “preclude the Nabob from his constitutional claims upon the Rajah of Tanjore, as a vassal and dependent. The guarantee of the Company went only to the point of Persian. “If there existed in both, or either of the parties, any original, constitutional rights, which were not the subject of the treaty, the Company were not bound,” they had no right, “to interfere.” But, should the Nabob demand a greater tribute than that settled by the treaty, or the Rajah either neglect or refuse to pay the stipulated

* Reuss’s Appendix. No. XXI p. 673.  
† Mr. Du Pre’s Vindication. p. 16.  
‡ Ibid.  
§ Ibid. p. 11.
fum, then the Company, though they had arbitrarily constituted themselves umpires, were obliged to adhere to their own agreement, and "assist the party performing against the party failing to perform" his stipulation. The enforcement of their guarantee might, as it actually happened, lead the Company, as allies or auxiliaries into a war; but when a solemn war is once declared and terminates in success, the principal, and not the ally or auxiliary, acquires the property of what he takes from the enemy, and that without rule or measure; so that he and his assigns are to be defended in the possession of them by all nations.

† 'Ο οίκος ἄνωτέρως τις ἐστι ἐκ ὧν καὶ κατὰ πάλιν ἔκλεισεν τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιεί. Aristot.
Τὸ τὸν κόπον ὁ μέγας τὴν ἑκατέρα προσφέροντες ὅτε κατανεμήσατο. Plutarch in Vita Alexandri.
Affairs of the Carnatic, from 1762 to the Treaty with Hyder Ali, in 1769.

THOUGH the taking of Pondicherry, in the month of January 1761, and the subsequent fall of the few places of strength possessed by the French in the Carnatic, put an end to the national war in Asia, its flames seemed to acquire additional force in Europe, before the end of the year. Spain having suffered the elder branch of the house of Bourbon to experience all the calamities, which follow unsuccessful hostilities, threw its own weight into the scale of France, when the affairs of that kingdom were too desperate to be retrieved. The tide of British success, instead of being flopped by this obstruction, in a manner, acquired vigour from resistence; and the new enemy was soon involved in the same misfortunes and disgraces with the old.

In little more, than the space of a year from the commencement of the Spanish war, a peace was concluded; which secured to the British those advantages in Hindostan, which their arms had acquired. In the eleventh article of the definitive treaty, Mahomed Ali was acknowledged lawful Nabob of Arcot, and guaranteed, in all the rights of that office, by the British and French nations. He was the first Indian prince, except the Nizam, mentioned in the same article, who had ever been comprehended as an ally, in a solemn treaty, between European powers *.

* Vide Treaty of Paris, Art. XI.
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

Three years before Mahommed Ali was declared an ally, by the treaty of Paris, King George II. had honoured him with that title, under his own hand. In a letter of the 21st of February 1760, his Majesty was pleased to assure the Nabob of his "invariable and per-
mant resolution of continuing firm to all his allies, in every "part of the world *." Relying on a royal promise, so solemnly pledged, the Nabob requested, in a letter which he wrote to Mr. Secretary Pitt, soon after the taking of Pondicherry, that, when peace should be made, an article might be inserted in the treaty, to secure the possession of the Carnatic to him and his heirs. In this letter he informed the minister, that he had supplied the army with provisions, during the siege. That he had prevented twenty thousand Mahommedans, who had been invited by M. Lally, from coming to the assistance of the French. That he had been, for fourteen years, connected in their adversity as well as prosperity, with the English. That he had assisted them at Fort St. David, before either Mr. Griffin or Admiral Boscawen arrived. That the misfortunes of his family proceeded, from the inveteracy of the French, on account of his known attachment to the English; and hence he deduced the death of his father, the expenditure of his treasure, and the ruin of his country †.

The treaty of Paris, by guaranteeing Mahommed Ali, in the entire possession of the Carnatic, confirmed in his person all the rights, with which he was invested, at the signing of the treaty. The two sovereign princes, who were the principals in that solemn stipula-
tion, bound themselves and consequently their subjects, from invading any one of those rights. Every encroachment, upon the immunities of an ally, as recognized by the contracting powers, would have been an act of hostility; an infringement, which might have

* MS. Copy of the Letter.
† Nabob's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, Feb. 1761.
justified the interference of the party, who had adhered to the treaty, in opposition to the party, by whom it had been violated. A constitution was formed, for the government of the Carnatic, which the subjects of Great-Britain and France were to observe, at their peril. Should either of these presume to invade that constitution, it was the duty of the sovereign of such invaders, to bring them to condign punishment, and to oblige them to make reparation; otherwise he himself became a party, and furnished the other guarantee, with a justifiable cause of war. The servants of the East-India Company were so sensible of the restraint, which the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris had laid upon their avarice and ambition, that they industriously concealed its contents from the Nabob, for several years.

Intelligence of the treaty, which guaranteed Mahommed Ali, in the entire possession of the Carnatic, had scarce arrived on the coast, when the Presidency shewed their disregard, for the solemn stipulation of their sovereign, by seizing a considerable portion of his ally’s territories. The expences of the sieges of Madras and Pondicherry, together with that of the war in other places, being placed to the Nabob’s account, that prince had been involved in a heavy debt to the Company. Towards the payment of this debt, he had assigned, as has been already related, the annual sum of twenty-eight lacks of rupees, charged upon his whole revenue. Notwithstanding this settlement, they had demanded near double that sum *, in one year, which his country could not afford to pay.

Mr. Pigot, the Company’s President, having resolved to return to Europe, in the end of 1763, shewed an inclination to close his government, with a measure, which, by bringing some splendid advantage to the Company, might throw credit on himself†. He, therefore, desired the Nabob to cede a territory to the Company

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* Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, Oct. 13th, 1770.
† Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 4th, 1763.
in Jaghire, as a reward for past, not as a condition of future services.

But before Mr. Pigot made this decisive requisition, he had managed matters, with an art, if not with a duplicity, unsuitable to those lofty ideas of political honour, with which the defenders of his conduct attempt to adorn his character. In a conversation with the Nabob, at the Admiralty-house in Fort St. George, he first only asked for some villages round Madras; and these only, after the discharge of his debt to the Company*. At another meeting he rose in his demands; and asked Conjaveram and other three districts. The Nabob, after remarking, that from soliciting for villages, the President had increased his requisition to whole countries, reminded him of his having ceded, at different times, St Thome, Turendaporum, together with the fort and territory of Punamallee; and, that, besides, he had relinquished the Peisheenish for Madras, which the Company were bound to pay, by the tenure by which they held that place†. To this Mr. Pigot replied, "that if the four districts mentioned were given, the Company would be extremely pleased and obliged to the Nabob, and would ever assist him and his children with a proper force of Europeans, without desiring any thing further. That till the Nabob had cleared off his debts to the Company, the revenues of those districts, after defraying the expences of the soldiers, should be placed to the credit of his account §."

When the time fixed by Mr. Pigot, for his return to Europe, approached, he proceeded from solicitation to requisition, as has been already observed. The Nabob endeavoured to obtain, in writing, those terms, which the President had verbally agreed to grant. He

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‡ Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, August 15th, 1763.
* Rous's Appendix, No. X. p. 162.
† Mr. Pigot to the Company, August 15th, 1763.
§ Ibid. p. 161.
sent, therefore, the copy of an agreement, containing the terms already specified; which he wished the Governor and Council to sign, prior to their receiving his Sunneds for the Jaghire. But Mr. Pigot returned the agreement unsigned, with every symptom of resentment. This mark of disrespect was followed, by a severe letter from the President, in which he reminded the Nabob of his obligations to the English; and accused him, in almost direct terms, of ingratitude. He told him, that it did not become a man, who owed his whole country to the Company, to ask any conditions for a part of it; "for (said he) they do not take anything from you; but they "are the givers, and you are a receiver." In consequence of these threats, the unfortunate Nabob was obliged to issue unconditional Sunneds, for an extent of country, to the annual amount of fourteen lacks of rupees. The utmost favour he could obtain from his imperious vassals, was the privilege of renting the lands, which he had granted away. This he requested, not from hopes of profit, for the sum is much greater, than the revenue yielded by the Jaghire; but merely to preserve appearances, with his own subjects, by keeping up a show of authority in districts, which were once his own. These arbitrary encroachments on the rights secured to Mahommed Ali, by the treaty of Paris, were begun by Mr. Pigot, after he had formally announced to the Nabob that treaty, but without mentioning the guarantee.

The news of the treaty of Paris, which arrived at Golconda, in autumn 1763, proved fatal to Sullabut Jung, whom the French had raised to the Subahship of the Decan, upon the death of his nephew Muziffer, in February 1751. That weak and unfortunate

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* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, August 13th, 1765.
† 175,000 l.
‡ Sir John Lindsay's Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770.
\[\text{Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, June 4th, 1761. Mr. Pigot, in a letter to the Nabob, dated August 14th, 1763, acknowledges the receipt of the articles of the treaty, but says, they are too long to be written.} \]
prince having been diversed of his authority, by his brother Nizam Ali, had remained, for several years, in confinement. As an insult upon his misfortunes, the usurper of his authority had permitted him to retain the titles of government. But Sullabut owed this distinction and the continuance of his life, to Nizam Ali's fears of the French, who, he believed, were attached to a Subah raised by themselves. But when he found, that they were excluded, by the treaty of Paris, from his part of the Decan, he dipped his hand in his brother's blood; and, by his murder, secured himself against any revolution, that might be attempted in his favour.

In the month of October 1763, Mr. Pigot resigned the government of Madras, and returned to Europe. Notwithstanding the severity and even injustice, with which he had treated the Nabob, he found means to reconcile his mind before his departure. Having offered his services in Europe, in the business of the Carnatic, the Nabob furnished him with instructions, as his agent, annexing to that office an annual pension of twelve thousand pagodas. Mr. Pigot was succeeded in the government by Mr. Palk; a gentleman of a milder disposition than his predecessor, and consequently more suitable to the temper of Asiatics; who are surprised and disgusted at the violent sallies of passion, to which some Europeans are peculiarly subject.

On the 16th of December, in the same year, Pretaupa Sing died suddenly at Tanjore. Prior quarrels, with his general, Mona-ji, and with his own son and successor, Tulja-ji, furnished a plausible foundation for reports, that Pretaupa had not made his exit in the natural way. But whether the furmises of murder proceeded from matter of fact, or from the character of Tulja-ji, who was thought capable of such villany, is a subject unworthy of enquiry. In whatever

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* Nabob to Governor Palk, October 31st, 1763.
† Near 50,000.
‡ Rous's Appendix, p. 83, 89.
manner Pretaupa came by his death, the complexion of his life was not calculated to leave regret behind him, when he died. Raised by a faction, from an obscure condition, in opposition to Shaw-ji, the legitimate heir *, who had been expelled, he was destined to be and actually remained a tool, during the greatest part of his government. Being by disposition false and treacherous, his natural timidity † was a kind of virtue, as it prevented him from the commission of dangerous crimes. He was succeeded in the government of Tanjore, by his son Tulja-ji, a young man, much more weak and more profligate than his father; who, though not virtuous, had confined his appetites to common vices.

Though Pretaupa Sing had been so much favoured, in the treaty of 1762, he shewed no inclination to be punctual, in observing the terms. The twenty-two lacks, which he had agreed to pay as arrears of tribute to the Nabob, had been transferred to the credit of that prince, in the books of the Company. But the second kist, which was payable in April 1763, could only be extorted from him in August, by the terror of the troops, marching to the siege of Madura, who were ordered to stop in the neighbourhood of Tanjore ‡. Notwithstanding this reluctance, in the performance of his part of the treaty, Pretaupa did not fail to ask new favours from the Presidency. He represented, that "the river Cavery should be swelled, that his country should be thereby cultivated to produce money to pay off the debts." He affirmed, that "even the Soucars || seemed unwilling to lend money;" as the river Cavery was not diverted from falling into the Coleroon, by its natural trouble, and threw him into a dungeon. Orme, vol. ii.

* Vide p. 68. This Shaw-ji, or Sahu-ji, was the unfortunate person, whom the servants of the East India Company set up against Pretaupa in 1749. But finding Pretaupa more suitable to their purposes, they agreed to "prevent the pretender" from giving him further trouble, and threw him into a dungeon. Orme, vol. ii.

† Orme, vol. ii.

‡ Roux's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.

|| Indian Bankers.
course. But, continues he to Mr. Pigot, "I depend on your ho-
" nour's friendship, which I have procured in every respect."

Though Mr. Pigot had exhibited every mark of a partial friend-
ship for Pretaupa, in the treaty of 1762, he had neglected one flip-
pulation in his favour, which left his country much in the power of
his superior, the Nabob. The river Cavery, after traversing the ex-
tensive country of Myalore, falls through the mountains, which se-
parate the two coasts, into the Carnatic; and, about six miles to the
north-west of Tritchinopoly, divides its streams between two chan-
nels. The northern branch assuming the name of Coleroon, falls
into the sea at Devi-Cotah †; but the southern branch, retaining
that of Cavery, separates itself, about twenty miles to the easter-
ward of Tritchinopoly, into several large branches, which, passing through
the province of Tanjore, give its fertility to that country ‡. The
streams of the Coleroon and Cavery form, by their separation, the
island of Seringah, famous for the pagoda, from which it derives
its name. The banks of the two rivers, for some miles above and
below Tritchinopoly, "are in no part two miles asunder, in many
" scarcely one: and at Coiladdy, a small fort fifteen miles to the
" east of Tritchinopoly §," the stream of the Cavery was certainly
intended by nature, to rejoin the Coleroon. But a mound of
a considerable length had been anciently erected, to prevent the
streams of the two rivers, from uniting again. The waters of the
Cavery prefers, in their natural course, upon this mound with such
force, that it requires almost constant repairs. As the boundaries of
Tanjore never extended to within many miles of the bank, that
country must have depended, from all antiquity, on the government
of Tritchinopoly, its nearest neighbour.

‡ Lawrence's Narrative, p. 17. § Ibid. The
The treaty of 1762, between the Nabob and the Rajah, had been confined to one object, the amount of the future Peishcush, to be paid by Tanjore *. The Presidency, who had made themselves guarantees of that treaty, had no right to interfere in any other disputes, between the Nabob and Rajah; nor to become arbiters, with regard to the constitutional right of the Carnatic over Tanjore †.

"That was a matter (says the very gentleman who negociated the "treaty itself) which had not been thought of, in settling the treaty "of 1762 ‡." Pretaupa Sing, notwithstanding, seems to have made the reparation of the mound, in some measure, the condition of paying the gifts, which the treaty had directed him to pay to the Company. Mr. Pigot, willing to favour him, wrote repeated letters to the Nabob, in the strongest terms §. But, upon examination ¶, even Mr. Pigot found the Nabob's right to the mound, so decisively established, that he entirely dropped every requisition, on that head ¶. It appears, that Pretaupa Sing himself acknowledged the right to be vested in the Nabob ‖, and that all the different deputies, appointed by the Presidency to examine into the subject, made their reports, that the right of repairing the mound existed in the Nabob alone, as Soubadâr of the Carnatic.

The Nabob, who had no reason to be satisfied, with the treaty, which had been forced upon him, in 1762, shewed no inclination to relinquish any of his rights, which still remained, to gratify the Rajah of Tanjore. Pretaupa Sing, who was neither a stranger to his own want of right, to the mound, nor to the Nabob's feelings,

† Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 28.
‡ Ibid.
§ Rou's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 209.
¶ Mr. Newton, who was appointed by the Governor and Council in May 1763, to examine into the subject, made his report entirely in favour of the Nabob. Rou's Appendix, p. 209.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore, entered in Country Correspondence, No. LXII. March 24th, 1763.
on that subject, proposed an interview, which took place in autumn 1763. The Rajah, in the most submissive manner, acknowledged his faults. He solicited the Nabob’s forgiveness, for his not having paid him the proper respect, when he landed at Negapatam in 1758; and for refusing him admittance into the fort of Tanjore. He begged his pardon, for his invasion of the districts of the Marawar, in express opposition to the injunctions of his superior; for his assisting Usoph Chan in his rebellion; and for all his past offences. He promised, that in future neither himself nor his sons should do any thing disagreeable to the Nabob. That, instead of aiding Usoph, he would take the whole burden of the war against him, on himself. That he would join the Nabob, “both in body and soul;” and that he would consider the Nabob’s enemies as his enemies, his friends as his friends. These declarations “he confirmed with an oath, a stronger than which, in his religion, cannot be taken.”

The Nabob was so well pleased, with the submissive conduct of Pretaupa, that he forgave him the sum of four lacks of Trivambore rupees. He also agreed to make some repairs on the mound; though he uniformly declared, that the diverting all the waters of the Cavery, into the province of Tanjore, was extremely disagreeable to his own people, as the flat country to the east of Trichinopoly would be thereby overflowed. But when Tulja-ji assumed the government, he demanded as a right, what his father had requested as a favour. Instead of flattering the pride of his superior, by applications to him in person, he wrote abusive letters, concerning that prince, to the Presidency of Madras; desiring them to lay their commands on the Nabob to repair the bank. The Presidency, who had uniformly paid great attention to the government of Tanjore,

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The text continues with a discussion of the events surrounding the interview and justification for the Nabob’s actions, as well as a comparison to the conduct of Tulja-ji.
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

CHAP. V.

He is supported by the Presidency.

Caufe of the Nabob’s unwillingness to repair the mound.

Jore, ever since the negociations about the treaty of 1762, vehemently pressed the Nabob, who was incapable of those “winning ways,” which had rendered the Rajah so valuable an ally and so great a favourite. The Nabob, conscious of his own rights, and how little the Rajah contributed towards the general defence, expressed his unwillingness, but complied. Besides, the reluctance, with which he was brought to confer favours upon a man, who had added insult to injury, the Nabob had a political reason, for deferring the repairs of the bank. The Rajah’s assistance was wanted for the siege of Madura; and he knew that nothing, but necessity, would induce him to perform his duty to his superior.

To

JT Rous’s Appendix, paffim.

* Extract of Minutes of Consultation, 28th April 1777.

As the Honourable Court of Directors, in their separate letter per Grenville 12th April 1775, order the Rajah of Tanjore to be restored to the full and entire possession of his dominions as he’d by him in 1762, without infringing the rights of the Nabob of the Carnatic; and as it appears from the letters mentioned hereafter from Rajah Pretaub Sing, as well as the opinions of this Government subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty of 1762, that the right of repairing or amending the Annacutta was then acknowledged to be vested in the Nabob. Resolved, it is the opinion of this Board, that this right doth exist in the Nabob alone, as Souabdar of the Carnatic, and that the Rajah of Tanjore is not to begin, or carry on any repairs whatever, unless permitted to do so by the Nabob. That agreeably to the Nabob’s request, the people sent by the Rajah of Tanjore to the Annacutta should be forthwith recalled, and that the Rajah be informed, it appears from the Company’s records, as well as from his father’s Pretaub Sing’s letters, that he has no right to repair the bank, unless privilege to do by the Nabob. That the Rajah of Tanjore be also informed, the Nabob hath granted permission for the repairing the Annacutta at our desire, and will send orders to his Amiladar at Trichinopoly to give every reasonable assistance, that it may be put in the same state it was during the life of Pretaub Sing. Resolved also, as this has been a subject of constant dispute between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, that the following references to the Records be inserted on this day’s Consultation, to shew at one view to the Honourable Court of Directors, that the right now claimed by the Nabob, has ever been admitted; but that this Board have at all times considered it as a matter of great moment, that the Annacutta should be repaired whenever the banks were broken down or washed away.

The President is directed to acquaint the Nabob of the proper steps the Board have of his acquiescence to have the Annacutta repaired, agreeably to our request to him on that head.

Consultation 21st March, 1763.

A letter is read from the Rajah of Tanjore, entered in Country Correspondence, No. LXII. requesting the Board would direct the Nabob to permit “him to amend the bank.”

Consultation 15th April, 1763.

A letter is wrote from the Board to Mr. Newton, ordered on a survey of the Annacutta, “the
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

To explain this subject, we must recur to former times. The city of Madura, with the province of the same name, being dependent on Trichinopoly, fell into the hands of the Moguls, when they conquered the last mentioned province. During the captivity of Chunder-Saib in the capital of the Marattas, Madura, with the rest of the Carnatic, became subject to the Nabob Anwar-ul-dien. When Chunder-Saib, in the revolution in favour of Muziffer Jung, assumed the title of Nabob of Arcot, Madura was seized by Allum Chan, one of his adherents; but the power of that officer declining at the death of his patron, the Nabob recovered the city, and placed his brother Mapheus Chan in the government. Mapheus Chan was succeeded, in the year 1758, by Moodally; and he, in June 1760, by Ufoph Chan, at

"the Board being desirous to procure for the King of Tanjore the liberty he desired, if it might be done without prejudice to the Nabob."

Consultation 5th May, 1763.
A letter is read from Mr. Newton on the subject of the Annacutta.

Consultation 16th April and 14th May, 1764.
A minute of consultation, and letters from the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore, together with a representation from the Tanjore Vaziquel on the subject of the Annacutta.

Consultation 21st May, 1764.
A letter is written to Mr. James Bourchier, ordered on a survey of the Annacutta, wherein the Board say, "The King hath probably requested more than the Nabob can grant without endangering his own country; and the Nabob is perhaps too tenacious of his own privileges, to comply with the King's request, as far as in reason he ought."

Consultation 24th July, 1764.
A letter is read from Major Campbell, wherein he says, "The Nabob has sent orders to his son, to repair the banks of the Cavery very immediately, and in such a manner that the King of Tanjore will have no reason to find fault with it."

Consultation 28th January, 1765.
The President requisitions the Board, that he had with some difficulty prevailed on the Nabob to permit the King of Tanjore to repair the breaches in the Cavery, and the Annacutta near Malere.

A letter is read from Mr. James Bourchier, describing the breaches of the Annacutta.

Consultation 24th August, 1764.
A letter is read from Mr. James Bourchier, wherein he says, that "a message from the Nabob confirmed what he had all along suspected, that though the Nabob had given his consent to make the repairs the Board required of him, nothing was more difficult from his intention than the performance of it."

Consultation 24th August, 1764.
A letter is read from Sir John Linday's Narrative. Tetarapa Moodally, ruler of the Tinnevelly and Madura counties, found means to obtain Mr. Pigot's private friendship; but he behaved so ill in his office, that it was found impossible to support.
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF

CHAP. V.

Ufoph patronised by Mr. Pigot.
He forces the Nabob to give him the government of Madura.
He supplies him with arms, &c.

Origin and history of Ufoph.

at the pressing instancies of Mr. Pigot, then President of Fort St. George. The Nabob, no stranger to the ambition and treacherous character of Ufoph, remonstrated in vain. The President insisted, that he should have the government, at a very small rent; for the payment of which he himself pledged his faith $1. Whatever reason Mr. Pigot might have had for his predilection in favour of Ufoph, it is certain he interested himself in his favour, with all the warmth and zeal of a friend ||. Not content with extorting the government of Madura for him from the Nabob, the President provided him with arms, guns, and ammunition; which, as there were no enemies then in the country *, seem to have been destined against his master.

Ufoph Chan was a fellow of mean birth, but possed courage and all the activity necessary to constitute a bold partizan. He support him long, in his public capacity. He was, therefore, obliged to give way to Ufoph Chan, another friend.

§ 1bid. But he never paid any rent.

|| The original letters, of which the following are copies, are now in London:

"To the Hon. George Pigot, Esq; President and Governor of Fort St. George."

"Honourable Sir,

"This moment I received a letter from Anjarga, advising, that the 4th instant arrived there 2 Europe ships; they left England 5 months ago; the Norfolk 74 guns, and Panther 60 guns, full of men. And some friends mine wrote me the names of the Governor and Council of Madras.

"Governor,
"John Smith,
"Charles Bouchier,
"Dawfone Drake,
"John Andrews,
"Henry Valetto,
"Richard Fairfield,
"Samuel Aridy.

"Really I am very sorry to hear, but I must think now that my great misfortune; hope to hear the news to the contrary, and beg, "Honourable Sir, to settle my affair in good time, for I am quiet ruined, and have no other friends at all. Conclude this with my kind respect, wishing your good health 

"success in all your undertaking. Believe me to be always with due respect, Hon. Sir,

I am your most obedient humble

& obliged Servant.

(Signed) MAHOMED ESOOf CAWN."

Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, inclosing the above.

"Sir,

"I send you a letter I have received from Ufoph Cawn, which must satisfy you he is a good man, as the contents shew that he fears, without a friend to recommend him to you, he is ruin'd. He is as good a man as Mr. Smith I will answer for it; and if he wants arms they are to defend your country and add to your honour. It I can procure him any, he shall have them, and I will answer for his being a good servant to you. I am, with the greatest regard and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient servant, and assured friend,

(Signed) GEORGE PIGOT."

* Sir John Lindsay's Narrative.
owed his rise, like some greater men, to accident. Having engraved the Company's arms on a gold plate, he suspended it from his neck; and the President, struck with the fancy, ordered an inscription to be put, on the other side, mentioning his merit and valour in war. Ufoph had distinguished himself, as a good soldier, on various occasions; and his gaining the support and friendship of Mr. Pigot, was a proof of his being a good politician. His breaking out into an open defiance to the Nabob's authority, so soon after his taking possession of his government seems, however, to have been a little repugnant to the latter character. Though the rent, which he had engaged to pay, had been rendered "extremely easy," by the influence of Mr. Pigot, he neglected, from the beginning, to remit even that "easy rent" to his master. A conduct so glaringly obstinate could not, publicly, be supported. The Presidency, therefore, found themselves obliged to assist the Nabob in reducing to obedience a servant, whom they had so lately and warmly recommended.†. An expedition was undertaken against him, in the year 1763; but the troops being ill provided, either through design or accident, with proper implements for a siege, the periodical rains forced them to quit the trenches‡.

Though Ufoph depended much upon the influence of his friends at Madras, he was not negligent in securing other friends. The first, the most eager, sincere, and powerful of those friends was Pretaupa Sing, Rajah of Tanjore. This approved ally of the English and faithful dependent of the Nabob of the Carnatic entered into a correspondence with Ufoph, and fostered those seeds of rebellion, which that refractory chief had sown. He advised him not to go to Madras, when his presence was required at that place;
for, said he, "the bad man," meaning the Nabob, "gives advice to the English, to which point we should attend §." He mentioned that the treaty of 1762 "was nothing more than a name ||." That, should the English fail to order the Nabob, to permit the mound of the Cavery to be repaired, that he would send his troops to the place and expect the assistance of Ufoph *. These assurances were sent to Pretaupa, much about the time that he took the most solemn oath appointed by his religion, that he would "take the whole of the war against Ufoph upon himself and join the Nabob, both body and soul, and would look upon his enemies and friends as his own †." But notwithstanding the solemnity of his oath, Pretaupa seems to have adhered, with a kind of mental reservation, to the interests of Ufoph. That chief had informed him in a letter, "that, by the blessing of God, the French squadron would soon arrive;" and, said he, "they consider your protection as their first object *.

The death of Pretaupa Sing only deprived Ufoph Chan of one friend, to give him another in the person of his son Tulja-jì. The first care of that prince was to secure to himself the undisturbed possession of the government, by cutting off the legitimate branches of his own family. Before he extended, as was believed, his hand to his father's life ‖, he murdered his cousin, the son of Nauzee, whom Pretaupa had kept a state-prisoner. Soon after his accession to the government, he sent emissaries into the territories of the Nabob, who killed "Gatica and two of his relations ‡." The unfortunate Gatica, who was destined to terminate a life of calamity, in a death of violence, was the same person, whom M. Lally found

§ Pretaupa Sing to Ufoph Chan. Country Correspondence. India House, Oct. 1764.
This letter was written early in 1763.
‖ Ufoph Chan to Pretaupa. Ibid.
* Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 197.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No, XIII. p. 198.
prisoner in Fort St. David, when he took that place in 1758. He was uncle to the wretched Shaw-ji, lawful Rajah of Tanjore, whose interests and liberty, the Presidency, in a manner, sold to Preetaupa Sing, in the year 1749. Shaw-ji, having made his escape from the hands of the Presidency, the unhappy Gatica, was confined in his place*. But fate reserved his life till the year 1764, to fall by the dagger of Tulja-ji†.

When Tulja-ji had rid himself of every cause of domestic fear, he turned his eyes towards his allies abroad. Upon receiving a letter from Usoph Chan, who was now, besieged in Madura, he returned an answer, in which are the following remarkable words: "I am convinced that you heartily wish for my prosperity, which is near at hand. You wrote me, that I should not delay my assistance to you. You need not, my friend, write often to me on this subject; should any thing happen, I will, with all my troops, join yours immediately without fail." At this very instant, some of his troops were in the camp of the besiegers of Madura. But that circumstance would facilitate the performance of his promise to Usoph, should any reverse of fortune happen to the arms of the Nabob and the Company. Tulja-ji and his father permitted, or rather ordered, a body of French, who were in the service of Tanjore, to join Usoph Chan. Unfortunately for that chief, M. Marchand was one of the number. This man seized his person and delivered him to his enemies. This event happened in the month of October 1764.§. The war cost much blood to the English, and more than a million sterling to the Nabob||, besides the loss of the revenue, which Usoph had withheld||.

* Orme, vol. ii.
† Roux's Appendix, ibid supra.
‡ Tulja-ji to Usoph Chan. Country Correspondence, 1744.
§ Roux's Appendix, No. XI. 1. p. 211.
|| The Nabob was at the whole expense, except the European soldiers, who were paid out of the revenue of the Jaghire. Sir John Linday's Narrative.
||† Sir John Linday's Narrative.
Tulja-jī expressed himself, in a letter to the President of Fort St. George, with peculiar feeling, for his unfortunate friend "I received," says he, "advice from Madura, that the perfidious wretch was seized, and the fort taken; this gave me inexpressible joy. I have offered my prayers, night and day, to God, and it hath now pleased his Divine Majesty to grant what was my desire†." But neither the exemplary misfortunes of his ally, Uloph Chan, nor any gratitude for the favours or fear of the arms of the English, who had made themselves guarantees of the treaty of 1762, could induce the Rajah to perform, with any punctuality, his part of the treaty. Though his country yielded annually near a million sterling ‡; two terms had elapsed without his paying the stipulated Kists to the Company §. This conduct was the more inexcusable, that the Nabob had relinquished four lacks of the tribute, in consequence of his promise to Pretaupa Sing, at their last interview ||.

The taking of Madura, in the end of 1764, only restored the Carnatic to a temporary repose. In the beginning of 1765, Nizam Ali, who had acquired by the murder of his brother, Sullabut, the title as well as power of Subah, entered that province with a great army. With a destructive species of war, he laid waste the open country, without deriving any considerable benefit, from his inhumanity. He subdued every place, through which he directed his march, to fire and sword; and such unfortunate persons as had escaped the latter were only reserved for slavery. The ravages, which he had committed, joined to the heat of the season, for it was now the middle of April, reduced his army to great distress for want of provisions and water. Colonel Campbell, who then commanded the joint forces of the Nabob and Company, having marched from Arcot, came in fight

† Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 211.  ‡ Ibid. p. 198.  § Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 198.  || Ibid.
of the enemy, at the Pagoda of Tripetti; but when the Colonel was preparing to attack Nizam Ali, in his camp, that Subah suddenly decamped, and marching near forty miles, in one day, evacuated the Carnatic, by the way of Collafria and Nellore.

During these transactions, Lord Clive arrived at Madras on his way to his government of Bengal. The conduct of Nizam Ali, together with the expediency of possessing the whole coast, from the boundaries of the Carnatic to those of Orissa, induced his Lordship to procure, from the Mogul, a Phirman, for those countries, which are distinguished by the name of the Northern Circars. These provinces, like most others in the Decan, were chiefly possessed by the native Rajahs and Polygars, in subordination to the Mogul viceroy, to whom they paid a fixed annual tribute. There were, however, many districts subject to temporary renters; and the whole was governed by a deputy appointed by the Nizam. Anwar-ul-dien, the father of the present Nabob, had executed that office, with such justice and reputation, for thirty years, that his family were still very popular in the country. Many of the Zemindars had owed their rise to Anwar-ul-dien; and not only they, but all the inhabitants and husbandmen, had expressed their wishes, that his son might obtain the command of the provinces. Sullabut Jung had offered the government of the Circars to Mahommed Ali during the French war, to detach him from the English cause; and he renewed the same offer, when he quarrelled with M. Bussy at Hyderabad. Even Colonel Forde, when he took Masulipatam, signified the propriety of the Nabob's taking charge of the Circars; but all these offers he declined to accept, without the express approbation of the Presidency.

* Sir John Lindfay's Narrative.
† Nabob to Mahommed Nazib Chan. Nov. 25, 1765. MS. † Ibid. § Ibid.

Lord
Lord Clive, who had been uniformly attached to the Nabob, did not forget the interests of that prince, when he obtained, from the Mogul, the northern provinces for the Company. He procured from the emperor Shaw Allum, Sunnuds, dated the 12th of August, 1765, rendering the Carnatic independent of the viceroy of the Decan. His Lordship, at the same time that he transmitted the Sunnuds, seems to have intimuated his wish to raise that prince to the Subahship itself, should it be found necessary to expel Nizam Ali, in the war which was likely to arise between that prince and the Company, for the northern Circârs. The Nabob excused himself, from accepting the offer, by declaring that "the Decan was too great for him to desire to have the charge of its government." He at the same time assured Lord Clive, "that he was perfectly satisfied with his Lordship's sending him the Phirman of free gift of the Carnatic, which he had been pleased to obtain for him, "from the emperor of the Moguls.""

To enforce the Mogul's Phirman, for the Circârs, General Calliaud marched at the head of the troops of the Carnatic to take possession of those provinces. This he effected, after some skirmishes with the Rajahs and Polygars. Nizam Ali, who was, at the time, engaged in war against the Marattas, in the country of Barad, upon receiving intelligence of those transactions, returned with the utmost expedition to Hydrabad. To revenge himself for the loss of the Circârs, he made sudden and great preparations for invading the Carnatic. To prevent the execution of his design, the Presidency of Madras invested Calliaud with full powers, ordering him to proceed to Hydrabad to negotiate a peace. A treaty was accordingly concluded, on the 12th of November 1766. The principal terms of the treaty were, that the Presidency should assist Nizam Ali, with

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* Sunnud, MS.  
- Nabob's Letter to Lord Clive in 1765, MS.  
† Ibid.  
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XII. p. 183.
their troops; and pay an annual tribute for the Circârs. These conditions were much more disadvantageous, than those upon which the provinces had been offered before; for by the former terms the Company were to have enjoyed the Circârs in Jaghire, on the sole condition of military aid. By the present treaty, they promised service and an annual rent. To pave the way for the treaty, such as it was, the Presidency obliged the Nabob to pay five lacks of rupees to Nizam Ali §; though he was not to derive the value of "a single cash," from the transaction, nor had been even so much as named.

This disadvantageous and even disgraceful treaty lowed the seeds of a dangerous and ruinous war. In consequence of their promise to Nizam Ali, the Presidency ordered Colonel Smith to march to Hydrabad, with a few Sepoys and a troop of horse to join that prince. The money given by the Nabob enabled Nizam Ali to pay off the arrears of his mutinous army. The joint force of the Subah and of his new vassals, marched toward Bengalore, in the province of Myfore; and took that place from the famous Hyder-Ali. The capture of Bengalore seems to have been the object of the treaty of Hydrabad, though that condition is not particularly expressed. In Nizam Ali's march towards Myfore, and during his progress in that country, he was joined by different detachments of the Company's troops, under Colonel Tod, Major Fitzgerald and others, to the number of one thousand Europeans, and five or six battalions of Sepoys. These reinforcements enabled Nizam Ali to collect the tribute from the different Polygars on his march ||.

The Nabob, who, from his knowledge of the country, was enabled to obtain the best information of the secret views of its princes, told the Presidency, that the collection of the tribute, and not a

§ Sir John Lindsay's Narrative. India Papers, passim. || Sir John Lindsay's Narrative.
war against Hyder, was the principal object of Nizam Ali. That notwithstanding the terms of the treaty of Hyderabad had been much more advantageous, than he had any reason to expect, he was not pleased with the conduct of the Company, in obtaining a Phirmān for the Circârs, without either his knowledge or permission, who considered himself as their immediate superior. That Hyder Ali was equally displeased with the treaty, as the Presidency had shewn their animosity against himself, by the readiness which they discovered to assist the Subah in invading his country. That, prior to his expedition to Myfore, Nizam Ali had sent a copy of his agreement to Hyder Ali. That, from these and other circumstances, he, the Nabob, concluded that both would soon terminate their own differences, and, with their united force, attack the Carnatic *

The event justified the suspicions of the Nabob. Hyder Ali being attacked on another side of his dominions, by the Company’s troops, resolved to settle matters with Nizam Ali. Major Bonjeur, with some Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, had been detached towards Kiftnagurry, in the Baramault country †, which he over-ran, and took all the mud forts: but he could make no impression, either on Kiftnagurry, or those forts which were built upon rocks ‡. The country of Baramault had been formerly a part of the Carnatic; but, having fallen into the hands of the Rajah of Myfore, it had submitted, with the rest of his dominions, to the usurpation of his rebellious general, Hyder Ali. These, with other reasons, induced Hyder to make proposals to Nizam Ali, who scrupled not to sacrifice his engagements with the Company, to the interest of his new ally §. A treaty was at last concluded between them, by the

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* Sir John Lindsay’s Narrative. India Papers, p. 331.
† Sir John Lindsay’s Narrative. Oct. 13, 1777.
‡ Rous’s Appendix, No. XI. p. 167.
§ Rous’s Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.
means of Mapheus Chan, the Nabob's brother, who had been dissatisfied, ever since the influence of Mr. Pigot had deprived him of the government of Madura and Tinnevelly, in 1758*.

Secret information of the conclusion of this treaty, having been brought to the Nabob, he advised the President and Council, to order an attack to be made upon Nizam Ali's camp †, before the junction of the Myforean. This advice was disregarded, at least it was not put in execution; but the Company's troops had separated themselves from those of the Subah. In the month of September, Colonel Smith was attacked on his march, near Changamal, by the united forces of the allies. The action was sharp, and lasted an hour; but though the enemy was repulsed, the Company's troops were obliged to retire. Marching for thirty-six hours, without refreshment, the army, having suffered incredible hardships, arrived at Trinomally; and having inclosed themselves, within the walls of that place, where they remained several days, were forced to be witnesses of the destruction of the country all around, with fire and sword. Colonel Smith, having again taken the field, encamped near the walls; but, after a few days, he decamped and pitched his tents near Califhy-wacam, about ten miles, to the north of Trinomally ‡.

While both armies lay in this situation, Hyder Ali detached his son, with five thousand horse, into the Carnatic. This body penetrated to the neighbourhood of Madras; and had the commander managed matters with the least address, he might have seized the President and Council, in their Garden-houses, in the environs of that fort. But the attention of the Myforeans to plunder, deprived them of an advantage, which would have enabled them to dictate

* Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.  † India Papers, passim. Sir John Lindsay's Indian Papers, passim.  ‡ Nabor to the President, &c. Aug. 2, 1767.
the terms of peace. Colonel Smith, having in the mean time attacked the allies, before Trinomally, with some success, sent the army into cantonments at Wandewash. The enemy having appeared beyond Velore, in the month of December, he took again the field, and attacking them, between Ambour and Wanumbaddy, obtained a victory, and pursued them to Caverypatnam. Both before and after the action, Nizam Ali made proposals of peace to Colonel Smith; but that officer refused to treat, till the Subah should shew the sincerity of his intentions, by separating his troops from those of Hyder Ali *

The Subah, bent upon a peace, separated his army, accordingly, from Hyder, in the month of January 1768. In February, a treaty of perpetual friendship was concluded between the Nizam, the Nabob, and the Company. The Nabob’s titles, and the grants of several places, which he had received from the Subah, were confirmed. The Dewanny of the Subahdary of Bijapour, and Carnatic Balлагaut was conferred upon the Company, for which they were to pay seven lacks to the Nizam, and a Chout to the Marattas †. In return the Nabob and the Company agreed to furnish Nizam Ali, with two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon, upon his requisition, should the necessity of their own affairs permit them to comply. In consideration of the losses sustained by the Company, the Subah agreed to deduct twenty-five lacks, from the revenue paid to him from the northern Circârs; besides two lacks for five years from Chicacole ‡. The losses and expences of war had fallen upon the Nabob; the profits of victory were appropriated by the Company §.

When the junction of Nizam Ali with Hyder, threatened the Carnatic with invasion, in the month of July 1767, Mr. Bouchier, the

* Sir John Lindsay’s Narrative.
† Vide Treaty, India House.
‡ Ibid.

President,
President, wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore, for his aid, in the expected war *. That Rajah, who was privately in the interests of Hyder, had publicly renewed his complaints, against the Nabob, about the waters of the Cavery. The bank had been already repaired by that prince to gratify the Presidency; but the Rajah alleged, that he had given orders for enlarging an old gutter, which conveyed a part of the waters into the Coleroon †. Upon receiving a letter from the President, the Nabob gave instantly directions for removing every foundation for a complaint on the part of the Rajah, to prevent him from having any excuse for refusing the demanded aid ‡. He accordingly promised publicly his aid to the English §, but he privately assisted, at the very time, their enemies. Whilst he pretended, that the distresses of his country rendered him incapable of paying a tribute of four lacks to the Nabob, he sent four lacks and four elephants, by his own Vackeel, to Hyder Ali ||. "Depending," says the Rajah, "on your firm friendship, I am in every respect calm in my mind, and all apprehensions are removed from me ¶.

When Colonel Smith had separated the Company's troops from those of Nizam Ali, and retreated into the Carnatic ††, Hyder announced that event to his ally the Rajah of Tanjore. "You must not imagine," said Hyder in his letter to Tulja-ji, "that I attend to any thing, but the destruction of our mutual enemy; you may rest assured of this. My reason for marching into Ballagaut is, that the English troops are retired from my country, and are marched six or seven stages toward Trenomele. I will, by the assistance of God, bring all the army together and

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* Rees's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.
† Ibid. p. 212.
‡ Ibid. p. 215.
§ Ibid. "The Rajah amused them for some time with promises only," &c. M. Du
## Appendix to Nabob's Papers, No. IV. p. 50.
¶ Rajah Tulja-ji to Hyder Ali. Ibid.
†† In September 1767.
"punish the enemy."—"You need not fear the enemy; depend upon your strength, and give no money to them, nor send them any troops, but put them off with delays; and write privately to all the Polygars, dependent upon you, to be in readiness with all their troops."—The Rajah religiously observed the instructions of his friend and ally. But so much perverted has truth been by party, that the advocate of the Court of Directors affirms, that the Rajah of Tanjore was persecuted by Hyder, for his uniform attachment to the interests of the Company†!

Prior to the treaty concluded in February 1768, with Nizam Ali, the Presidency, encouraged by Colonel Smith’s victory over the joint forces of the allies, had resolved, not only to carry the war into Myfore, but to make an absolute conquest of that country. Their letter of the 21st of December 1767 to the Nabob, upon that subject, is a curious instance of clumsy artifice and ill-covered Jesuitry. They press that prince to join the army, promising to give him the management of the conquered country: "But," continues the President, "I cannot now tell you, whom I am to appoint to manage those parts." They inform the Nabob, "the Company would not desire any other countries."—"But," say they in the same sentence, "the Company intend taking under their government some other neighbouring countries at Bombay ‡." They advise him, that they intend to place two lacks of Pagodas to his account of the extraordinary expenses of the war. Yet they say, that it is very uncertain whether Nizam Ali began, from his displeasure against the Company, or on purpose to distress the Nabob. The

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* Ibid. p. 51. This letter seems to have been written in the beginning of September 1767: for it alludes to the expedition of 5000 horse, under Hyder’s son, who penetrated to Madras in that month. Tuljaji wrote a very friendly answer to Hyder, to which the reader is referred. Ibid. p. 52.  
† Vide Mr. Rou’s Restoration, &c. confidere 4.  
‡ President Bourchier to the Nabob, Dec. 21, 1767.
truth is, that the war had proceeded from the rooted resentment of the Subah against the Company, for their manner of stripping him of the northern provinces. The Nabob appealed to themselves that this was the case; but, as they seemed to think that his presence might be useful to their affairs, he promised to join the army.

The object of the Presidency, in sending Mahommed Ali to the camp, was to make a war, which the ambition of the Company had kindled, the war of the Nabob; to furnish a colour of justice, for their charging him with the expence. Though he was sensible of their artifice, he thought it prudent to comply. He accordingly joined the army; but the hands of the commanding officer being tied up, by the timidity and ignorance of field-deputies, the whole summer of 1760 passed in inactivity and fruitless negociations for peace. Though, by the original agreement, between the Nabob and the Company, it had been stipulated, that no business with the country powers should be transacted, without his participation, the field-deputies, at the instigation of Hyder’s vakeel, excluded him from having any share, in the conferences. But Hyder, being well informed, that the Presidency wished eagerly for peace, only amused their deputies, to stop the progress of the war; till the impatience or terror of his enemies should enable him to dictate the terms. Though he affected to wish, for an accommodation, he did not neglect such hostilities, as promised success. He took the important fort of Mulwagge. He gained some advantages over Colonel Wood, who had attempted in vain to take the place.

Though these hostilities might have convinced the Presidency at Fort St. George, and their deputies in the field, that Hyder meant nothing less, than to negociate, on equal terms, they still continued in a manner to solicit peace. The deputies, thinking that the pre-

* Sir John Lindsay’s Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770.
† Ibid.
fence of the Nabob impeded their negotiations, pressed him to return to Madras. The Nabob argued in vain, that his presence in the army would contribute to keep the Polygars and commanders of forts steady to the English interest. The Presidency, entering into the views of their deputies, commanded him to return. They had even threatened him with deprivation, in a letter to the field-deputies; and, when he wrote to them complaining of this insult, they refused to receive his letter. He thought it prudent to return to Madras; where he arrived, in the month of November 1768. Colonel Donald Campbell, a gallant and experienced officer, was obliged to quit the field, on account of his health; and he was, soon after, followed by the field-deputies. All these things discouraged the army, and added spirit to the enemy. Hyder attacked Colonel Wood, plundered his baggage, and recovered all the conquered countries, except a few places of strength. Thus ended the year 1768, in mismanagement, disaster and disgrace.

Hyder Ali, having thus, by his address and spirit, rendered the efforts of the Presidency against his own country abortive, prepared to carry the war into that of the enemy. In December 1768, he entered the Carnatic "with a considerable body of horse and foot "lightly equipped," and penetrated into the province of Titchinopoly. Having advanced towards Tanjore, his friend and secretly, the Rajah of that country, supplied him with four lacks of rupees, and provisions for his troops; and "was ready to join "his interest." Hyder, at the same time, detached one of his generals, into the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly, who plun-

† Sir John Lindsay's Narrative, Oct. 13th, 1770.  
‡ Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 15.  
§ Sir John Lindsay's Narrative.  
¶ Mr. Du Pré's Vindication.  
\* Sir John Lindsay's Narrative. 
\+ Sir John Lindsay's Narrative. 
\- India Papers, passim.
dered and destroyed the country. No part of the southern division
of the Carnatic, except the territories of the friendly Rajah of Tan-
jore, escaped the destructive ravages of the active and enterprising
Myorean. The English army were unprovided with cavalry, and
could neither overtake his march nor stop his progress. The horse,
which the Rajah of Tanjore had sent to the English, as a cover for
his secret connection with Hyder ‡, had been long recalled, by their
perfidious master §. The Myorean pursued his predatory operations
without obstruction. He went twice to Pondicherry to confer with
the French; and, at the same time, amused the English Presidency
with hopes, rather than offers, of accommodation. Having, at
length, sent all his heavy baggage from Pondicherry to his own
country, he proceeded with a body of horse to the Mount, a place
within a few miles of Madras *. Mr. Bourchier, under whose go-

government these misfortunes chiefly happened, had quitted the chair,
and returned to Europe, in the beginning of 1769. His successor,
Mr. Du Prè, wishing to put an end to a war, which, by destroying
the country, deprived him of resources for carrying it on with suc-
cess, listened to the pacific proposals of Hyder Ali; and a peace was
accordingly concluded on the 3d of April 1769.

‡ Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 12.
§ Ibid.
* Sir John Lindsay's Narrative.
CHAP. VI.

Affairs of the Carnatic from the Treaty with Hyder Ali, in 1769, to the Conclusion of the first Expedition against Tanjore in 1771.

In the course of the preceding narrative, which though succinct, it is hoped, has comprehended the most material transactions, on the Coast, the Court of Directors have been seldom mentioned. This circumstance proceeded less, from any inattention to that respectable body, than from their want of importance in affairs, over which they are supposed to preside. Radical defects in their very institution, their distance from the scene of action, their being individually called, from narrow and confined occupations, to the extensive field of political management, their fugitive authority, which scarcely lasted a space of time sufficient for transporting their orders to the east, their being too often ignorant themselves, or too frequently deceived by others, rendered them objects of little consequence, in a political system, which they affected to guide. In a manner conscious of their want of importance, as a body, they endeavoured to pay the debt owing to vanity, by gratifying the demands of self-interest; and, therefore, their great inducement, for soliciting and receiving their places, was to provide for their own relations and friends. This object being obtained, they became little solicitous about the interests of their constituents. To support the appearance of authority, some ignorant clerk, who thought insolence a mark of dignity, penned their dispatches, and assumed the manner.
and dictation of despotic power; but their orders were only obeyed, when they suited the views of those, to whom they were addressed.

Unimportant as the condition of the common herd of Directors might appear to have been at home, it became an object of ambition to their servants, when they returned from abroad. The latter, together with the spoils having acquired the manners of the East, frequently took arms against the authority, to which they owed their power; till by force, by negotiation or compromise, they obtained seats at the Board. The first use they made of their power was to cover the retreat of their own fortunes from India; and to support, in some friend, favourite, or partner in plunder, the same system of venality and corruption, which had enriched themselves. Their local knowledge being blended with local prejudices, instead of enlightening the ignorance of other Directors, perverted their judgment. Inflamed by disappointments, but forgetful of favours, they seldom failed to suggest such measures, as might contribute to distress those, who had failed to extend their liberality to the utmost limits of their avarice. Thus, the injustice and oppression committed by the servants of the Company in India, instead of being checked by the authority of the Directors, were too frequently encouraged by their approbation. These general observations are not intended, as a general censure; for, in the conduct of the Court, we sometimes meet with some commendable deviations, from the lines we have above described and stigmatized.

To return to the affairs of India: In the negotiation with Hyder Ali, which terminated in the treaty of the 3d of April 1769, the Presidency having proposed, that some chiefs, who had adhered the Company, should be included in the treaty; Hyder demanded the same advantage, for the Rajah of Tanjore, on his part*. The Presidency justly conceived, that this demand was made, at the request of

* Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 15.
quest of the Rajah, to preclude any animadversion upon his conduct, for having furnished Hyder Ali, the enemy of the Carnatic, with money and provisions *, for carrying on war against his superior, the Nabob and his protectors the English. The stipulation, in his favour, proved to a demonstration the Rajah's guilt; and that circumstance ought to have induced the Presidency to reject, with resentment, a proposal, which converted a subject of the Carnatic, into an ally to its greatest foe. But, it seems, that peace was, at that moment, such a desirable object, that indignation gave place to necessity. As Hyder shewed no inclination to desert his ally, the Presidency proposed to include him in the treaty, as their friend and ally; to prevent him, from becoming still more attached to Hyder, by permitting that chief to become his avowed protector and guarantee †. Hyder, whose sole object, in the proposition, seems to have been a security to the Rajah, from animadversion, acquiesced in the offers of the Presidency, as still better for his friend, than his own guarantee.

This proposal on the part of the Presidency "did not proceed "from any opinion, that the Rajah's conduct merited their at-
tention to his interest ‡." They had been no strangers to his duplicity and treachery during the whole course of the war. Though, at the requisition of the Presidency in July 1767 §, he had promised to assist them with a thousand horse and twelve hundred sepoys, he neither sent that number, nor did those he sent join the army, till the 19th of February 1768 ||. Had he ordered a body of cavalry to the aid of the English, when they were first required, they might have been of essential service, "whilst the united forces of "the Nizam and Hyder were acting in the Carnatic ‡‡." Their appearance could not then be obtained. But when the Nizam deserted.

* Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 15.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid.
§ Rous's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 213.
|| Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 11.

Hyder,
Hyder, and evacuated the Carnatic, Tulja-ji sent his cavalry to join the English, "when their service could be of little use." "This pretended aid was only given to save appearances, and to furnish, in case of need, a future plea to both the contending parties; to the Nabob, that he had assayed; to Hyder, that he only seemed to assist." His cavalry, soon after they had joined Colonel Wood, in the Coimbettour country, "dropped off by parties at a time;" till, at length, the whole either deserted of themselves, or were recalled by their master, long before the conclusion of the war.

The dilatory and suspicious conduct of the Rajah, his inattention to the requisition of the government of the Carnatic, which had constitutionally a right to his assistance in war, his acting, upon almost every occasion, contrary to that spirit of mutual friendship, which had been the only basis of the treaty of 1762, had neither escaped the notice, nor had been suffered to pass, without the animadversion of the Presidency. In their letter of the 8th of October 1767, they had signified, to the Court of Directors, their reasons for being dissatisfied with the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore. The Court of Directors, happening at the time to be led, by men of comprehensive ideas and political talents, did not hesitate, upon a subject, which involved the peace and security of the Carnatic. Conscious, that the treaty of 1762, having only the quantum of the annual peishcush for its object, did neither infringe nor abolish the right of the Carnatic to the military service of Tanjore, without insinuating the least doubt on that subject, they delivered their sentiments to the Council at large, and sent decisive orders to the Select Committee, on the 17th of March 1769; whilst the war with Hyder Ali was still depending.

* Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 12.
† Ibid.
§ Ibid.
¶ Ibid.
|| East-India House.
¶ Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 12.
These sentiments and orders explain the delinquency of the Rajah of Tanjore, at the same time that they define the mode of punishing him, for his unjustifiable conduct. "We observe with great dissatisfaction (say the Directors to the Council at large) the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore, who forbore so long to join you with his horse; and when they did join you, they seem to have been of no manner of use. It is very extraordinary, that when the safety of the Carnatic was in danger, he should have acted so dubious or so pusillanimous a part. When we consider the protection we have given that Rajah, and the long and uninterrupted tranquillity his country has enjoyed by it, we cannot but feel the strongest resentment at his conduct. Our further sentiments on this subject, and powers of acting therein, are entrusted to the Select Committee."

Those powers were accordingly addressed to the Select Committee, in the following words: "It appears most unreasonable to us, that the Rajah of Tanjore should hold possession of the most fruitful part of the country, which can alone supply our army with subsistence, and not contribute to the defence of the Carnatic. We observe the Nabob makes very earnest representations to you on this subject, in his letter entered in the book of Country Correspondence; wherein he takes notice, that the Zemindars of the Carnatic have been supported and their countries preserved to them by the operations of our forces, employed in his cause, and that nothing was more notorious, than that three former princes of the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore Rajah seventy, eighty, nay, even one hundred lacks of rupees at a time; that to the preceding Nizam he had paid a contribution of fifty lacks; and the present, if he had met with success against our army, would not have been less extraordinary."

* When attacked, in September 1767, by the united forces of the Nizam and Hyder Ali.  
† Directors to Governor and Council, March 17th, 1769. India-House.
have been content with less than a crore* of rupees from the Rajah. How just then does it appear, that he should be made to bear some part of the expense of those measures, to which he owes his security and the peace of his country! We, therefore, enjoin you to give the Nabob such support in his pretensions on the Rajah of Tanjore, as may be effectual; and if the Rajah refuses to contribute a just proportion to the expenses of the war, you are then to pursue such measures, as the Nabob may think consistent with the justice and dignity of his government.

The sentiments of the East-India Company, with regard to the constitution of Tanjore as well as the conduct of its Rajah, may be collected, from the above letter and orders. It appears, that, though the treaty of 1762 had limited the annual tribute to four lacks, the ancient constitutional right of the Carnatic to the military service of Tanjore, remained unimpaired‡. That the Rajah, having long evaded that service, had at last industriously given it, in a way, which "had been of no manner of use." That the Court of Directors considered Tanjore, as a part of the Carnatic, and consequently subject, by a certain tenure, to its government. That they judged the contributions raised, from former Rajahs, proper precedents for the present Nabob, in the sums he might think just to demand, as a part of the expenses of a war, during which Tanjore had been protected from the ravages of invaders. That they seemed to allow, that the Rajah was no more than "a Zemindar of the Carnatic," depending on its government, and deriving from it his protection; and that the Company, as allies to the Nabob, were not only justified, but even bound "to pursue such measures, as that prince might think consistent with the justice and dignity of his government," in pu-

* About 2 million sterling.
† Letter to the Select Committee, March 17th, 1769. India-House.
‡ Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 16.
nishing a vañal, who had, neither with arms nor money, contributed to the general defence.

The positive orders of the Court of Directors, for calling the Rajah of Tanjore to account, for his conduct in the war, did not arrive till autumn 1769, when the season was too far advanced, for carrying them into effect. But other reasons, besides those, which arose from the climate, weighed with the Presidency, when they resolved to suspend the execution of the orders, till a more proper opportunity should present itself. The ravages of Hyder Ali, the vigour with which he had carried on the late war, the earnest if not commanding manner, with which he had insisted, that the Rajah should be comprehended in the peace, the animosity, which he had exhibited on every occasion, against the Nabob, rendered it highly probable, that he would not remain a tame spectactor, should an expedition against Tanjore take place*. Though he was engaged in disputes with Nizam Ali and the Marattas, he might be induced to compromise matters, with both those powers, and turn his arms against the Carnatic, which he had resolved, it was believed, on all occasions to distress†. These were the offensible motives, which prevented the Presidency from carrying "the commands of their masters into execution;" for they declared, "that the Rajah certainly deserved chastisement; and not only for the supply of money and provisions, with which he had furnished the enemy, instead of assisting the Nabob and the English, but for since delaying the payment of the peishnav, settled by the treaty of 1762, which had become due in the month of July 1769 ‡." This last he had done "under the pretence of poverty, and soliciting to have the whole remitted, in consideration of the expence of the troops

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.  
† Ibid.  
‡ Ibid.
he had sent to the assistance of the English, during the late war;  
and which gave the English no assistance §.

They affirmed, at the same time, that had no constitutional dependence in the Rajah, no acknowledged superiority in the Nabob existed, it was "undoubtedly most reasonable, that Tanjore should bear a part of the charge of repelling the invaders of the Carnatic, by which it was surrounded on all sides *. That this principle, even if it had not been established, by any particular compact, treaty, or agreement, was clear and determinate, as resulting from equity and the natural rights of governments. That it was certainly contrary to sound policy in the Carnatic to suffer the existence of such a state. That, if the Nabob possessed the whole power of the Carnatic, it would be good policy in him, and consistent with the principles of the Hindostan governments, to reduce Tanjore to the same terms of obedience and control, to which other Rajahs had been reduced; and that it would be equally good policy in the Company to do the same, had they possessed the whole power of the Carnatic†. That the impropriety and inconvenience of such a state subsisting, in the heart of the province, had been evident from the Rajah's conduct, in the war with Hyder Ali; and that this conduct might have furnished the Presidency, with a just plea for calling him to an account, had not the state of the neighbouring powers rendered an expedition against his capital, dangerous in the execution and uncertain in the event‡.

Whilst the Presidency were arguing thus, at Madras, intelligence of the peace with Hyder Ali arrived in England. The letters of the Court of Directors are full of indignation at a treaty, which, they said, could be only justified by necessity. After accusing the

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§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939. 
* Ibid. p. 938. 
† Ibid. 
‡ Ibid.
CHAP. VI.

Presidency of having misrepresented the Nabob, on account of his disapproving of a peace, in which he is not so much as once named §, they recapitulated some instances of their unjustifiable conduct to that prince, during the war. They reprimanded them, for "having pompously appointed him Phoufdar of Mysore;" and for accusing him, on account of his accepting that nugatory gift, "of an inatiable desire of extending his dominions ||." They insinuated, that by following their advice, "he found himself reduced, disappointed, and almost despised," yet that they "blamed him for want of temper *." Having repeated some passages in their several dispatches, they endeavoured to condemn them on their own evidence. They accused them of irresolution as men, disability as negociators, weakness and deficiency as politicians. They affirmed, that though they had rashly dared to route the jealousy of the country powers, they had not discovered, on trying occasions, the becoming firmness necessary to support the dignity of the English name; and that by their feeble conduct in war, and their pusilla-nimity in submitting to a treaty dictated by an enemy, "they had "laid a foundation for the natives of Hindooftan to think they may "insult the Company at pleasure, with impunity †."

Proceeding from this general censure, they dwelt with particular severity on the article in the treaty with Hyder, which comprehended, at the recommendation, or rather at the command, of that chief, the Rajah of Tanjore. "Had you indeed obtained," say the Directors, "from the Rajah of Tanjore the horse and assistance "you solicited; had he thereby drawn upon himself the resent-"ment of the enemy; had it been difficult, on the Rajah's account, "to have appeased Hyder, there might have been some merit, in "procuring the Rajah safe terms. But we do not conceive that

§ Rous's Appendix, No. XX. p. 534.  
|| Ibid. p. 532. 
* Ibid.  
† Ibid. p. 533.
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"Hyder has discovered so much want of penetration, in his transactions with you, as to warrant a supposition, that he could himself be imposed upon by such an artifice; and his warm attachment to the Rajah of Tanjore, manifested by strenuously insisting he should be included in the treaty, could scarcely be unknown to that prince. What their sentiments must be of persons, whom they had reduced to the necessity of practising arts of this nature, it is not difficult to determine.—We cannot discern any advantage gained, by this extraordinary effort of your skill in negotiation, which you make matter of so much merit. The plain fact is, that the Rajah of Tanjore, who, as tributary to the Nabob, ought to have furnished his quota towards carrying on the war, which he has not done, is still styled by you, a friend to the Carnatic; and by Hyder's adherence to him, for refusing to assist you, he is, as we conceive, effectually sheltered by the faith of a treaty, from being compellable to contribute a single rupee, towards defraying the expense of the war. Our former orders, therefore, in this respect, relative to the Rajah of Tanjore must be suspended, because they are, by your conduct, rendered utterly impossible to be carried into execution without committing a breach of the treaty you have concluded †."

The concluding paragraph of the above quotation has been held forth, by the advocates of faction and party, as a revocation of the orders of the 17th of March, 1769, relative to the calling the Rajah of Tanjore to account, for his conduct in the late war. It appears, however, by the subsequent conduct of the Court of Directors, that they themselves did not extend the meaning of their own words to the pitch, to which they have been since wound up, by hirelings or too busy friends. In the letter of the Presidency to the Court, dated the 31st of January, 1770, they "point-

† Rou's Appendix, No. XX. p. 515.
“edly declare, that they do not think the treaty with Hyder any

"obstacle to the execution of the orders they had received §." That

letter was received in July, just four months after the pretended

revocation had been dispatched to India. Instead of enforcing the

paragraph, as revoking their orders of the 17th of March 1769,

"the Directors never thought proper to take notice of the subject

directly or indirectly.” The Presidency, therefore, had every

reason to consider the paragraph, which is now set up as a revoca-
tion of the orders of 1769, as the strongest confirmation and en-
forcement of those orders ||. The Court, instead of doubting of the

propriety of their own orders, express much displeasure and disap-

pointment, at the article of the treaty with Hyder, which, as they

conceived, opposed the execution of those orders. The truth is,

the part of the paragraph, which factious writers construe into a

revocation, appears to have been merely an effusion of passion, from

minds chagrined, irritated and enraged, at the manner and terms

of the treaty with Hyder Ali. But this is not the place for finally
discussing a subject, which must be resumed in the order of time.

The unsuccessful war, which had raged, for some time, on the

cost of Coromandel, together with managements in all parts of

India, had not only routed the attention of the Court of Directors,

but turned the eyes of government towards the East. In autumn,

1769, the Directors having appointed three commissioners, to examine

and superintend the affairs of the Company, in all the Presidencies,

applied to Government, for a squadron of men of war, “to give coun-

“tenance to their affairs *.” The commander of this squadron was

Sir John Lindsay, an officer of distinguished merit in his profes-
sion; who received also a commission from the Company, as their

plenipotentiary to all powers, upon or near the gulf of Persia; at

the same time, appointing him “commander in chief of all their


" ships,
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"ships, frigates, and armed vessels, in and through all parts of "India †." The commissiioners, appointed for superintending and managing affairs, throughout India, were Messieurs Vanfittart, Srafton, and Forde, men of character and experience, whose melancholy fate is still recent in every one's mind.

Sir John Lindsay was invested with still higher powers, than those conferred by the Company. He was appointed by a commissiion under the great seal, his Majesty's Minifter, with plenipotentiary powers, to Indian princes in general; but more particularly to the Nabob of Arcot, who had become an ally of the crown of Great Britain, by the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris. The managers of the affairs of the Company at home, as well as their servants abroad, had industriously concealed, from that prince, the nature and import of that article for several years. The success, with which this secret was preferved, furnishes an irrefragable proof, that every individual thought it his own interest, to keep the Nabob in a state of ignorance of his rights. Though that prince had obtained, at length, some knowledge of the nature of the guarantee, which secured to him the possession of the Carnatic, he had found it almost impossible to avail himself of that knowledge. The authors of his grievances were the only channels, through which he could convey his complaints; and self-preservation effectually prevented them, from becoming their own accusers. In the beginning of 1769, some account of his sufferings had been conveyed to the throne; and, before the end of the year, Sir John Lindsay, as plenipotentiary from his Majesty, was on his voyage to India.

On the 26th of July 1770, Sir John, after having remained some months at Bombay, arrived at Fort St. George ‡. Having laid his commissiion before the Nabob, he opened to that prince the object of his embafly and the nature of his instructions. He


assured
assured him, that it was his Majesty's firm design to adhere to all
the promises made by his late royal grandfather, in his letter
of the 21st of February 1760. That it was his Majesty's per-
manent resolution, like that of the late king, to continue firm to
all his allies, in every part of the world. That the king was
determined to support those engagements, into which he had en-
tered, by the treaty of Paris, with other European powers, to se-
cure the Carnatic to the Nabob and his posterity. That should it
appear, upon examination, that the distressed situation of the affairs
of that country, had proceeded from the intrigues of any of his
Majesty's trading subjects, the Nabob might depend on the royal
protection and friendly assistance; when the real state of the hard-
ships, under which he laboured, should be laid at the foot of
the throne. That to enable his Majesty to vindicate his justice
and good faith to the whole world, he had laid his commands on
the plenipotentiary, to demand in his Majesty's name, a full and
succinct account of the Nabob's transactions with the Company,
since the treaty of Paris; that, upon a full information of all
affairs, his Majesty might have it in his power, not only to re-
dress past evils, but to prevent future oppressions.

In answer to these assurances, the Nabob expressed himself, in
terms full of gratitude, for such distinguished marks of his Majesty's
friendship, and the repeated assurances of the royal protection to
him and family. He assured the plenipotentiary, that he could
find no words to express the deep sense he had of his Majesty's
goodness, in so reasonably interposing in his behalf, and offering his
royal assistance, when he most stood in need of support. But not-
withstanding those expressions of gratitude, he was still afraid to
avail himself of the protection of the Crown against men, who
might continue to possess that power, under the rigour of which

§ Counter-signed by Mr. Secretary Pitt.
|| Sir John Lindsey to the Secretary of State, Oct 13, 1770.
* Ibid.
The East India Company.

he had already so much suffered. To improve his fears, various reports were industriously propagated. Some insinuated a want of powers in the plenipotentiary; others the insufficiency of those powers, had they really existed, in opposition to the charter of the Company. Jealousy, disappointment and resentment arose, at once, in arms. The Nabob, knowing the fate of other princes, who had fallen victims to the displeasure of the Company, began to dread, that resentment might induce them to deprive him of his country, as their servants had threatened, two years before‡. The example of the Nabobs of Bengal was constantly present to his eyes, with all its melancholy circumstances †; and he shuddered at giving offence to a body of men, whose insolence, tyranny, rigour and injustice he had so frequently experienced. Disappointed ambition, and a still more hardened and vindictive passion, disappointed avarice, were likely to lie in wait, for a proper time, to satiate themselves, with the utmost exertions of revenge. The support offered was at a great distance and in itself uncertain; but the enemy was near and sure of seizing every opportunity, to wreck their resentment upon an unfortunate man, who presumed to appeal for protection, from the dictates of insolence and the demands of rapacity.

The event shewed, that the Nabob’s fears were better founded than the hopes of support presented by the plenipotentiary. In a government, subject to frequent changes of men and consequently liable to fluctuations in opinions, promises of protection are, at best, but unintentional deceptions, which may lead the credulous into ruin. This observation has actually been verified, in the person of Mahommed Ali, Nabob of the Carnatic. The oppressions of the Company, the imperious rapacity of its servants, had forced him to throw himself under the protection of the state. The state, in

† Sir John Lindsay to Mr. Wood, Oct. 13, 1770.  ‡ Sir John Lindsay to Lord Weymouth, Oct. 13, 1770.
the most solemn manner, promised its protection; and, in the
person of an ambassador, vested by the seal of Great Bri-
tain with every legal power to pledge the public faith, af-
fured the Nabob, that it was only necessary for him to specify
his grievances to have them redressed. He accordingly specified
his grievances; but, after having been amused during three years,
with the vain parade of an embassy, he found himself, in a much
worse condition than before. The royal commission was recalled,
without having accomplished the least article of the avowed ob-
ject, for which it had been granted. The plighted faith of the
Crown was broken; the credit due to the great seal of one of
the first states in the world was destroyed, at the requisition of a
body, who had tarnished the honour of a free nation, by in-
numerable acts of tyranny and oppression. To this source may
be traced all the late misfortunes of the Nabob of the Carnatic.
Government, instead of fulfilling engagements, which every state
holds sacred, remanded back the wretched fugitive to the fetters,
from which he had attempted to escape. The Company enraged
at the presumption of his defection, have added revenge to those
forbid and unjustifiable passions, from which he had already suf-
fered so much; and with a peculiar refinement on cruelty, whilst
they divest him of his rights, they deprive him of his reputation,
the last comfort of the unfortunate.

The Nabob had sufficient discernment to foresee a part of those
misfortunes, which have since fallen on himself and his family, on
account of his having appealed, from the oppressions of the Com-
pany, to the justice of the Crown. He, therefore, expressed the
greatest anxiety about his own perilous situation, when the plenipo-
tentiary demanded a faithful account of his grievances. But, upon
the plenipotentiary's "promising, in his Majesty's name, that should
" it become necessary for his protection, and the security of his fa-
"mily,
mily, he would enter into a solemn treaty with him, as soon as he "should make the necessity of such a measure evident *," the Nabob gave a full detail of his transactions with the servants of the Company, from the year 1760, when he was dignified with the title of an ally by the late king. He justly considered, that his being acknowledged the ally of that monarch, had entitled him to the royal protection against the injustice of the subjects of Great-Britain, as well as against the force of foreign Europeans. This protection had been pledged in the most solemn manner; but the Nabob's neglecting to secure himself, by the treaty offered by the plenipotentiary, frustrated, in the event, his hopes of redress.

Though the servants of the Company on the Coast had, almost uniformly, during the wars with the Nizam and Hyder Ali, treated the Nabob with contempt and injustice, the Court of Directors seem to have respected his rights, in the year 1769. In their instructions to the three commissioners, dated the 15th of September 1769, they enjoined them "to provide effectually for the honour and security of "their faithful ally, Mahommed Ali, Nabob of Arcot." They blamed the Presidency, for their injustice to that prince; and stigmatized their conduct, as a most "flagrant breach of their repeated orders." They declared their sorrow to find, that the imprudent and impolitic schemes of the Presidency had eventually increased the debts of the Nabob, and accumulated his distress. "When we reflect (continued the Court of Directors) on the long experience we "have had of Mahommed Ali's faithful attachment to the English "Company, we are surprised at the idea entertained by the Governor "and Council, in their letters of the 8th March and 27th June "1768, to reduce him to a mere nominal Nabob †. The faction of

* Sir John Lindsay to Lord Weymouth, Oct. 15th, 1770.
† To complete the whole, as the Company's servants found the expense of the war with Hyder increasing, and as the appearance of troubles in Bengal forbade them to hope for assistance from that quarter, as they probably had then a prospect of making peace with
the treaty of Paris, by which treaty public faith became the guarantee of the Nabob's title, will be of little use to him, if no notorious infringements of the rights and powers usualy inherent in, and dependent on, such title, should be by us countenanced and permitted to take place. More especially as, perhaps, we might thereby involve ourselves in the very disagreeable necessity of answering, at some future period, for the infringement of a public treaty and the consequences thereof. Unfortunately for the Nabob, the commissioners defined to carry these instructions into execution, never arrived in India.

Though the Presidency at Fort St. George had affected to comprehend the Rajah of Tanjore, in the treaty of the 3d of April, as their friend, he was no stranger to the circumstance, that he owed that favour to Hyder Ali. A principle of gratitude to that chief, or rather a fixed aversion to the Nabob and his allies, the English, had thrown him entirely into the interest of Hyder, with whom he carried on an uninterrupted and friendly correspondence. Depending on his aid, or following his advice, he not only evaded the payment of the peishcheh settled, by the treaty of 1762, but even peremptorily demanded fourteen lacks of rupees from the Nabob, as the expences of the troops, which he had sent to the assistance of the English in February 1768, but which he had withdrawn, before they had been of "any manner of use."

" with Hydey, or little hopes of conquering his country, they resolved to take the Car- native into their own hands, as the only means of paying the expense of the war, which they had undertaken contrary to the advice of the prince of the country; to leave the Nabob, though included in the treaty of Paris, and an acknowledged ally by their sovereign, a name only, "without a country. This," they say, "may look like violence, but the measure is necessary, and not a thing to be considered or doubted of," Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, 21st January 1771. Instructions to the Commissioners, Sept. 15th, 1769. § Letter from Select Committee, Sept. 29th, 1770. || 175,000 l. Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 562. * General Letter, March 17th, 1769.
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Though the Rajah seems to have been sincere in his attachment to Hyder, that crafty chief wished to command more decisively the councils of his weak, versatile and vicious ally. That profligate young man, being destitute of every dignity of mind, was always fond of the Company, and was consequently led, by the advice of men of the lowest cast and most servile professions. Gilbiliapah, a Barrawar, an office similar to that of a pimp in a common brothel, but if possible of less dignity, was first his favourite and afterwards his minister *. In the beginning of the year 1770, one Hussen Khan Soor, a fellow who had used to get his living at Putcotah, by catching fish †, having recommended himself to the Rajah, by playing on a musical instrument, was placed by him, in the chief management of the affairs of government. Mona-ji, who had served his family so long, was not only displaced, but confined; and even a plot for affaffinating him, in his own house, was formed ‡. The new minister, who seems to have been a Mahommedan, proved so ungrateful to a foolish master, who had raised him from the dust, that he is said to have devised a scheme for placing the fort of Tanjore, in the hands of Hyder Ali §. Tulja-ji, who was as inconstant in his favours, as he was versatile in his politics, became soon tired of the fisherman, and dismissed him from the office of minister ‖. But no change of servants wrought any favourable alteration in the mind of the Rajah. In the month of July 1770, he was in arrear, for the stipulated tribute; and he continued his intrigues and correspondence with Hyder Ali, throughout the remaining part of the year ‡. 

In December 1770, the designs of the Rajah to disturb the repose of the Carnatic, began to be discovered by intelligence received, from various quarters, by the Presidency, as well as by the Nabob. A

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* The Author of the Defence of Lord Pitt explains his self, in making a Barrawar, a character of dignity. That vile appellation is too coarse to be even pronounced, by any Indian, possessed of delicacy.
† Rous’s Appendix, No. XXII, p. 656, 657.
‡ Ibid., p. 637.
§ Ibid.
‖ Ibid.
¶ Ibid, p. 569, 570.
vackeel from Hyder Ali. to the Rajah of Tanjore, was flopped, with his retinue at the fort of Caroor, under the jurisdic- tion of Trichinopoly, till orders should be received concerning him, from the Nabob and the Presidency. An intercourse of letters had passed, between Tulja-ji and Madaverow the chief of the Marattas; and the hostile preparations, which were made throughout the territory of Tanjore, seemed to place it, beyond a doubt, that something more, than mere ceremony, was the foundation of the Rajah's correspondence, with foreign powers. On the 2d of February 1771, the Rajah marched from Tanjore with an army, with the professed intention of proceeding against the country of the Marawar. That country extends, along the bay of Bengal, from the borders of Tanjore to point Ramen, the nearest part of the continent to the island of Ceylon, from which that point is separated, by a shallow and narrow channel. The sea, stretching to the west from point Ramen, borders the country to the south; and an ideal line divides it, on the west, from the province of Madura, to whose Rajah the Marawar was tributary, before the Carnatic fell into the hands of the Mahommadans. Madura itself, with all its vassals, depended on the province of Trichinopoly, when the latter was reduced by the Moguls; and consequently its tributaries, under their ancient tenures, were transferred to the conquerors. The Marawar himself acknowledged his dependence, and was obliged to furnish "his quota of troops to the government of Trichinopoly, in time of war and danger." The country, properly called that of the Marawar, was itself divided into two governments, the most extensive of which was subject to a chief called

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 569.
† Ibid. p. 569.
‡ Ibid. p. 570.
§ Jefuits, Letter, vol. ii. The President and Council of Fort St. George do not appear to have been well informed concerning the dependence of Marava, or the country of the Marawar. We find, by the letters of the Jefuits, who travelled in Marava in 1769, that it had from all antiquity been subject to the government of Madura.
¶ Rous's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 581.
¶¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 672. 680. 682.
the Polygar of Satputty *, or the Great Marawar; the latter was known, by the name of the territories of the Polygar of Nellahcottah, commonly, but corruptedly, filed Nalcooty.

The pretensions, by which the Rajah justified his hostilities, against the Marawar, were founded upon prior transactions, which require to be explained. In the year 1716, some disputes arising between the Rajah of Tanjore and the Marawar, the former invaded the territories of the latter; who, though he was assisted by his superior, the Rajah of Trichinopoly, was defeated, and lost a part of his country to the victor †. Sadatulla Chan, then Nabob of the Carnatic, being the lawful superior of both the contending parties, having interfered, transferred their disputes into his Divan, who settled them under certain restrictions, with regard to the countries seized by the Rajah of Tanjore ‡. Upon the death of the Marawar, in the year 1725, his successor was displaced, by a relation, aided by the arms of Tanjore. Another pretender arising was assisted, in the same manner, by the Tanjorines; but, after he got possession of the government, he proved ungrateful to his benefactors, and having defeated them, in the field, expelled them from the countries, which they had seized in 1716 §. In the time of Pretaupa Sing, his general, Mona-ji, retook the ceded territories; but the Marawar repudiated himself of those territories, in the year 1764, when the Nabob and English were engaged in the siege of Madura ||. It was to recover what his father had lost, that Tulja-ji took the field, with a rabble rather than an army, consisting of sixty-four thousand men ¶. He was joined on his march by some topisles and artillery-

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* Rees's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 590.
† Ibid. No. XXII. p. 682.
‡ Ibid. p. 684.
§ Ibid.
|| Ibid.
¶ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 581. This rabble consisted of

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<td>Peons</td>
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<td>Commotions</td>
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64,000 men,
The Tanjorines, having taken the barrier of Mooderwauly, in the first week of February *, entered the territories of the Marawar, ravaged the open country, took almost every place of strength, and sat down before Ramnadaporam, the capital, before the end of the month †. The Marawar himself being a minor, the management of affairs was in the hands of his mother, the widow of the late Marawar, a woman of a masculine spirit. To prevent herself and her son from falling into the hands of the Rajah, she kept a quantity of powder near their apartments, to which she had resolved to let fire, should they happen to be driven to the last extremity ¶.

The vigorous defence of Ramnadaporam, at length, induced the Rajah to listen to terms, a few days after he had opened his batteries. The conditions were, that the Marawar should give alkack of rupees in ready money, two elephants, two pieces of cannon, some jewels, and other things of value. That he should cede to the Rajah the countries he had lately taken by force; and deliver the fort and district of Armogan, for the residence of a person of the blood of the Marawar, whose pretensions the Rajah had engaged to support ¶.

"Having finished the business of the Greater-Marawar**, to use the expression of the Rajah, that of the Leffer-Marawar or Nalcooty only remained, which he resolved also to finish §§. Having effected his mode of settlement, by extorting money, territories and things

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§ R Ran's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 572.
|| Ibid. p. 573.
† Ibid. p. 574.
†† Ibid. p. 594.
¶ Ibid.
††† Ibid. p. 605.
** *Ibid. p. 609.
§§ Ibid.
of value from Nalcooty, he returned to Tanjore; but kept his army in readiness to take the field †.

Though the Marawar was almost as faithless a vassal, as the Rajah of Tanjore, to the Nabob, he did not fail to apply very early for the assistance of that Prince, against the invader of his country. The Leffer Marawar or Polygar of Nalcooty, knowing that he was destined to be the next victim, was equally pressing in his solicitations for the support of his superior. Both owned their dependence and submission as subjects of the Carnatic*; they silled, flattered, entreated, and promised ‡. The Nabob, as the power of the sword was in other hands, could only send remonstrances to the Presidency. During the military progress of Tulja-ji, which continued only six weeks, he wrote twenty-two requisitions; but the government of Fort St. George were, either too cautious or too ill prepared to take the field. Mr. Du-Prè, the President, wrote a letter to the Rajah, on the 14th of February ††, expressing his surprise at his commencing hostilities, without laying the state of his disputes with the Marawar before the superior of both, the Nabob of the Carnatic. He told the Rajah, that he had given him, upon other occasions, his friendly advice; and that, now, on behalf of the Company, as guarantee of the treaty of 1762, he was obliged to give it as his opinion, that the part the Rajah acted was contrary to that treaty §. The President added, "When you reflect on this, if it be your intention to maintain peace and friendship with the Circar of the Carnatic and the Company, you will, no doubt, immediately recall your troops; refrain from the least hostility against the Marawar, depending that justice will be done, upon enquiry into the circumstances of the case."

† Mr. Du Prè's Vindication, p. 35. † Ibid. p. 574.
‡ Ibid. p. 586. ‡ Ibid. passim.

Though
Though the Rajah received this letter, before he sat down before Ramnadaporam, about the 20th of February, his answer was only returned on the 25th of March, a considerable time after he had "finished" the affairs of the Marawar. Having given some account of the origin of his claims on the Greater and Lesser Marawar, together with injuries which he pretended to have received from the Polygar Tondiman, he concludes his letter with the following words, which are more expressive of his views and refractory conduct than any comment that could be made: "You are a protector of my "government," you say, "notwithstanding you have not settled "a single affair belonging to me*. If I stay quiet I shall greatly "hurt my dignity, wherefore I marched myself. If you now ad- "vise me to desist, what answer can I give to it†? In the treaty, "it was not forbidden to clear the country possessed by the Marawar‡, or to undertake an expedition against the Polygars, who "may use compulsions; since it is so, it cannot be deemed contrary "to treaty. You write, that if I desist, you will settle the affairs in "a reasonable manner; I continued to speak to you, this long "time, concerning this affair, but you have not settled it; not- "withstanding, if you now write, that I did not acquaint you before "I began it, what answer can I make to it§? I have finished the "affairs relating to the Marawar and confirmed him in his business. "The affair with Nalcooty remains to be finished, which I shall "also finish‖.

Though this letter, particularly the sentence with which it concludes, was considered by the Select Committee‡‡, in the light of a

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* Mr. Du Pré had settled the treaty of 1762.
† He had now finished the business.
‡ "The treaty related only to matters of "account." Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 16.
§ At the very time that the Rajah gave, in a manner, the last direct to the English President, he corresponded in the most friendly manner with the French Governor of Pondicherry; and sent a Vackeel to the Marattas, who threatened at the time the Caracc with invasion.
‖ Roux's Appendix, No. XXI. p. 608.
‡‡ Ibid. p. 609.
‡‡ March 28, 1771.
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defiance*, they were unwilling, for various reasons, to carry things to extremities. To a want of ability of taking the field with effect, they added their fears from foreign powers, especially from the Ma-
rattas†. Mislaking the insolence of Tulja-jī for a confidence de-
ferred from the certainty of aid, from the neighbouring states, they became irrefolute and indecisive in their councils; if a judgment may be formed from the perusal of their minutes. But there is rea-
son to suspect, that private animosity, in this case, as well as in affairs of greater intricacy, superseded, or at least suspended, the re-
gard of the Presidency for the public weal. The confidence which the Nabob had derived from the support of his Majesty's minister, had diminished their influence at his Durbar; and, from a resent-
ment, natural to men jealous of power, they were unwilling to in-
volve themselves in a war for the constitutional rights of a govern-
ment, which they had ceased to control. An intercourse of sharp letters, which had begun between them and the Plenipotentiary upon his arrival, still continued; and, as the Nabob seemed to lean towards the sentiments of the latter, in his correspondance, fresh fuel was added to the flame. Their deliberations could not be suppos-
to partake of any complaisance to the inclinations of that Prince; and we, therefore, must conclude, that their subsequent resolutions against Tanjore proceeded either from necessity or a sense of justice, and not from any favour for the Nabob ‡.

Toiled between the expediency and even necessity of bringing the Rajah to account, for his unjustifiable conduct, and their own animosity against the Nabob, the Presidency became irrefolute, inde-
cisive, and fluctuating in their councils. On the one side, a sense of duty and an attention to the public safety erected a bul-
work of facts and arguments, to support their resolution; on the

* Root's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 665.
† Ibid.
‡ 'The Company's servants really appear to be exceedingly sorry, that the prince...'
* 'India know their SOVEREIGN is greater than...'

C H A P. VI.

Irresolute conduct of the Presidency.

Jealous of the influence of Sir John Lindsay.

Their resolutions against Tanjore proceeded not from favour for the Nabob.

Their fluctuating conduct.
other, animosity and excessive caution swept in and levelled all again. In deliberating on the subject, they brought before them such of the Company's orders, as seemed to affect what they called "their present critical situation." The Court of Directors, in their letter of the 27th of June, 1770, had strictly forbidden them "to become "parties in any disputes between the powers of India."---But the Rajah of Tanjore was not an independent power, but a feudatory, a vassal, who had failed in his duty to the Carnatic, of the peace of which, the Presidency were the guardians. The Court of Directors had declared, in their letter of the 23d of March, 1769, that they were bound by the treaty of Paris to acknowledge, and strongly urged by honour and interest to support Mahommed Ali as Nabob of the Carnatic. Yet they strictly forbid their servants, even in support of their ally, to invade the dominions of those, who desire the friendship of the Company, and do not forfeit it, by becoming themselves the aggressors. But the Rajah of Tanjore had not only leagued with their enemies, but had become "the aggressor," by kindling a war in the heart of the Carnatic, the peace and tranquillity of which they had been ordered to defend and vindicate. The Court of Directors had, in their letter of the 17th of March, 1769, given strict orders for bringing the Rajah to account, as a vassal of the Carnatic, for his conduct during the Mysore war; yet in their letter of the 23d March, 1770, in a fit of passion with their servants, on account of the treaty with Hyder Ali, they seem to suspend the execution of their orders relative to Tanjore. But the Presidency were of opinion, that the article of the treaty, which included the Rajah, was so far from securing him, from being brought to account, for any breach on the constitutional rights of his superior, that it could not be con-

* Rout's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 659.  
† Ibid. p. 660.  
‡ Ibid. p. 662.  
§ Ibid. p. 663.
trued to defend him against animadversion, for his unjustifiable behaviour during the war.

Without having recourse to the orders of the Court of Directors, which, however positive, as they were made for general purposes, could never completely embrace the variety of circumstances which might arise, the Presidency should have recurred to the expediency of the measure, founded upon the constitutional rights of the Nabob and the Rajah. It appears that the Rajah's conduct was not only unjustifiable, but deserved immediate chastisement, because, being himself a tributary of the Carnatic, his taking up arms against its dependents, was an act of hostility against the government to which he was a vassal.

That had it even been true, which was by no means the case, that the Maratha war was not dependent on Trichinopoly, the Rajah was highly reprehensible, in deciding by arms disputes, which ought to have been settled, according to ancient custom, by the Divan of the Nabob of the Carnatic. That, as his lighting the flames of war, not only without the consent, but contrary to the express orders of his superior, was an act of rebellion, it was the duty of the allies of that prince to assist him "in a manner consistent with the justice and dignity of his government." That independent of their engagements to the Nabob, their own interest and the safety of the possessions of the Company, depended on the speedy reduction of a man, who was privately connected with the Marattas and Hyder, and had invited the arms of both to an invasion of the Carnatic. That, besides his intrigues with the powers of India, he had not only shewn a manifest partiality for other European nations, in pre-

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f Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, p. 16.
Rous's Appendix, No. XXI.
Rous's Appendix, p. 659.
Rous's Appendix.

† President to the Nabob, Feb. 20, 1771.
Rous's Appendix, March 17, 1769.

§ Court of Directors to the Select Committee.
ference to the English, but had obstructed and discouraged the commerce of the latter. That, instead of adhering to the treaty of 1762, in which he had been so much favoured, he had refused or neglected to pay his tribute, for the last two years. That, without any dissimulation on that subject, he insulted the guarantees, who had solemnly bound themselves to "affit the party performing "against the party failing to perform," by declaring, "that if the "English are inclined to maintain the friendship, the tribute may "be paid sometime sooner or later," plainly making their good behaviour the condition of his performing his own duty. That it was, as contrary to justice as to sound policy, to permit a power to exist in the heart of the Carnatic, who, instead of contributing to the general defence, was ready with his treasure and troops, to assist invaders. That, upon the whole, the connection of the Rajah with the enemies of the Carnatic, his hostilities against its dependents, his flagrant breach of the treaty of 1762, his partiality to others in opposition to the English interest, his disobedience to his superior, his ingratitude to his protectors, his behaviour in the late war, the danger, if not certainty of his kindling another war, unless prevented, rendered it, at once, just, expedient and necessary, to bring him to a severe account for his conduct.

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<td>§</td>
<td>The tribute had remained unpaid since July 11th, 1762. P. 624, 684.</td>
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<td>&quot;The Rajah has, however, given grounds for many pretences to treat him with severity; he has not paid the Peshshuith regularly, he did not furnish assistance in the war; and he did furnish provisions and paid a sum of money to Hyder, when he entered the Carnatic, in the beginning of 1769.&quot; Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 685.</td>
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<td>&quot;The Rajah has broken the peace; he has not even paid the Peshshuith; he is in every respect the aggressor. The Nabob is the party injured; and the Presidency are bound to see justice done.&quot; Sir John Lindsay to the Presidency, March 20th, 1771. Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. p. 285.</td>
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Though the Presidency felt the force of all those arguments and facts, they proceeded, with manifest caution, if not coldness, in their preparations, for an expedition against Tanjore. The want of military stores, a deficiency of funds for the other expenses of war, the declaration of the Marattas in favour of the Rajah *, real or supposed dangers from Nizam Ali, the attachment of Hyder to Tulja-ji, the connection of that Rajah with the French and other Europeans were the obvious reasons, for the inactivity of the Presidency. But, it is apparent, that the jealousy of the Company’s servants of the influence of his Majesty’s plenipotentiary with the Nabob, which jealousy had been inflamed into passion and even vindictiveness, by an intercourse of intemperate letters, had been the chief obstacle to decisive measures †. The Rajah, ascribing their inactivity to their want of power, acquired confidence, and remained in the same state of open defiance to the Nabob and his allies. Having “finished” the business of the two Marawars, he returned to his capital, which he prepared for defence ‡. He advanced a considerable force, within two stages of Trichinopoly. He resolved to take 6000 Marattas into his pay; and as an undoubted demonstration of his intentions, he detached a body of five hundred chosen horse, a battalion of Sepoys and two guns, to surprize and take the Nabob’s second son, who, he had heard, was on his way to Trichinopoly §.

Notwithstanding the apparent unwillingness of the Presidency to plunge themselves into a war, in support of the rights of the Nabob and their own guarantee of the treaty of 1762, the Rajah’s conduct had become so glaringly hostile, that they could no longer remain inactive spectators ||. They had been frequently solicited in

* Rous’s Appendix, No. XXII. p. 679. † Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1771. Vide Remarks on the Nabob’s Letter of March 24, 1771. Rous’s Appendix, No. XXII. p. 682 to 689.
‡ Sir John Lindsay to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1771. § Ibid.

|| Rous’s Appendix, No. XXII. p. 686.
vain by the Nabob; but, now, they applied to that prince in their turn. Mahommed Ali, either impressed with those difficulties, which had suggested themselves to the Presidency, or, from a doubt of the expediency of the measure, or a despair of the success of an expedition against Tanjore, expressed his unwillingness to accede to their proposal. He informed them, that there were three obstacles to the undertaking, which seemed insurmountable. That the Rajah had sent a large sum of money to the French, a thing much in his power, on account of his wealth. That he had gained Hyder, by whose means he hoped to become independent of the Carnatic; and that he had solicited and obtained the promise of assistance from the Marattas. The President, in answer to the Nabob's objections, observed, "that things were now come to such a pass, between the "Rajah, the Company, and the Nabob, by the great lengths to "which the former had gone," that he really believed Tanjore would join any enemy of the Carnatic. That the reduction of a force so hostile was essential to the safety of the Nabob and to the interests of the Company. That an expedition of the nature of that proposed must ever be attended with risk, and might be productive of an invasion by the Marattas; but that their coming, at that time of the year, would be attended with less loss and danger, than in the season, in which the Nabob had been so eager for the expedition. That, as to the French, it was indeed most probable, they would join the Rajah, as soon as they were in any condition for that purpose; but, that this circumstance, instead of being an objection to the expedition, was the most urgent motive to the undertaking it, before they had acquired the power of giving effectual aid to the enemy. That, as to Hyder, there was little to be apprehended from that chief, considering the present untoward state of his own affairs.

* June 12, 1771. Rous's App. No. XXII. p. 685.  † Ibid. p. 686.  § Ibid.  § Ibid.
To these reasons, the Nabob replied, "that he was under the order" of the Presidency. But the committee, who had waited upon him, on the occasion, thinking that he wished to shelter the measure, under that expression, declared that every thing depended, on the resolution he himself should form. Doubting no longer the sincerity of their intentions, he begged leave to ask three questions: Whether the object of the expedition was merely to chastise the Rajah? The recovery of a sum of money, for his contumacy? Or the absolute conquest of the country? The committee answered, That could the Rajah be brought to the payment of a large sum of money, and to submit to such regulations, as might remove all future apprehensions, it were better than to proceed to absolute conquest. But that, as it was doubtful, whether the Rajah could be brought to secure terms, without coming to that extremity, it was necessary to adapt the preparations for the expedition to that ultimate object. The result was, that the Nabob became, for the time, reconciled to the proposals of the committee, upon their affuring him, that whatever sums of money might be taken from the Rajah, should be applied to the discharge of his debts to private creditors, after deducting from those sums, the expenses of the expedition. But after this acquiescence of the Nabob, he recurred, in the beginning of July, to his former objections. These, however, were again over-ruled, by the eagerness of the Presidency for an expedition, which the insolent conduct and dangerous intrigues of the Rajah had, now, rendered absolutely necessary.

Notwithstanding this second acquiescence to the inclinations of the Presidency, the Nabob's aversion to a military expedition recurred. Preferring negociation, to a recourse to war, it appears, that he proposed to bring about an accommodation, by the means of the Maratta vackeel §. In a conference with the President, on the 22d of July,

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† Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 687
‡ Ibid. p. 690.
§ Ibid. p. 693.
he insinuated his aversion to hostile measures, stated difficulties, and hinted the expediency of remaining quiet at present, and deferring the expedition to another time. In another conference, on the 23d " he expressed his disinclination to an immediate expedition, " chusing rather an accommodation with the Rajah, to be negociated " by himself, without their interposition; but desiring, neverthe- " less, their support to the measure. It appears, that the Select Committee, taking the whole seriously to their consideration, had come to a resolution to leave the negociation to the Nabob, and to give him every support †. " By the minutes of the 29th of July it " also appears, that the Nabob had opened his demands to the Tan- " jore vackeel; but that the vackeel declared, he had no powers to " accommodate the matter; that finding the negociations at Madras " might be attended with ruinous delays, he had proposed to send his " eldest son to Trichinopoly, requesting the Presidency to support " him, with the appearance of resolution, to compel the Rajah, if " necessary, by military force. On the other hand, the Rajah, meaning nothing less than a reasonable accommodation, " used de- " lays, procrastinations, and evasions, in order to waste the time, " till the setting in of the rains, and the rising of the Monsoon, " should deprive the Nabob and English of the power of military " compulsion, for the season."

The designs of the Rajah appeared so evident to the Presidency, that they perceived no probability of his submitting to safe and honourable terms, without military compulsion. Orders were, therefore, issued to General Smith, on the 30th of July, to prepare the army assembled at Trichinopoly, for taking the field. These orders mentioned, " that the Nabob had determined to accept terms from
"the Rajah;" but the Presidency, at the same time, declared that "it was highly probable, the Rajah would never comply with such terms, as should be deemed safe, honourable and sufficient, unless compelled by force of arms." Under the supposition, that matters might proceed to an absolute conquest of Tanjore, they made prior arrangements for that event. Upon the requisition of the Nabob, they agreed to place the country and capital in his hands; in the same manner, as the Company had done, on former occasions, with respect to the forts and territories of other Zemindars, who had been reduced, on account of actual rebellion against the government of the Carnatic, or for withholding the customary tribute. In return, the Nabob promised to pay to the Company a free gift of ten lacks of pagodas, with a donation to the troops, in compensation for the plunder, should the place be taken by storm. But he refused to receive a garrison of the Company's troops, as a matter of right, into the fort; though he declared, "that whenever there should be occasion, he should desire and solicit the Presidency to garrison the place," in the same manner as Trichinopoly and Ve-lore."

Men,

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Substance of Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, &c.

The motives to the expedition of 1771 were partly in obedience to particular orders; partly to fulfill the guarantee of the treaty of 1762; but chiefly from just apprehensions that the general peace of the Carnatic, and even the immediate possessions of the Nabob and Company would be endangered, should not the power of the Rajah of Tanjore be checked.

The temporizing and deceitful conduct of the Rajah, in the Myfore war, had excited the resentment of the Court of Directors. This they express in very pointed terms, in their letters to Madras, of the 17th of March 1769. In the 7th paragraph of that to the Select Committee, after animadverting severely on the conduct of the Rajah, for not contributing to the defence of the Carnatic, which he ought to have done as a tributary, they enjoin them to give
H I S T O R Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T O F

C H A P. VI.

The whole argument flattened relative to the pretensions of the Company to the disposal of Tanjore.

Men, who neither understood the constitution of the Carnatic, nor the peculiar situation of the Presidency, have stigmatized these terms with

give the Nabob such support in his pretensions on the Rajah, as he might think consistent with the justice and dignity of his government.

These orders were positive. But before the Committee had taken any measures in consequence of them, they had the mortification to find that the indignation of the Court of Directors, so lately expressed against the Rajah of Tanjore, was transferred to themselves. In the treaty with Hyder Ali, at the close of the Myfore war, the President and Council of Madras had, for political reasons, included the Rajah, on the part of the Carnatic, though his conduct deferred no attention to his interests. From their misjudging the nature and extent of this transaction, it was condemned by the Court of Directors, in terms full of circumspection and reproach. In their letter to the President and Council, of March 23, 1770, after some satirical observations on the skill of their servants in negotiation, they say, that the King of Tanjore, who, as tributary to the Nabob, ought to have furnished his quota towards carrying on the war, is effectually sheltered by the faith of a treaty from being compellable to contribute a single rupee; and that, therefore, their former orders, relative to the King of Tanjore, were necessarily suspended, as being rendered utterly impossible to be carried into execution.

The chagrin rather than the conviction of the Directors, relative to the consequences of the treaty with Hyder, is evident. The Presidency, in their own vindication, wrote their sentiments very fully in their letter of January 31, 1770. They explained the motives of the war and peace with Hyder, and declared it as their opinion, that the stipulation with respect to the Rajah could neither be an obstacle to the execution of the orders of the 17th of March 1769, nor shelter him from any constitutional claims of the Nabob for military service or otherwise.

The same sentiments were repeated at different times. If, therefore, the Court thought them inadmissible, they ought to have signed their disapprobation, and thereby have prevented the execution of orders which appeared to them inconsistent with the treaty. So far from that, however, they took no further notice of the matter. The Presidency, therefore, thought themselves warranted, from the silence of the Company, to consider the orders of 1769 as still standing in force, whenever the situation of affairs should demand their execution. They accordingly mentioned them in their dispatches of the 20th of July 1771, as one reason, among others, for calling the Rajah to account. Those dispatches were received in England in January 1772; and the Court of Directors approved of the conduct of their servants to that period.

From these circumstances, it is submitted, whether the Presidency had not reason to understand the silence of the Court of Directors as an acquiescence in their explanations on that subject; and whether they judged amiss in considering the angry paragraph, which is now set up as a revocation of the orders of 1769, to be rather a motive for their enforcement. The Court signify much displeasure with their servants for a certain article in their treaty with Hyder; but what they say is evidently more expressive of their fears lest that article should prove an obstacle to the execution of their former orders, than of a wish that those orders should be suspended. Were one permitted to hazard a conjecture, it might be supposed that there was not an intention to suspend, much less to revoke, those orders, until the new arrangements for restoring the Rajah in 1775 rendered a disapprobation of old measures necessary.

With what colour of justice, therefore, can the Court of Directors pass so severe a censure upon their servants as to tell them that, in the expedition of 1771, they had departed from the letter and spirit of the Company's orders? If the duplicity of the Rajah's conduct in the Myfore war appeared to the Company in such a light, as to warrant the decisive orders which they
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

with the name of concessions, and, as such, have ascribed them to private and selfish motives. These ought to have considered, that as the

they had given to their servants in 1769; how much more forcibly did both the letter and spirit of those orders speak, when the Rajah not only refused to pay to the Nabob the arrears of a tribute stipulated by the treaty of 1762, and for the performance of which the Company had made themselves the guarantee; but when, at the same time, in defiance of all remonstrances, and in direct violation of the treaty with Hyder, he became an aggressor, and took up arms against the dependents of the Carnatic!

Had the treaty with Hyder stipulated anything in favour of the Rajah which could even be supposed to impede the execution of the orders of 1769, his following conduct plainly removed the obstacle. By a breach of the treaty, he forfeited all right to its benefits; and consequently the orders, instead of being any longer doubtful, became instantly clear and decisive, and assumed the same force and vigour as if no such treaty had ever existed.

But the Presidency have no need to appeal to suppositions, and the deductions arising from them, in their own vindication. They can plead the express declaration of the Company themselves for the justice of their proceedings. The Directors, in their letter to the Nabob of March 25, 1772, acknowledge, that the rashness of the Rajah in taking up arms against the Marathas and Nolcoor would, at all events, have urged them to unloose the sword in order to chastise him, had the Nabob ensured the necessary resources. When, therefore, the Nabob did ensure the necessary resources, the expedition had its sanction.

Such was their own tenure in 1772, of the principle upon which their servants had proceeded in 1771. They avow the spirit of the orders of 1769 in its fullest extent. Whatever, therefore, may be now alleged to invalidate those orders, it is evident that a different mode of construction was not adopted till after that period. But the expedition of 1773 made a very material change in the state of the Carnatic. That change of circumstances seems to have suggested a change of measure; and, to justify the new system, it became necessary to condemn the old.

Enough, it is hoped, has been now produced, both from the records of the Company and their servants, to convince the impartial public that the expedition of 1771 was strictly conformable to the orders of 1769. But there were other motives, besides an obedience to those orders, which rendered that measure not only expedient but even necessary.

The Rajah of Tanjore refused to pay the tribute stipulated by the treaty of 1765, for which the Company were responsible; he would not contribute his quota towards the charges of the Mysoor war; he had rebelliously invaded the rights of other subjects of the Carnatic, by force of arms; and there were the strongest reasons to suspect, that he had been in negotiation with the Marattas, Hyder, the Dutch, Danes, and French. From all these circumstances collected together, the servants of the Company thought they saw sufficient cause, not only to be upon their guard, but even to make use of compulsory measures, should the refractory conduct of the Rajah continue to render them necessary.

They proceeded, however, with deliberation. Being adverse to a decision by arms, if it possibly could be avoided, they first had recourse to lenient methods. They remonstrated to him on the impropriety of his behaviour, and represented the consequences to which it must expose him. They promised him the protection of the Company, as soon as he shewed that he desired it; but assured him, at the same time, that a regular payment of the pecuniary, and a strict compliance, in all other respects, with the treaty of 1765, were the only conditions on which he could either hope to obtain their friendship, or even ecape their resentment. But nothing would do. Persuasion and threats were
the dispute related only to the feudal rights of the Carnatic over
the Rajah. He remained obstinate. His capital was besieged; but, when the breach became almost practicable, he submitted to the Nabob's propositions, and the army returned to Trichinopoly.

It was easy to foresee, however, that this compromise would not be of long duration; at least, on the part of the Rajah. Accordingly, fresh differences soon arising between the Nabob and him, a second expedition was undertaken against him in 1773, which ended in the total reduction of his country.

In the letter of the Court of Directors of the 12th of April 1775, both expeditions have been much cenured, though the first was once approved. But, as the same principal servants were not in office at Fort St. George, at those different periods, it is only to vindicate the expedition of 1771 that the present observations are submitted to the public. Those gentlemen, who are chargeable for the succeeding measures, can, no doubt, if necessary, sufficiently answer for themselves.

It is therefore to be hoped, that enough has been said to vindicate the government of Fort St. George, on that occasion. But, should anything further be wanting, to satisfy the mind of the reader, it is supplied by the Court of Directors themselves, in their minute of the 18th of August 1773; wherein their Chairman, in their name, complimented the Governor on his return to England, in very high terms of approbation, for his wife and upright management of their affairs; for his good conduct towards their ally the Subah of the Carnatic; and, in particular, for his invariable regard to their orders in all cases.
the French power had been annihilated on the coast. That, as allies, auxiliaries, or mercenaries, they could acquire no inherent right to any territory, they might overrun, to no fortress, they might seize. That the keeping possession of Tanjore, which is a part of the Carnatic, would have been a direct breach of the treaty of Paris, by which Mahommed Ali is guaranteed in the entire and exclusive possession of that country. That should it be granted, a concession which we are, by no means, inclined to make, that Tanjore was not a part of the Carnatic, yet, if conquered in a regular and solemn war, it must have become such, as that war was the war of the Nabob, not the war of his auxiliaries and mercenaries, the Company. That, as the Company neither were nor could be principals in hostilities, which might terminate in the capture of Tanjore, their taking possession of that place for themselves, or for any other than the Nabob, who was the principal, would have been an act of private injustice, if not robbery, punishable by the common law of the state, of which they are the subjects. That, granting they may have had a right, in some cases, to become principals in war in the Carnatic, they had evidently no such right, in the present dispute; for though the Rajah had broken the treaty of 1762, by his refusing to pay, for the last two years, the stipulated peisheuith, that treaty was not their treaty, and they had no right to enforce its terms, but upon the express requisition of the Nabob. That this requisition could only place the Company, in the light of allies; and that, as allies, they had no claim to the disposal of any conquests, made in the war, either by the law of nature or nations.

The Nabob's eldest son, being invested, by his father, with powers to accommodate matters with Tanjore*, arrived at Trichinopoly, about the 20th of August 1771†. Preparations, sufficient for taking the field, being made, Seid Muckdoom Ali, an officer of rank in the Nabob's service, was sent to Tanjore, with letters from the

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p 724.
† Ibid. No XXIV. p 821.
President, from General Smith, and from the Nabob's son, containing proposals of accommodation. Tulja-ji, having imprisoned his general, old Mona-ji, and the Dobeer, who had managed his finances, had thrown the whole of his affairs, into the hands of Gilbilliapah, the Barawar or pimp, whom we have already described. It is doubtful, whether this vulgar minister exhibited most insolence or folly, in a conference, which he deigned to hold with the bearer of the joint requisition of the Nabob and the English. Seid Muckdoom having informed him verbally of the terms, he had been empowered to propose, "Gilbilliapah flew into a violent passion." "You will see (says this impertinent Barawar) in what manner I shall thresh the English, so that they will long remember" the correction of this hand. "I will order my Sepoys to fire, from the great smoke of which the English will not be able to see any thing; then I will fall upon them with my horse; the dust kicked up by their heels, will get into the eyes of the English, as soon as the smoke is dispersed." "This is an excellent scheme (Seid Muckdoom replied), and certainly the true way of threshing the English." The Barawar minister, still continuing his apt allusions, said, "the way to catch birds is to put a piece of wax on their heads, when the sun is perpendicular; which melting the wax, the same will run into the eyes of the birds, and then they may be taken."

This wise and modest minister having finished his conference with Seid Muckdoom, that officer was sent for by the Rajah; who abruptly asked him, why he had come to Tanjore? "I have brought (said Seid Muckdoom) letters from the English governor, the English general, and the eldest son of the Nabob." "What have

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1. Rnr's Appendix, No. XXIV. p. 865.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Gilbilliapah was not ostensibly re-
"I to do (replied the Rajah) with the governor? I do not desire him to guarantee the treaty now." But when he saw the letter from the Nabob's son, he flew into a violent passion, and expressed himself in terms, with respect to the Nabob, which seemed so indecent, that they could not be repeated by Scid Muckdoom. The Rajah's answer in writing is marked, with the insolence and folly of his character. He insisted that the Nabob, instead of receiving the arrears of tribute, and satisfaction, for the Rajah's own rebellion and injustice, should defray the expenses of his troops; and, in short, in opposition to each demand, he set up a like demand of his own.* He concludes his letter, with saying: "I, on my part, sent my demands in writing, which, I hope, you will take into consideration. I am ready to undertake the same business" (that of war) "which you come upon at present.""

All hopes of negotiation being at an end, General Smith marched, with the army, from Trichinopoly, about the middle of September. Having repulsed the Tanjorines, who had attacked him, on his march, he sat down before the fort of Vellum, which was evacuated by the enemy, on the 20th of the month. On the 23d, the army encamped before Tanjore; but the batteries against the place were not opened, till the beginning of October. The French of Pondicherry and the Dutch at Negapatam had both sent Europeans to the assistance of the Rajah; and the Dutch, besides, had supplied him with guns and ammunition in abundance. The fort of Tanjore was accommodated with every necessary, for an obstinate defence; a numerous garrison, composed of Arabs and disciplined Sepoys, plenty of provisions, and an inexhaustible magazine of military

† Mr. Da Prè, who was governor of Madras in 1771, had settled the treaty of 1762.
† Rous's Appendix, No. XXIV. p. 865.
* Ibid.
† Ibid. p. 866.
‡ Ibid. p. 868.
§ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 788.
** Ibid. p. 789.
frores. The care and success, with which Tulja-ji had provided the means of war, proved, that he had long meditated a revolt; and had his foreign allies seconded his hopes, he might, perhaps, as he afterwards threatened, have "driven the English, not only from " Tanjore, but from the coast.”

During the siege, in which instances of spirit and courage were exhibited, on both sides, the Rajah, in the usual manner of the East, continued to treat for peace, to retard, if possible, the operations of war. The season was far spent; the rains and monsoon were near; and should these set in, he knew that the enemy must break up the siege, and consequently put an end to treating; and another year might procure new allies, or obtain the effectual assistance of old friends. On the 25th day, after the trenches had been opened, a breach, which was thought practicable, was made. This circumstance induced the Rajah to think seriously of a temporary accommodation, to save his capital. The rains had, now, set in, and the Nabob’s son, dreading the consequences of a repulse, in the assault, communicated the offers of the Rajah to General Smith. He, at the same time, told the General, that if he thought the fort could be taken, he would delay the negotiation; but the General spoke so undecidedly, on that head, that the terms offered by Tulja-ji were accepted on the 27th of October *.

The most material conditions of this treaty, which, however, the Rajah never meant to perform, were these: The immediate payment of eight lacks, being the peisuiss of the two preceding years; thirty-two lacks, and 50,000 rupees, for the expenses of the army; for which districts of his country, capable of paying that sum, in two years, were assigned. The Rajah agreed, besides, to cede the fort of Vellum, to give up his claim to the districts of Elangad and Coiladdy, and to relinquish the Jaghire district of Arni. He pro-

* Rous’s Appendix, No. XXII. p. 877, 878.
mified to restore the lands, money and effects, which he had extorted from the greater and lesser Marawar; to send troops to the assistance of the Nabob, upon that prince's requisition; to be a friend to the friends, an enemy to the enemies, of the Carnatic; to deliver up European deserters, to give no protection to the run-away Polygars of Warriarpollam and Arialore. He, also, engaged to permit the trade of the English Company to extend itself through his whole country; and to treat their weavers and other dependents with kindness. The Rajah had scarcely signed the treaty, when he began to equivocate about the terms. But, as the guns had not yet been drawn from the batteries, dispositions were made for recommencing hostilities; and a fresh negotiation ensued. Thus ended the first expedition against Tanjore, and the army returned to Tirchonipolly and its environs.

When intelligence arrived at Madras of these transactions, the Presidency expressed their concern and surprise at the terms of the treaty, as inadequate to their expectations, and, in themselves, totally insecure. They were so much convinced of the latter, that they declared, in their letter of the 7th of November, 1771, to General Smith, that it appeared "necessary, that, in the very com-

### Table: pecuniary advantages gained by the treaty were these:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two years peshiculah recovered</td>
<td>8,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on ditto</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indemnification for charges of the expedition payable in two years</td>
<td>35,50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazir to Nabob's eldest son</td>
<td>3,00,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto to his second son</td>
<td>1,00,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rupees</td>
<td>45,27,000</td>
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<th>Countries acquired, and their estimated value.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fort of Vellum, neither district nor revenue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The district of Elangad and Coiladdy recovered</td>
<td>80,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>The district of Arni</td>
<td>2,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fort and district of Hanumtugood, taken by the Rajah from the Marawar, and now given up to the Nabob</td>
<td>2,00,000</td>
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**Per annum, rupees 4,80,000**

The jewels, &c. of the Marawar were of small value. Rous's Appendix, No. XXV, p. 931, 932.

"mencement"
They expressed their dissatisfaction to the Nabob, and to the Court of Directors.

They, however, declared that they would, on no account, have the idea entertained, that they meant to renew the war; for that they even wished to conceal from the public, they were apprehensive another expedition against Tanjore might become necessary. They expressed their dissatisfaction at the treaty, in still stronger terms to the Nabob, in their letter of the 9th of November. "Had the Rajah," they said, "submitted himself, and had your Excellency then granted such terms, as should have been thought safe and honourable to your government and the Company, safe and honourable terms might have been adviseable. But the Rajah has acted a very different part. He set both your government and the Company at defiance, and compelled the army to lay a regular siege to his capital. Many lives have been lost, and great quantities of stores have been expended. The siege advanced successfully, the breach was almost practicable, and the officers and soldiers were in good spirits. Under these circumstances, there was every reason to hope, that the fort might soon have been taken; and then your Excellency might have given the law, and settled the affairs of Tanjore, in a proper manner." The Presidency expressed the same sentiments, in terms equally strong, in their dispatches to the Court of Directors, dated the 28th of February 1772.

General Smith, in his letter to the Presidency.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 799.
† Ibid. p. 801, 802.
‡ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 929, 930, 931.
of the 6th of November, 1771, makes use of the following remarkable expressions: "I have very freely given my sentiments, " with respect to the Rajah of Tanjore. I urged, that I thought " no medium could be preferred with him; but, at the time I did " so, I hoped whenever an expedition did take place, that it " would be with a firm resolution on the part of the Nabob, as " well as the Board, to reduce him entirely *." The Nabob, urged by the discontent of the Presidency, became highly offended with his son, for concluding a peace, when there was such a certain prospect of terminating the war, by the taking of Tanjore. Having expostulated with him, in severe terms, for his conduct, he told him, that he could only ascribe it, to his want of abilities, his facility of disposition, or his having been corrupted by the Rajah †. In short, the peace appeared so insecure in itself, so inadequate to the claims of the Nabob and the delinquency of the Rajah, that it raised a general discontent among the English as well as the natives. Nothing was talked of in the settlement, nothing was read but letters from the army, representing the certainty of their taking Tanjore, had not the peace prevented it; and every one declared, " that it was " shameful thus to stop the progress and tarnish the glory of the " British arms, in the moment that fortune presented the laurel ‡." Such universal discontents at a peace, which saved his capital and country to Tulja-jī, demonstrate, that he had deserved to have lost both, in the opinion of all, who, from their being on the spot, were the best judges of his delinquency §.

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXIV. p. 524.
† Ibid. No. XXIV. p. 381.
‡ Ibid. No. XXV. p. 630.
§ The Court of Directors, in their letter of the 18th of April, 1770, make use of the following remarkable word: " As to what relates to the Nabob, and the conduct, which " you are to hold in the present troubles in " your parts of India, a great deal must be " left to your discretion on the spot. You have " certainly more opportunities than are of " coming at the true knowledge of the causes, " the origin and tendency of disputes, as " on a sudden slip, among the powers of " India, as of relations of interest in which " we stand to them." Rous's App. No. XVI. " p. 464.
To the preceding account of the expedition of 1771, it may not be improper to annex the opinion of Sir Robert Harland, then his Majesty’s Plenipotentiary on the coast, concerning the conduct of the Presidency of Fort St. George. That officer, after blaming their inactivity, from the month of February to September, proceeds thus, in his letter to the Earl of Rochford: “The country of Tanjore was then, as I have been informed, unprepared. The fort was unprovided with the means of defence, the Rajah’s troops were neither formed nor disciplined. On the contrary, the Company’s servants possessed plenty of stores and ammunition; and an army lay idle and inactive at Trichinopoly, within a very short march of Tanjore.” After specifying the unaccountable delays in undertaking the expedition, the Plenipotentiary states the equally inexplicable treaty, which terminated the war. “The army was thirty-six days before Tanjore. The walls were breached, and dispositions made for storming the place, when the whole was settled by negotiation. The Nabob disavowed his share in that negotiation. The Governor was dissatisfied. The Nabob’s son, in his letters to his father, which I have read, says, that it was with the advice, consent, knowledge, and approbation of the general, he agreed to terms. The general, denying this charge, considers the whole, as a contrivance between the Nabob and his son.” After stating the improbability of the Nabob’s being concerned in frustrating the object of the expedition, Sir Robert Harland proceeds: “To conclude the whole, when I consider every thing, the situation, the strength, the riches of Tanjore, its vicinity to the French at Pondicherry, the uneasiness of the Rajah at his present state of dependence, the danger of future inconveniencies, in case of his junction with the enemies of

* Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, February 15th, 1772.
† Ibid.

“Great-
"Great-Britain, it appears very difficult to discover a due attention to the interests either of the Company or nation, through the whole of this transaction."—"The Rajah’s peishcush had been much reduced, by the treaty of 1762, from what it had formerly been; and even that reduced tribute he did not pay. The troubles, which at any time arise in the Carnatic, are settled solely at the expence of the Nabob; but though Tanjore is protected, the Rajah contributes nothing towards the general defence."

* Sir Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, February 15th, 1772.
† Ibid. There were very weighty reasons for concluding the treaty; but they are foreign to the object of this work.
In the year 1770, a dispute about the possession of a rocky and barren island, on the coast of South-America, had almost involved Great Britain in a war with both the great branches of the House of Bourbon. The East-India Company, fearing that the expected hostilities might extend themselves to Asia, applied to Government for a strong squadron of men of war, to protect their establishments in the East. Though matters were settled in the beginning of 1771, the squadron was ordered to sail in the month of March, under the command of Sir Robert Harland, Baronet, Rear-Admiral of the Blue. That officer, on his departure, was vested with the same plenipotentiary powers from his Majesty to the princes of India, which had been given to Sir John Lindsay, in the year 1769. The object of the commission, which was dated the 15th of March, was to "inquire how far the eleventh article of the definitive treaty of peace and friendship, between the King of Great Britain, the most Christian King, and the King of Spain, concluded at Paris, the 10th of February, 1763, had been complied with by the parties concerned; as also, to treat with any of the princes or powers in India, to whom the eleventh article might relate, with regard to the most effectual means of having the stipulations, therein contained, punctually observed and carried into execution." His Majesty, at the same time, promised, that he would approve, ratify, and confirm what should be agreed and concluded, in relation to the premises, between the Princes and powers aforesaid, or such person or persons, as they

* Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 417.

should
"should depute or appoint for that purpose, and the said Sir Ro-
bert Harland *.

On the second of September, the Rear Admiral arrived at Fort St. George ‡; and, on the 13th, he communicated to the Presidency the following article of his instructions, as Plenipotentiary from his Majesty, to the Princes and powers of India ||. The words were;

"You will represent, in the freest manner, to the Governor and Council at Madras, any complaints, which in your judgment shall be well-founded, that may be made by the Nabob of Arcot, and transmit to us the earliest intelligence thereof, with your sentiments thereon †." This royal interposition, expressed in such explicit terms, raised the hopes of the Nabob, and expelled his fears. Depending on the protection of the Sovereign, he naturally became less anxious about retaining the favour of trading subjects; unconscious that this little glimpse of sunshine was so soon to be extinguished by a storm.

The East India Company, founded originally on the principles of commerce, had carried very early into every department of their management, all the hardened and unrelenting passions, which never fail to accompany an insatiable love of gain. Their misdemeanours had made them known to the world, before their consequence had rendered them objects of attention; and their original annals are stained with oppressions, piracies, frauds, and circumventions. Their limited power had confined their misdemeanors for more than one hundred and fifty years, to a narrow circle; and these were partly concealed, under the veil of secrecy, with which they affected to cover their transactions. But it must be acknowledged, that, in those early times, their circumscribed commerce had confined the management of their affairs to mean and unskilful hands. Their Directors at home were no more than low and rapacious

rapacious tradesmen; and their servants abroad were chiefly
drawn from hospitals, appointed by charity for rearing indigent
and deserted boys. When the means of advantage grew more ex-
tensive, by the concurrence of various revolutions in the East, the
management and service of the Company became objects of ambition
to persons of a better education, and more enlarged minds.

Some men of talents, some of honour, several possessed of spirit and
courage conducted affairs at their boards, and fought their battles in
the field. But even these were not able to resist that fordid prin-
inciple of avarice, which is inherent in every mercantile institu-
tion; to which also the almost equally obdurate passion of ambition was
annexed, when they acquired a control over Princes, and the man-
agement of provinces and kingdoms *.

In the period, which is the object of the present discourse, several
men of talents and strict principles were in the Direction at home,
and in the management of affairs on the Coast. But even these
were incapable of divesting themselves entirely of jealousy, when
they found that a Prince, whom they had been accustomed to con-
trol, had obtained the protection of the Sovereign. The extensive
possessions of the Company, an ample revenue, a large army,
the many lucrative, and even honourable places in their gift had,
in a manner, raised them from the rank of subjects, to that of rivals
to the crown. Their principal servants, conscious of their own for-
mer consequence, could not permit themselves to be deprived of any
part of that consequence, without resentment. This circumstance
introduced a degree of intemperance into their consultations and

* "These are men, who are now become
governors and viceroys of kingdoms larger,
if we take our possessions from Surat to Ben-
gal, than made half the Roman empire; and
these are the men, who by the rapid and im-
mense riches they acquire, from amongst the
wealth of the people, who are to be expected
to look government in the face, with that ad-
monition that has taught them to think, that
money may decide any thing. Nor will they
easily submit to part with power, however
they came by it, they have so long been al-
lowed to exercise; and that has brought
them such an immoderate degree of wealth,
without violent opposition to every thing and
every man, employed to prevent it." Sir
Robert Harland to the Secretary of State, Jan.
9th, 1773.
correspondence; and gave birth to unnecessary complaints of the conduct of the Nabob to their Superiors at home. Those complaints were greedily seized, by a more unprincipled Direction, than that which subsisted at the time; and were made the specious pretexts of coercive measures against the Nabob; which measures sprung, in fact, from an unforgiving jealousy, and self-interested motives. But these were the measures of succeeding times. The Directors of 1771, though they expressed their jealousy of the interference of the crown, were sensible of the independent rights of the Nabob. In their dispatch of the 10th of April, they used the following remarkable words: "We have no natural ally but the Nabob.—Our connection with the Nabob stands entirely on ancient friendship, and reciprocal kindness, and we wish to continue it on the same footing. But as we cannot be compelled to follow his projects, when they appear totally repugnant to our interests, so, on the other hand, he cannot be forced into our views, if they are disagreeable to him: All we have, therefore, left, is to expostulate with him. He must determine for himself, and we for ourselves."'

In the passage just cited, the Directors defined the limits of the Company's power, with respect to the affairs of the Carnatic. How a succeeding Court trampled down this fence shall be, hereafter, both explained and exposed. The Directors of 1771, notwithstanding their moderation, with regard to the independent rights of the Carnatic, were, at the very moment of writing their opinion on that subject, fapping the foundation of those rights, by endeavouring to remove the support of the Crown from the Nabob. They lamented, that an unusual commission had been granted, without any communication with themselves; and consequently without previous steps being taken, for the prevention of those jealousies, which might naturally be supposed to arise from such circumstances *. Though they did not chuse then to deny the right of

the Crown to send representatives to its allies, they insinuated, that
the rights and privileges of the Company rested upon as high author-
ity as the King's commission †. These sentiments, expressed to their
Servants, prove, that they had already made applications to Govern-
ment, for the redelivering the fugitive Nabob into the hands of his
former keepers.

In a country tossed by faction, and flunan by clamour, ministers
definitute of ambition, and fond of ease, too frequently become little
solicitous, about the honour of the State. When the dog of discontent
growls at the door of the Cabinet, they throw to him a fragment of
the prerogative, as a sop, to procure his silence; and, with a pernici-
ous want of dignity, they hope to diminish their cares, by lessening
their authority. This torpid disposition of mind is terrified at an ex-
tension of power, as it is accompanied by an increase of labour; and in-
formation is disagreeable and irksome, as it may bring on the trouble
of doing justice. Each demand, for circumscribing the consequence
of the State and the rights of the crown, is heard by such men with
avidity, as every diminution of power contracts the circle of public
business. This ruinous system of frigid policy, they endeavour to im-
pose upon the world under the name of moderation; but, by proce-
cuting it too far, the honour of the State is tarnished, and the pledged
faith of the sovereign violated.

The East-India Company might have felt this self-denying prin-
iple in government, almost during the whole of the present reign.
That Company had obtained countries, provinces, and kingdoms,
under the protection and assisted by the power of the State. But go-

government, instead of asserting the State's claim of sovereignty, seemed
afraid to question the Company's rights; for fear the trouble of a
revenue of near six millions a year should fall into their own hands.
The anxiety of the Court of Directors, about a royal commission to

† Rous's Appendix, No. XVII. p. 403.
Indian princes, was vain and superfluous. The state had permitted them to rise from the rank of subjects to that of sovereigns, to hold dominions more extensive, and scarcely less valuable, than its own; to maintain an army more numerous than that of Great-Britain; to appoint their relations, dependents and servants, to offices of more power and emolument, than any in the gift of the Crown; to carry insolence and oppression to every quarter of Asia; to dethrone princes, and to invest mean persons with the pomp and authority of royalty. It was, therefore, highly improbable, that a government so indulgent to the Company, would refuse one poor Nabob to his former lords. It accordingly happened, that when the Directors mustered sufficient courage to demand the truant, the royal commission was immediately withdrawn; and he was delivered into their hands, to be punished for his credulity in the support of government, as well as his defection from the authority of the Company.

But had the royal commission continued in India, unless the promise of the Crown to redress grievances, and to draw clear lines between the power of the Nabob and that of the Company, had been also performed, it was not worth the price of the sheep-skin, on which it was written. Though the managers of the affairs of the Company, both in England and abroad, were at first alarmed, they soon found, that a commission, neither supported nor followed by an enquiry, was no more than a paper-kite, suspended over their heads. Unfortunately for the Nabob, having been accustomed to the validity of seals in India, he repose implicit confidence in the faith of that of Great-Britain. This confidence was encouraged and confirmed, by the paper-war, which was carried on between the plenipotentiaries and the Presidency; for he was then to learn, that the authority of a king, to which his principles had annexed the idea of invincibility, was defined to yield to that of trading subjects.

The contest by letters, between Sir John Lindsay and the Presidency, which had begun, soon after his arrival in July 1770, had languished...
languished in the course of the summer of 1771. When Sir John Lindsay left the coast in October, he was succeeded in his differences with the Presidency, as well as in his powers to the Nabob, by Sir Robert Harland. That plenipotentiary, either impressed with the injustice of the Company to the Nabob, or anxious to acquire his confidence, by an appearance of zeal, espoused his cause, with a vehemence, which created obstructions to its progress, by its own rapidity *. The Nabob, impressed by fears from the Marattas, or gained by their promises, had shewn a great eagerness, for an alliance with that nation, for more than a year. The Presidency, on the other hand, either afraid of Hyder Ali, or bound by secret promises to that chief, had opposed the alliance; and, with perseverance, and perhaps with prudence, had hitherto adhered to a strict neutrality †. The Marattas had wooed them, as the lion does his mate, mixing threats with courtship. Hyder was extremely polite; and as they had smarted under his force, his present kindness acquired value from the memory of former injuries ‡. They thought it, therefore, expedient to support Hyder Ali against the Marattas, * provided the revenues and resources of the Carnatic were under their controul §. The result, however, was, that neither Hyder nor the Marattas were afflicted. The latter, willing to gain five lacks of rupees ||, which the Rajah of Tanjore had engaged to pay, upon condition of their invading the Carnatic ¶, entered the passes before the end of the year 1771. To save his country, from the ravages of those marauders, the Nabob was obliged to pay down a considerable sum of money, besides presents of jewels, fire-arms and elephants ¶.

* Vide Rou’s Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 415, 416, &c.
† Ibid. p. 1401.
‡ Ibid. p. 1387, & passim.
§ Ibid.
¶ Ibid. p. 1394.

|| Ibid. p. 1395.
¶ Sir Robert Harland takes the merit of having induced the Marattas to retreat. (Appendix, p. 444.) But it is probable, that the money and jewels of the Nabob added some weight to his interposition.
In the correspondence, between the plenipotentiary and the Presidency, relative to the Marattas, the former explained, in ample terms, the right, which the Nabob had, to rely on the protection of his Majesty and the support of the Crown. "In the Nabob's present circumstances (says Sir Robert Harland), he claims the royal protection, so often promised to him, by his late Majesty George the Second, and repeated by his present Majesty, our sovereign, in several letters addressed to his Highness, strongly expressive of the greatest friendship and most perfect regard for him and his family. At the same time, he throws himself upon the nation for protection, agreeable to his expectations, from the eleventh article of the treaty with France and Spain in 1763." Having specified the Nabob's right to the support of the state, he animadverts with severity, on the opposition given, by the Company's servants, to that support. Having demanded an account of their transactions with the country powers, they had told him, that they "could not, consistently with their trust, render an account of their conduct to him, or to any but a constitutional power." This expression, appearing to deny the authority of his commission, threw the plenipotentiary into a violent rage. "Your charge seems to me (he said) to be directly pointed at the royal authority, and the undoubted rights of the Crown. When you take upon you to censure a measure, which is the sacred privilege of majesty, and the constitutional right of our sovereign, let me tell you, it is very unbecoming, it is presumptuous, it is arrogant."

This angry language terrified the Presidency, and, by raising the hopes of the Nabob, led that unfortunate Prince into error. He could no longer doubt of the permanent support of a Crown, whose authorised servant had irritated the Company beyond their common pitch of forgiveness. In proportion as the Nabob's expectations of

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4 Rous's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 416. 5 Ibid. p. 419. 6 Ibid. p. 422.
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royal favour increased; the confidence of the Presidency, in their own safety, diminished. "The heavy charge brought against us," they said, "evidently shews what is intended against us, and renders any attempt to justify our conduct to Sir Robert Harland improper; as it is necessary we should reserve our defence, until we are called upon to make it in a legal and constitutional course." Trivial as these circumstances are in themselves, they deserve to be recorded, as they influenced the conduct of the Nabob; and consequently the subsequent measures of the Company.

During these disputes between the Plenipotentiary and the Presidency, the latter were meditating an expedition against the Greater and Lesser Marawars, Polygars dependent on the government of the Carnatic. The country of Marawar, as has been already mentioned, depended anciently on the province of Madura, which was itself subject to the Rajah of Trichinopoly, long before the country fell by conquest into the hands of the Mahommedans. The state of the subjection of the Marawars to the government of Trichinopoly was, that they paid a certain annual tribute; and brought, upon requisition, a certain number of troops into the field, at their own expense, when their superior was engaged in war. In case of either neglect or disobedience of orders they were fined, like other Zemindars; and when they sent a less force than the established number of troops, government used to levy a proportionable sum upon the revenues of their countries. During the troubles which succeeded the death of Anwar-ul-dien, father of the present Nabob, the Marawars paid little attention to the government of the Carnatic. When peace was restored, they sometimes sent small presents, but no regular tribute, to the Nabob; but, in time of war, they neither sent troops nor furnished money for the general defence. When the Rajah of Tanjore invaded their territories in the beginning of

* Rees's Appendix, No. XVIII. p. 22.
† Ibid. No. XXVI. p. 941.

1771,
1771, they owned their errors and professed their entire submission to the Nabob; but, though the expedition against Tanjore was partly undertaken on their account, they furnished neither troops nor provisions during the siege, when required by their superior, in terms of their tenure and dependence.

Ramnadaporam, the capital of the Greater Marawar, is situated on that point of the continent which advances nearest to the island of Ceylon. That of the Nalcooty Polygar, or Lesser Marawar, is called Tripatore. The first lies at the distance of little more than one hundred miles to the South of Trichinopoly; the latter is forty miles nearer to the last-mentioned city. The two Marawars could bring, upon an emergency, twenty thousand men into the field; but their troops, like those of other Polygars, were rather a rabble, than soldiers. Having received intelligence of the intended expedition, they assembled their native troops in the beginning of March 1772; and entering into a treaty with the Dutch, the Presidency of Negapatam promised to write to the Governor of Colombo, for fifteen hundred Europeans and as many Malays. The hostile appearance of the Marattas on the borders of the Carnatic, had suspended the expedition for more than seven months; but that fear being removed, orders were issued to General Smith to march, with the troops in the South, against the refractory Polygars. The plan and conduct of the expedition were left entirely to the General. But, as the Company only acted as friends and allies to the Nabob, negotiation and treaty were left wholly to that Prince. The Presidency, at the same time that they own, that the right of peace and war was vested in the Nabob, insinuated to the General, that he

ought not to agree to any treaty till the Polygars were entirely reduced. General Smith, having marched from Trichinopoly on the 11th of May 1772, before the end of the month sat down before Ramnadaparam. The town being ill fortified and worse defended, was taken by assault, on the 2d of June, with very inconsiderable loss on the side of the victors. As the plunder of the place, by the laws of war, became the property of the captors, the Nabob's eldest son, who attended General Smith, on the part of his father, in the expedition, agreed to pay a stipulated sum to the army for the right to the spoil. The other forts belonging to the Greater Marawar soon followed the fate of the capital. General Smith then directed his march against the Polygar of Nalcooty, or the Lesser Marawar. That unfortunate Polygar fell a victim to the negligence of his own vakceels, who had negotiated a treaty of submission with the young Nabob. Lieutenant-colonel Bonjour, whom the Presidency had ordered to proceed from Madura with a detachment, to support the operations of the main army, was advancing with hasty strides towards the residence of the Little Marawar. When the terms of the treaty were settled, General Smith delivered letters to be sent, by the Polygar's agents, to stop the progress of Bonjour. But they delayed to send the letters; and the result was, that the Lieutenant-colonel attacked the strong post into which the Lesser Marawar had retired; and in the assault the Polygar was slain. The death of the Lesser Marawar left his whole country to the entire disposal of the victors. This event happened on the 25th of June 1772.

The expedition against Tanjore in the year 1771, had rather irritated than humbled the Rajah. The retaining of the fort of

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\[ \text{Ramnadaparam taken.} \]

\[ \text{Army marches against Nalcooty;} \]

\[ \text{who is killed in an affliet, owing to the negligence of his Vackeels.} \]

\[ \text{A new quarrel with Tanjore.} \]

\[ \| \text{Russ's Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 956.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 989.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 970.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 598.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 1002.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. 1085.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 106.} \]

\[ \| \text{Ibid. p. 1097. 1097. The conquest of the two Marawars was obtained with the loss of twenty men. Ibid. p. 1082.} \]

\[ \| \text{Vellum,} \]
Vellum, which had been intended by the Presidency as a check on Tulja ji*, had hurt his pride and roused his resentment. He, therefore, refused to permit provisions to be carried to the place; alleging, "That the stipulation was merely the cession of the fort, "which could by no means be construed as an engagement to ren- "der its market flourishing †." To this quibble, in evasion of the late agreement with his superior, he added serious and dangerous intrigues for disturbing the peace of the Carnatic. In the month of June 1772, he was known to negotiate with the Marattas; and to have offered to that government ten lacks of rupees, upon condition of their sending an army of horse to his aid ‡. The objects the Rajah wished to obtain by the assistance of the Marattas were, "the reduction of Vellum, the removal of the Nabob's people in "the assigned lands from his country, and an acquittal of the "Peishtraf §." Those rash schemes were entirely planned by the Rajah himself; for, as he knew that both Mona-jī and the Dob- beer ¶ would dissuade him from measures likely to involve him in inextricable difficulties, he carried on this negotiation secretly, by his mean dependents and vulgar friends. Whilst he solicited foreign enemies to invade the Carnatic, he received, protected, and encouraged the fugitive Polygars of the Marawar country, who were meditating new disturbances ‡.

In the beginning of 1773, the Rajah seems to have re-admitted into a degree of his confidence Hussen Chan Soor, the Mahomedan fisherman, who had been his minister during a part of the year 1770. Several other persons of mean birth and abilities planned his measures and shared his favours. The friends of the expelled Marawars flattering his vanity and inflaming his passions by their

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Rajah prepares provision for being sent to Vellum.

He negotiates with the Marattas.

The negotiation carried on by his vulgar favourites.

He protects the fugitive Polygars.

He is led by men of low birth and mean talents.
intrigues, endeavoured to obtain his aid to restore their affairs. Having applied to Hyder Ali for a force to recover their respective possessions, that chief told them, "That, he knew who they were, " but that, if they would bring him a letter from the Rajah of Tant " jore, he would then agree to give them some assistance." Having carried this intelligence to Tulja-ji, he agreed, with joy, to give them a favourable and full letter, agreeably to their utmost wishes. He received, at the same time, into his capital, with great ceremony and civility, Venecata Narrain, the Vackeel of Hyder †. The Vackeel promised, in his master’s name, that immediately, on his return to Seringapatam, from an expedition in which he was then engaged, he would send and promote the assistance of the Marattas ‡. To prevent a discovery, the Rajah dismiss’d the Vackeel, after loading him with marks of respect; whilst, at the same time, he wrote letters to the Maratta government, full of the most flattering expressions §. But whilst he was planning measures of danger, he was busy in disgracing such of his old servants, as were possessed of abilities to carry them into execution. He deprived Mona-ji, not only of all power, but his allowance from government, except two villages, which that chief possessed by way of Jaghire ||. Husein Chan Soor, the fisherman, so often mentioned, rose in favour, in proportion as Mona-ji declined. This vulgar statesman, deriving boldness from ignorance, advised the Rajah to withhold the money due to the Nabob, and let that prince at open defiance ¶.

Secret intelligence of these transactions was received at Madras in the month of April; and that part of the intrigues of Tulja-ji, which regarded the Marattas, was fully discovered in May, by Mr. Moflyn, the Company’s resident at the court of Poonah. In a letter

* Rou’s Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1105.  § Ibid.
† Ibid.  ¶ Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1106.
of the 14th of May, Mr. Moflyn informs the Presidency at Fort St. George, that a Gozamie, by name Mohim Geer, applied to the Maratta government, as Vackeel from the Rajah of Tanjore, for leave to raise ten thousand horse, which he made no secret were to be employed against the Nabob of the Carnatic*. The same intelligence had been conveyed, on the 6th of May, by Mr. Moflyn, to his immediate superiors, the Presidency of Bombay †. Though the Maratta government yielded, at first, to the Rajah's request, by means of presents to some of the ministers, the levying the troops was afterwards stopped, by the influence of Sacaram Bapoo, who pointed out the bad consequences, which might attend the measure; but the Vackeel of the Rajah still retained hopes, as he had received no positive denial §.

Whilst the Rajah's emissaries were employed in soliciting the assistance of the Marattas, he himself used every art of entreaty and persuasion, to gain the support of Hyder Ali. He sent for Vençata Narain, the Vackeel of that chief, and told him, that he had no other protector, but his master $. That no union, no friendship, no cordial alliance could ever subsist between himself, the Nabob and the English Company. That it was incumbent on Hyder to come with his whole force; and that he himself would collect his own forces and join him, as well as the expelled Polygars of Marwar and Nalcooty, who were all his allies. That, as their success against the Nabob and the Company admitted of little doubt, the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly might be easily taken, which two countries should be made over to Hyder for his assistance, together with some supplies of money. The Rajah earnestly solicited the Vackeel to write to his master, in the most persuasive terms, to prevail upon him to advance speedily, with his whole force. He,

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* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1155.  † Ibid.  § Ibid.  ¶ Ibid. p. 1111.

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at the same time and to the same purpose, wrote a long letter to
Hyder himself; and to give more weight to the negociation, the
old Dobbeer, or Duan, wrote another letter ||. To these letters Hyder
sent an answer desiring to know, how much ready money the
Rajah would give? By what means he proposed to take and cede
over to him the provinces of Madura and Tinnevelly? What friends
he had in those countries? Who of the Polygars were his allies?*
That he must determine, on all these circumstances, and inform him
of the result of the whole †.

Though the intrigues of Tulja-ji, with the Marattas and Hyder
Ali, were not likely to produce any serious or immediate effect, their
existence proved the dangerous and restless conduct of that Rajah.
During his applications for assistance beyond the limits of the Carnatic, he deviated, in almost every point, from his duty, as a de-
pendent on that country. In the expedition against the two Marawars, he chose to neglect to obey the requisition of his superior,
for the assistance of his troops ‡: on the contrary, he dismissed a
part of his cavalry, that they might assist the Polygars, without the
appearance of his being concerned §. When those chiefs, by their
own folly in refusing the equitable terms offered by the Nabob, had
suffered the extremities of war and were expelled, the Rajah not
only admitted the fugitives into his country, but encouraged them
to raise disturbances **. This circumstance forced the Nabob to keep
an army, in the territories of the Marawars, at an expense, be-
yond the amount of the revenue ††. The Rajah had engaged, in the
agreement signed, sealed and sworn to, at the gates of Tanjore, in October 1771, to refuse his protection to the runaway Polygars

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* Ibid. p. 1112.
† Ibid.
‡ Ibid. p. 1109.
** Ibid. No. XXVII, p. 1119.
†† Ibid.
of Warrior-pollam and Alianore, and to restore their effects. But he not only detained their effects, but had assigned them a place of refuge, in the district of Cumcurrum belonging to Tanjore. He permitted, or rather persuaded the Collories of his own country to make incursions, into the province of Trichinopoly; and to drive the cattle of the inhabitants away. He neglected to discharge the debt due to the Company, for their Paddy, which he had seized, in the year 1771; and he obstructed, by various difficulties and troubles, the English garrison at Vellum, from being regularly supplied with provisions. Though he was in considerable arrears to the Nabob, he appears to have been in no want of money, by the sums, which he had offered, and actually sent, to other powers, to induce them to invade the Carnatic.

Determined to support his disobedience and refractory conduct towards his superior, the Rajah entered into a negociation, with Dutch and Danish factories on the coast, to supply him with money, upon mortgages on some districts of his country. He had resolved to obtain a considerable loan from Goland Moodaly, "who was Dubash to most of the Great Folks at Madras." Had he pursued this plan, with more constancy, and to a much larger extent, the Great Folks, who were the masters of Goland Moodaly, might have had an interest, in overlooking for some time longer his designs. But Tulja-ji, though not more faithless, was less prudent, than his father Pretaupa Sing; who had always an expert agent at Madras to negotiate a loan, when he wished to obtain a favour. But the present Rajah chose rather to enter into dangerous connexions, with the Dutch, than to negociate with the English Presidency. These connexions were deeply rooted, and, therefore, full of peril to the

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\[1\] Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1110.  
\[2\] Ibid. p. 1110.  
\[3\] Ibid.  
\[4\] Ibid. p. 1105.
Company, as well as the Nabob. The latter had written to the General of Batavia, complaining of his subordinates at Negapatnam, for assisting the Rajah; but that governor avowed, that in supporting that Rajah, the factory "had done no more than they were bound to do by their engagements; and that in conforming to those engagements, they had done right." Whilst the Rajah was busy in breaking every article of the agreement of 1771, the Nabob not only adhered to the terms, but seemed willing to establish friendship and perpetuate harmony, between himself and his vassal.

The intrigues of Tulja-ji, his avowed disregard of the agreement of 1771, his alliances abroad, his preparations for war at home, induced the Presidency to listen to the requisition of the Nabob, for the assistance of the Company to reduce entirely an inmate so dangerous to the peace and security of the Carnatic. Mr. Du Prè, who had been President during the first expedition against Tanjore, had resigned the government, and returned to Europe, in the end of February 1773; and Mr. Haftings, who had been designed to succeed him in the chair, had left the coast, more than a year before Mr. Du Prè's departure, to take upon him the government of Bengal. Mr. Wynch, the second in Council, had succeeded Mr. Du Prè, as governor; and it was to him the requisition of the Nabob, relative to the reduction of Tanjore, was made. The Select Committee, in deliberating on the subject, declared, that the treaty of 1762 had been cancelled, by the conduct of the Rajah, which obliged the guarantees of that treaty to take up arms, and enter into a solemn war. That it is established by the law of nations, that when a rupture happens, all treaties between the contending parties, prior to that rupture, are thereby disannulled, or at least suspended; and that upon a restoration of peace, the former treaties may be restored, but not

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1. Papers published by the Company, relative to the restoration of Tanjore, vol. i. p. 4.
2. Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII.
3. Ibid. p. 1116.
4. Without
without being named, to the state in which they were before the rupture, or that others may be substituted in their place. That the treaty of 1762 was so far from having been restored by the agreement, which had terminated the war of 1771, that it was not even mentioned or alluded to, in that agreement. That, at the commencement of the expedition, the Presidency had promised and agreed, not to interfere in any negociations between the Nabob and the Rajah; but to leave the whole to be settled by the former. That the Nabob had actually settled the whole, without a single allusion to the treaty of 1762. That, upon the whole, as war, which extinguishes all treaties, had intervened, the Company could not be considered, as guarantees to a treaty, which no longer existed.

Though the measures of the Presidency, who were vested with the whole executive powers of the Company, were, in their political capacity, decisive, and when they regarded the country powers irrevocable, their arguing upon every point was necessary, for the information of their superiors, and important to themselves, as the reasons advanced might be proper grounds of censure, or a just foundation for applause. But, neither in the present case, nor in any other, beyond the trading powers, granted to the Company by charter, are the motives, reasons or arguments of the servants of the Company to be admitted, by the dispassionate, as a justification of wrong measures, or a confirmation of those, which were right. This observation is, by no means, made to invalidate the justness of their reasonings upon the treaty of 1762. Had the Rajah and his ancestors been independent, from all antiquity, on the government of the Carnatic, his intriguing with foreign powers to invade that country, his raising disturbances within its limits, his known design to join any of its eventual enemies, the danger of that design, from the situation of his country, in the heart of the province, would

\[ \text{Arguments and facts, relative to the necessity of calling the Rajah to account.} \]

Even if both he and his ancestors had been independent.

\[ \text{Rous's Appendix, No. XXII p. 725.} \]
\[ \text{Ibid. No. XXVII. p. 1113.} \]
\[ {\dagger} \text{Ibid. p. 1117.} \]
\[ {\ddagger} \text{Ibid.} \]
not only render it justifiable, but, from self-preservation, necessary, in the Nabob, to prevent the intended mischief, by the power, which Providence had placed in his hands. The Presidency joining, or refusing to join, could alter, in no degree or respect, the nature of the case. They had no claim to appear, as principals in the war, they had no right to decide upon its issue. The only thing of which they were the competent judges was the expediency of the measure, with regard to the interests of their constituents. That this expediency existed, is apparent from the state of things, as well as from their own declaration. If their masters thought otherwise, they had a right to censure, to suspend, to dismiss their servants; but they had no right to interfere, none to reverse the effect of the measure, in which those servants had only assisted, as mere auxiliaries of a country power.

The Presidency were so sensible of the expediency of the expedition against Tanjore, that it is apparent, from their own minutes, they were much more eager for that measure, than the Nabob*. That prince, dividing his fears between Hyder and the Marattas, the allies of the Rajah, was unwilling to risk the ruin of his own country, from an invasion made by either of those powers, by an expedition of uncertain event, against Tanjore†. It was known, that the object of each of those powers was to take Tanjore into possession, and not under protection‡; and the march of the Nabob's forces against the place would probably be a signal, for their invading his dominions. The Nabob, therefore, declared that he was unwilling to press a service of such danger, unless it suited in every respect the Company's affairs§. He promised, however, to find the resources, in the same proportion, as during the last siege. He declared his doubt of the event, as the Rajah, besides his connexion

* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1124. † Ibid. p. 1122.
‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

with
with the country powers, was in friendship with the French, and had promises of assistance, from the Danish factory of Tranquebar. The Select Committee represented to the Nabob, that in case the expedition against Tanjore should take place at all, it ought to be undertaken, in time sufficient to bring it to a conclusion, before the setting in of the rains. They, at the same time, resolved in their minutes, that "it was proper and necessary that the expedition against Tanjore be undertaken; and that the present opportunity, "all circumstances considered, is the most favourable for carrying "the same into execution." The resolution of the Select Committee was confirmed, by the Council at large, on the 29th of June 1773. In their minutes upon the subject, they recapitulated old arguments and advanced new. They agreed, that as the treaty of 1762 was annulled and extinguished, by an intervening war, followed by another treaty, in which the Company were not mentioned; that "all idea of the existence of a guarantee was removed." They, therefore, founded the auxiliary assistance, which they proposed to give on the expedition, and even necessity of the measure.

Though the Members of Council, who planned, or rather urged the second expedition against Tanjore, have been reviled, censured, and stigmatized by the Directors of the year 1775, that enlightened body could not have, with any justice, accused their subjects of neglecting the interests of the Company, in their stipulations with the Nabob. They insisted, that he should not only pay for the future, but replace the pay already issued to three thousand Seapoys, which the Presidency had thought proper to levy some time before. But as to the Nabob's promissory present of ten lacks of Pagodas to the Company, the Governor declared, that he made no condition for, nor

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† Ibid. 1130, 1131.
†† Ibid. p. 1125. || Ibid. p. 1118.
§ Vide passim. Consultation, June 29th, 223, 400,000 l. claim.
claim of, any thing; but that whatever his Highness, out of his good-will and friendship, should be pleased to offer, he would willingly receive it for the Company*. In return for these grants, on the part of the Nabob, the Presidency engaged to support him in his expedition against Tanjore, with a large army, to place the fort, when taken, either by capitulation or storm, in his hands, with the flores and effects which might be found in the place. But they declared, that should it be taken by storm, the plunder should become the property of the captors, by the usage of war †.

The preparations of the Presidency, for taking the field, could not long remain unknown to the Rajah. Having some time before disgraced and confined Mona-ji, at the request of his vulgar parasites, he had, as early as the month of May ‡, endeavoured to reconcile the mind of that aged Chief, as the only person fit to manage his affairs, in times of difficulty and danger. Mona-ji endeavoured to excuse himself, by alleging, "That he was now beset with old "age and infirmity, and had no abilities left §." But being soothed, flattered, and threatened by the Rajah, he, at first, took the command of a body of five hundred horse, and one thousand Sepoys‖; and on the 10th of July, he was placed at the head of the army ¶. The capital was, in the mean time, placed in the best state of defence**. More than twenty thousand men, of various kinds, were in arms ‐. The French of Pondicherry amused the Rajah with hopes of effectual assistance §§. The Dutch of Negapatnam, and even those of Ceylon, were sincerely in his interest, and the support of it favoured their own. The Danes of Tranquebar, as well as the

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* Mr. Wynch uses the very words of Mr. Du Pre, on a like occasion, Sept. 18th, 1771. † Ibid. p. 1145. ‡ Ibid. p. 1145. § May 28th, 1773. ¶ Ibid. p. 1113. ‖ Ibid. ¶¶ Ibid.

† The force of Tanjore, in the beginning of August, 1773, amounted to twenty-one thousand nine hundred thirty-three men. ‡ Ibid. p. 1167, 1168. §§ Ibid. p. 1145, 1158, 1160, 1167.

Dutch
Dutch on the Coast *, afflifted him with men †; money, and war-
like fiores. The uncle of the King of Candia, having arrived at 
Negapatnam, lent a Vackeel to the Rajah, and promised aid ‡. The 
Dutch obtained in mortgage from him Nagore, Trivalore, and Vi-
 derniam, for an hundred and fifty thoufand Pagodas; and he or-
dered his Vackeel, at Negapatnam, to fell entirely, for thirty thou-
faud more, the villages and grounds, for which the Dutch had till 
then paid rent §. Hyder Ali, having affullyed a force at Dundegul, 
fent assurances that he would aflift the Rajah, when the army 
should move againft Tanjore ||. The Dutch having hoifted their 
colours at Nagore, supplied the Rajah with guns, military fiores, 
and men, from Nagapatnam; and, in short, every preparation was 
made for the security of Tanjore, which the Rajah feemed deter-
minded to defend to the laft extremity ††.

General Smith having encamped the army, in the plain of Trit-
chinopoly, in the end of July, entered the province of Tanjore, in 
the beginning of Auguft. The firft accidents commenced on the 
6th of that month, when the Nabob’s cavalry defeated a body of the 
enemy, with considerable loss, near the walls of Tanjore ‡. On the 
20th ground was broke ** before the place; but the batteries, for 
making a breach, were not opened till the 27th of Auguft ††. A 
detail of the fiege is unimportant in itself, and unnecessary to 
the purpofe of this work. On the 17th of September, a practicable 
breath being made, Tanjore was rather surprifed than formed, at 
twelve of the clock at noon, when the fun was moft intensely hot;

* Rous’s Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1146. 
† Ibid. p. 1152. 
‡ Ibid. p. 1150. 1152. 
§ Ibid. p. 1150. 
|| Ibid. p. 1152, 1153, 1181. 1191. 
†† Ibid. p. 1153. 

The dangerous conneftion of the Rajah, 
with the Dutch, is proved by the following ex-
tract of a letter, from the Governor General of 
Batavia, to the Nabob, dated July 26th, 1771. 

Concerning the affiftance of warlike fiores, 

" given by thofe of Coromandel to the Rajah 
" of Tanjore, I fhall demand account from Ne-
gapatnam. Mean while ferves to your Excel-
" lency’s information, that the Netherlandish 
" Company stands in alliance with that prince, 
" and that the duty of faithful confederates re-
" quires to affift one another, in cafe of ne-
cofity.” 

‡ Ibid. p. 1174. 
** Ibid. p. 1193. 
†† Ibid. p. 1200.
and the garrison, consisting of twenty thousand fighting men $\text{ff}$, except a few, not expecting an attack, "had retired from the breach to their houses to eat rice §." The Rajah and his family, with Mona-ji, together with his sons, were made prisoners; and the Nabob having agreed to pay a stipulated sum to the army for the plunder, the place was saved from the devastation and rapine, which usually attend a conquest acquired by assault ||.

Whilst Tanjore was pressed by a siege, the Dutch Presidency of Negapatnam took possession of Nagore, a considerable sea-port, belonging to the province of Tanjore ¶, together with several valuable districts, on the pretence of having purchased them from the Rajah. To support their usurpation, they had assembled a considerable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Nagore, to defend their new acquisitions. The Nabob, after representing the invalidity of those transactions, between his tributary and the Dutch, and likewise the bad consequences, which might result to his government, and consequently to the Company, from the addition of influence and consequence, which any other European power in India might derive from territorial possessions, requested the assistance of the troops to recover the alienated districts, should the Dutch refuse to relinquish their claims in an amicable manner ¶. But the Presidency, though sensible of the danger and inconvenience of permitting any other Company to increase their power on the coast, shewed an unwillingness to adopt a measure, which might be construed into a violation of treaties subsisting between the Crown of Great Britain and the States of the United Provinces *. They consulted therefore, Sir Robert Harland, his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, on that subject; and he gave it clearly as his opinion, that "the Company's assisting the Nabob, in recovering lands unjustly alienated by his Feudatory, could be considered, in no re-

\* Roux's Appendix, p. 1216.
\* Ibid. No. XXIII. p. 1217, 1218.
\* Ibid. p. 1217.
\* Ibid.
\* Ibid.

"spec,
spea, as an infringement of treaties, which could not have regarded any encroachments wantonly made on dominions, to the disposal of which the Crown, much less the Company, had no right. That as the Presidency, as auxiliaries, had actually assisted the Nabob, in the reduction of Tanjore, it was equally incumbent upon them to give their aid to put him in possession of the country dependent on that capital. That he himself, as the representative of the King of Great Britain, would have no objection to assist the Company with the force under his command, should it be required."

The Presidency were sensible, "that from the system of government, and the nature of tenures in India, the Rajah of Tanjore, not being Lord Paramount of his country, but tributary to the Nabob, had no right to alienate any part of his lands, without the consent of his Liege Lord, the Ruler of the Carnatic Payen-ghaut;" but notwithstanding this resolution of the Presidency, the army, who expected little benefit from a contest with Europeans, shewed an apparent unwillingness to proceed on that service; and "consequently, nothing was done with spirit." Accounts of this unwillingness were soon carried to Negapatnam; and the Dutch became consequently obstinate. The troops were, at length, prevailed on to proceed, but with a peculiar refinement on the operations of war. The Nabob's troops were placed in the front, to expel the Dutch; and those of the Company were only to assist, in case of necessity, hoping, by this subterfuge, to seem not to have acted against the Dutch. This conceit was practised with such a minute ceremony, that some of the Company's Officers, who led the Nabob's cavalry, "unfashed, and declared themselves off duty."
"duty §." But the Dutch thought proper to relieve them from their embarrassment, by relinquishing the territory and town of Nagore to the Nabob, upon his replacing the money which they had paid to the Rajah.

Thus fell Tanjore into the hands of the Nabob of the Carnatic, by a regular conquest accomplished in a solemn and necessary war. To the incontestible right which that Prince acquired by this event, to the territory of his dangerous and rebellious feudatory, was added the sanction of the King of Great-Britain, not only in the person of his representative acting in India by the authority of the great seal, but even by his Majesty's personal approbation of the measure. Sir Robert Harland had ordered, at the desire of the Presidency, two of his Majesty's ships, the Dolphin and the Swallow, to bring troops and stores from Masulipatam, to assist at the reduction of Tanjore. He, at the same time, signified to the Governor and Council, that should they find it expedient for the present service, he was ready to land the marine forces under his command to do duty in the garrisons or to act in the field. He assured them, that should they judge it necessary to require any further assistance of his Majesty's ships, or of the force under his command, they had only to signify their wishes; as he was well-disposed to co-operate with them, in every thing, for the public good.* His Majesty had approved of the first expedition against Tanjore, in a letter under his own hand; and it may consequently be inferred, that he approved of the second expedition, which was founded upon the same grounds of justice, expediency, and necessity. The words in his Majesty's letter to the Nabob, which is dated April 7, 1772†, are these: "It gave us satisfaction to hear, that the Governor and Council of Madras

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* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1134.
† Papers published by the Company in 1777, vol. i. p. iv.
I had sent the Company's troops with yours to reduce your territory the Rajah of Tanjore to obedience, in which we hope, by the blessing of God, they will be successful.

To this approbation of the Crown and assent of its Plenipotentiary, with respect to the measures against Tanjore, was added the acquiescence of the Court of Directors, if in their case, as in that of others, the old adage may be applied, that "Silence is consent." They had not even been silent on this subject; for the expedition of the year 1771 differed in no respect, in its cause and object, from that of 1773. The Court of Directors had been fully and regularly informed of the motives which had induced the Presidency to give the assent of the Company to the Nabob, in the first of those expeditions; and they had approved of every part of the conduct of the Presidency down to the month of January 1772. On the 20th of September 1773, just three days after the taking of Tanjore, the President and Council informed the Directors, that they had been unanimous in their opinion in favour of the measure, for the reasons set forth in their proceedings. This dispatch was received in

† It is thought proper to throw the whole of the letter into this note, as it contains some of those solemn assurances of support, which the Crown is bound, in honour as well as interest, to give to the Nabob.

"George the Third, &c. &c. &c. To Nabob and Wallajah, &c. Nabob of Arcot and the Carnatic,"

"We received with pleasure your letter, in which you express to us your gratitude for the additional naval force which we have sent for your security, as well as that of our East India Company, and your confidence, that we shall tread in the steps of our royal grandfather, by granting protection to you and your family. We have given our Commander in Chief and Plenipotentiary, Sir Robert Herland, our instructions for that purpose, and we flatter ourselves that he will reconcile the differences which have arisen between you and the Company's servants against your mutual interest. It gave us satisfaction to hear that the Governor and Council of Madras had sent the Company's troops with yours to reduce your tributary, the Rajah of Tanjore, to obedience, in which, we hope, by the blessing of God, they will be successful; and so we bid you farewell, wishing health and prosperity to you and your family.

"Given at our Court at St. James's, the 7th day of April 1772, in the 12th year of our reign, Your affectionate friend, G E O R G E, R."

§ Vide thanks of the Court to Mr. Du Pré, August 1773. Mr. Du Pré's Vindication, last page.

|| Rout's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.

London.
London on the 26th of March 1774, three weeks at least before the latter ships of the season failed for India. On the 24th* and 29th of October 1773, the Presidency transmitted an account of their transactions, and the motives of their conduct, relative to the conquest of Tanjore, to the Court of Directors; and both those dispatches came to the India House, on the 26th of March 1774†. The Select Committee, on the 29th of October 1773, entered into a detail of the motives and reasons which weighed with them in the resolution which they had taken to assist the Nabob in reducing Tanjore, sending, at the same time, a copy of their proceedings to the Company; and "we trust," say they, "that our conduct will meet " with your approbation ‡." This letter was also received on the 26th of March 1774§; but though the Court of Directors were possessed of the whole materials, and had some weeks to deliberate on the subject, before the failing of the latter ships, they remained totally silent.

Though, in the course of the summer 1774, several other dispatches, relative to the conquest of Tanjore and the subsequent measures, which arose from that transaction, the Court of Directors entered into no examination, formed no resolution, made even no mention at all of the subject. They passed it over as a matter of course, an event which had arisen from expediency, and even necessity; a transaction, which had been the natural consequence of the Company's connection with the Nabob, and the propriety of supporting the rights and dignity of his government, over his vassals, according to their own uniform and repeated orders to their servants ||. The winter of 1774, and the first two months of 1775, passed away, in the same silent approbation of the conduct of

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* Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.
* Ibid.
† Ibid. p. 1364.
‡ Ibid. p. 1365.
§ Ibid. p. 1366.
|| March 17, 1769. March 23, 1770, &c.
the Presidency of Fort St. George, relative to the conquest of Tanjore. The Directors of 1773 had, in the most public and decisive manner, approved of the expedition of 1771, which differed neither in justice nor propriety from that of 1773. They had thanked Mr. Du Pré, who had concerted and executed the measure, for his eminent services to the Company, in every part of his conduct, during his government, and, in particular, in his support of the rights of the Nabob. They had rewarded Mr. Haftings, who had been Second in Council at Fort St. George, when the expedition of 1771 was planned and executed, with the government of Bengal. For near thirteen months after intelligence of taking Tanjore was received, at the India-House, the Court of Directors, like their predecessors in 1773, seem to have entirely approved of the measure, by their total silence on the subject. It was not till the 12th of April, 1775, the very day on which the Court of Proprietors were met to choose new Directors, that the old disapproved, censured, stigmatized, and reversed not only the measures of their predecessors but even their own. How and from whence this sudden light fell on the India-House, and kindled in the minds of the Directors, when their power was just expiring, such a fervour for justice, is less important, than it is difficult to explain.

The more points, in which the subject of Tanjore is viewed, the less defencible will the subsequent conduct of the Directors of 1775 appear. It has been already proved, beyond the power of a just reply, that Mahommed Ali possessed the only sovereign authority in the Carnatic. That the Company, neither by charter nor even by usurpation, either could possess, or even pretended to hold any sovereignty in that country. That in no war, which, either the disobedience or ambition of the Nabob's vassals might kindle, or render absolutely necessary, the Company had any right to appear, as principals. That, by their connection with Mahommed Ali, their interest in the security of his government, they thought themselves bound
bound in duty to appear as his allies, when he found himself obliged to take the field against foreign invaders or refractory subjects. That the servants of the Company abroad never claimed any other title to themselves, than that of allies, nor to their troops but that of auxiliaries to the government of the Carnatic. That, in the two expeditions against Tanjore, the Presidency had been uniformly careful to mention, in almost all their minutes on the subject, that their forces were only auxiliaries in the Nabob's army. That, as they had laid no claim to the war, as their own, they had most solemnly relinquished every idea of having any right to the making of peace. That, in the first expedition, they were so sensible of their own want of every right to interfere, they acquiesced in a treaty, which they declared to be insecure; and withdrew their troops from the walls of Tanjore, when a practicable breach was made. That, when the expedition of 1773 was undertaken, the Governor and Council, who were vested with definitive powers relative to all agreements with Indian princes, disavowed every claim to any conquest, that might be made. That having accordingly assisted the Nabob in making a conquest, that conquest was solemnly and irrevocably vested in that prince, as the acknowledged principal in the war. That, when a territory is acquired in a regular and solemn war, by any power, that power has the most decided, the most indisputable and irreversible title to that conquest, by the law of nature and nations. That, by the same law, both the victor and his assigns are to be defended in the possession of whatever he has taken from his enemies.† That, should any other power dispose of territories acquired, by the rights of conquest, such interference would amount to actual hostilities, and place the injuring party in a state of war with the party injured. That, should the subjects of

† Plato de Leg. lib. i. Ariflot. de Repub. vii. cap. 5. Grot. lib. iii. cap. 6. fecl. 2. lib. i. cap. 4. Xenophon. de Inft. Cyr. lib. Puffendorf, lib. vii. cap. 7. fecl. 3.
any other power, under any pretence whatsoever, seize or alter the
possession of any conquest, such power is bound by the law of na-
ture and nations, to punish its offending subjects, and to make,
from their effects, due reparation to him, whom they had dispo-
ssed of his undoubted and acknowledged rights. That, should
the state whose subjects the offenders are, either neglect or refuse to
bring them to justice, such state would commit a violation of the
treaties subsisting between it and the injured power; and be fur-
ther accessory to a flagrant and unpardonable breach of public
faith, should it overlook the injustice done to an ally, by such
offenders, for any despicable advantage to be derived from them,
to itself.
THE East India Company, ever since their first institution, had industriously, and, till lately, very successfully, covered their transactions with a veil of secrecy; which few had the curiosity, and fewer still the means to penetrate. This maxim of mystery naturally sprung from the jealous principles of commerce, which hopes to preclude rivals, by a suppression of its profits. When states and kingdoms, by scarcely accountable revolutions, came under the management of the Company, the silence, which had been thought necessary for preserving commercial advantages, was transferred to a still more necessary business, the concealment of plunder. The principal servants, having fabricated fortunes under a mysterious cloud, had an interest in remaining quiet; and the fear of dismission, and consequently of ruin, deterred those in inferior stations from divulging that small portion of the delinquency of their superiors, which fell within their knowledge. Besides, the enviable situation of tyranny and pillage, was a prize in the wheel, into which they had thrown their own lots; and even a kind of misplaced honour sometimes prevented men of principle from detecting peculation, injustice, and vice; to avoid the disgrace, which the world has, perhaps injudiciously, annexed to the character of an informer.

The distance of the scene of iniquity naturally diminished the impression made by vague reports of crimes; and the national curiosity,
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fity, with regard to the affairs of the East, was lessened by the national aversion to a monopoly, which precludes the people at large from their natural rights to universal commerce. The plunder of Asia, in a manner, brought the first authentic accounts of Asiatic revolutions to Europe. Mankind began to enquire, "how, and whence such splendor came;" and when they saw, that persons of mean parts had amassed great and sudden riches, they naturally suspected, that rapacity, injustice and tyranny had supplied their want of talents. Instead of prudently brooding over their ill-got hoards, the Company's servants, upon their return from their provinces, flew in the face of nobility itself; rivalled it in the possession of lands, outstripped it in dissipation, ostentation, and luxury; and sometimes overcame it in parliamentary influence. Jealousy and resentment, which are too often more powerful passions, than a desire of redressing the injured, excited a degree of revenge. Some men of talents, who precipitately thought, that national indignation might produce national justice, unveiled some of the fountains of corruption in the East. Their discoveries were heard with attention by the nation; but a benumbed state seconded not the ardour of the people, for restoring public honour, by exhibiting examples of public justice.

An enquiry into abuses, when it is not followed by animadversion and punishment, instead of repressing vice, produces a larger crop of delinquency. The Company's servants in the East, instead of "shortening their hands from vice," if an Asiatic expression may be used, on an Asiatic subject, "lengthened" them to every act of insolence and oppression. Their masters in the West, finding that the storm, which threatened the mismanagements of the Company, had dissipated without falling, flew in the face of a state, which, from its inactivity, they had great reason to despise. When the fear of future punishment was removed, former rancour and animosity
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moisty returned. To partake of the injustice, if not to share in the peculations of their servants, a Court of Directors, not only reversed the most solemn and decisive measures of their predecessors in office, but invaded and frustrated the most sacred engagements of the state. Some writers of spirit and information took arms in the cause of humanity and justice. They dragged forth the delinquents from the cloud, in which they had involved themselves, and brought them bound to the tribunal of the public. The public, before sentence was passed, shewed a laudable inclination to hear the culprits, in their own defence.

The Court of Directors undertook this defence, with an appearance of conviction of their own integrity and the rectitude of their measures; a circumstance calculated to impose upon the world. In a public advertisement *, they assured their constituents and the nation at large, "That from the materials before them, they had "not the least doubt of refuting the heavy charges brought against "them, which, could they be proved, would not only render them "unfit to conduct the affairs of the Company, but utterly unworthy "of every degree of public trust and confidence." To support this precipitate declaration, they proceeded to what they called a defence of their conduct. But, when they ought to have stated their case in the plain and simple garb which conscious integrity and truth always choose and love, they overwhelmed and frightened the nation, with many enormous volumes, printed from the heavy and contradictory records of the Company. The Directors, by this clumsy artifice, hoped, perhaps, to create a general disgust against a subject, which few had abilities and scarcely any the perseverance to explicate, in such a confused mass. Under the cover of a dull and torpid publication, they thought they had secured a safe retreat from further censure. This Asiatic mud-fort formed of consultations,

* March 26th, 1777.
dispatches, and country correspondences, we have formed, with less danger than labour; and, we trust, we have had the good fortune to confound an awkward enemy, by turning on him his own artillery.

Though the Court of East India Directors have failed, in their solemn engagements to the public, to justify their own conduct relative to their behaviour towards the Nabob of Arcot and the pretended restoration of Tanjore, it is feared, that "by crawling over the subject, they have rendered it disgusting to the generality of readers, by the flame of their heavy papers." Our apprehensions on that head will render it perhaps necessary to recapitulate some capital points, which have been more diffusely examined and proved in the preceding part of this work. Where any doubts may arise in the mind of the reader of this chapter, he is referred to the pages in which the subject is treated at large, under the evidence of unquestionable authorities. In short, instead of following the example of our opponents, whose obvious intention has been to restore the transactions of the Company to their original obscurity and uncertainty, we shall endeavour to develop truth, and to present her, in her native simplicity, before the eye of the public. Whatever the decision of that public may be on the subject, we shall think ourselves sufficiently rewarded by the consciousness of having exposed INJUSTICE and supported JUSTICE.

It has appeared that the East India Company, which was first formed in a period of time unfavourable to commerce, had carried into its original institution and management, the narrow principles of mean traders †. That the managers of their affairs at home had

† We shall have occasion hereafter to shew, that the restoration of Tuljâ-nâ. notwithstanding the pompous virtue expressed in the orders of April 12, 1775, was but a cruel mockery of that Rajah, who has been only raised as a figure of straw against the Nabob, to promote an auction of corruption in the Carnatic.

† History and Management of the East India Company, p. 8, 12, 13.
very early usurped an absolute dominion over the stock-holders; and
had, by private contracts, unjust deductions, and iniquitous frauds,
embezzled their property §. That their principal servants abroad,
following the example of their superiors, or obeying their orders||,
had been guilty of treachery to the natives of India, and of acts of
cruelty, injustice, and oppression to their fellow-subjects ¶. That
when they were called to account by the Great Mogul for their in-
justice to his subjects, their conduct in adversity was as mean, ab-
ject, and submissive, as their insolence and haughtiness had been
intolerable in prosperity*. That when the mismanagements of the
Company forced, in a manner, their affairs into parliamentary dis-
cussion, they were detected in perverting public justice, by corrupt-
ing the venal and bribing the profligate †. That, after the two
Companies were united, in the beginning of the present century,
the same attention to self-interest, the same eager pursuit of personal
gain, continued among the leaders at home; and the same tyranny,
circumvention, and fraud, among the principal servants abroad ‡.
That when the Company, by various revolutions in Asia, ascended
from the condition of traders to that of sovereigns, they mul-
tiplied their acts of injustice, in proportion to the extent of their
power $. That though some men of talents and some of integrity,
had frequently the management of affairs at home and abroad, few
of these could divest themselves of the confined principles of avarice
and self-interestedness||. That instead of behaving themselves like
dutiful subjects to the state, with whose just authority the real
interests of the Company are closely and inseparably connected, the

§ History and Management of the East India
¶ Ibid. p. 14, 15. Hamilton, vol. i. Har-
vol. x.
† P. 17. Journals of the Commons, April
1675.
‡ P. 19, 20, 21, &c. Harris, vol. ii. Dod-
§ Vide the whole of this work, with the un-
doubted authorities on which it is founded.
|| P. 160, et passim.

managers
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managers of their affairs insulted the commission of their Sovereign, disregarded the public faith, and trampled upon a national guarantee. That these principles, as they proceed chiefly from radical defects in the constitution of the Company, call aloud for the correcting hand of the legislature, to prevent future mischiefs by new regulations, if not to punish former delinquencies.

In the course of the preceding work, it has been proved, that the Company's servants uniformly were considered and owned themselves the subjects of the Mogul, in all parts of that monarch's dominions, where they possessed settlements*. That, especially in the Carnatic, when they took up arms, upon any occasion, they avowed that they only performed their duty, as subjects of the Mogul empire, according to their original condition and tenure in the country and the fundamental principles of the Mogul government†. That they considered and always acknowledged the Nabob of Arcot, as the mediate power, between them and the Mogul, to whom their allegiance and support was due, as faithful and approved subjects‡. That they knew and owned, that Mahommed Ali, the present Nabob of the Carnatic, was the lawful Nabob of that country, by the free and legal Sanads of the Mogul, as well as of his deputy, the viceroy of the Decan§. That they looked upon the French Company, who had been established in the Carnatic, on the very same footing with themselves, in the light of rebels, for carrying on war against Mahommed Ali∥. That, in the person of their governor, Mr. Pigot, they signified their wish "to carry on their business, under that prince's protection, as they

† P. 112. Governor Saunders, ubi supra.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid.
∥ Governor Saunders, Feb. 15th, 1754.
Lawrence's Narrative, p. 5.

" did
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They still continue in the same relation to him.

Have no right to be principals in war.

None to the disposition of conquests.

Deduction of the history of the Carnatic.

Tanjore a part of it from the earliest times.

The whole Carnatic reduced by Bijapour.

"did under that of former Subadars." That, upon the whole, as no revolution has happened in the Carnatic, no breach upon the legal appointment of Mahommed Ali, to the government of that country, the Company and their servants still continue, in the same relation to that Nabob, as they had uniformly stood with regard to his predecessors and to himself. That, in the double capacity of subjects to Great Britain, and to the government of the country, where the settlement is placed, the Company, neither had nor have any right, to become principals in any war; and that they can only appear, as allies, auxiliaries or mercenaries. That in none of these characters, they have any right whatsoever to either the possession or the disposition of conquests; and, that their claiming the one or arrogating the other is a violation of their duty, as subjects of Great Britain, as well as of the country government.

To demonstrate the indisputable right of the Mogul to the Carnatic and all its dependencies, by conquest, the history of that country has been deduced from the earliest times. It has been proved, that, as early as the year 1310†, a Gentoo prince reigned in the Carnatic, who was sovereign of the provinces of Canara, Myfure, Travancore, Tanjore, Marava, and Madura ‡. That this prince, to defend himself against the inroads of the Mahomedans, had built the city of Bigenagur §, in the mountains, about eighty geometrical miles to the south-east of Goa ||. That this city, which gave its name to the kingdom of which it was the capital, was attacked and taken, in the year 1563, by the united force of the four Mahomedan principalities of the Decan †*. That, in a war which commenced in 1650, the whole Carnatic was entirely reduced under the yoke of the Mahomedan kings of Bijapour and Tellingana ††.

* Mr. Pigot to the Nabob, Aug. 5th, 1759, and June 23d, 1760.
† P. 142. Dow, vol. i.
‡ De Faria, vol. i. p. 95. vol. ii. p. 83. 142.
§ Dow, vol. i.
|| Lettres Edifiantes, tom. xxiii.
*° De Faria, p. 252.
†† Dow, vol. iii.

That
That in the years 1686 and 1687, the emperor Aurungzebe conquered the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana. That the Naigs of Tanjore, by that conquest, became feudatories and vassals of the empire. That about the year 1696, nine years after the reduction of the kingdoms of Bijapour and Tellingana, one Ecko-ji, a Maratta, servant to the king of Bijapour, having been called by the hereditary Naig of Tanjore to his assistance, seized the country, which he had been called to defend. That the Mogul Nabob of the Carnatic reduced Sahu-ji, the son of the usurper, to an absolute dependence on the empire. That the Nabob imposed upon the vanquished Sahu-ji, an annual tribute of thirty lacks of rupees. That, in consideration of that sum and his entire submission to the mandates of the Mogul, that monarch conferred upon him the title of Rajah, by an imperial Phirmaun.

† P. 56, 57.
§ P. 57.
|| 375,000l.

* Cowlhamma from Nabob Zulphkfr Cawm Phirman, Nabob of the Carnatic, to Sabougur, the Son of Ecko-ji, Naig or Zemindar of Tanjore.

"I have received your obligation in writing, containing assurances of your humiliation, submission, penitence, and dejection, and of your avoiding your former untoward conduct, and not afflicting Ramah, begging pardon for your past faults, and engaging to become a faithful subject of the Empire; and also engaging to pay an annual tribute of thirty lacks of rupees, twenty lack you will pay now, with jewels and elephants, and ten the next year; and in the room of furnishing me with a force, you will deliver up to me the forts of Pallamcottah, Citroners, and Tank, with their districts; and also Cantamamgoodys, Sheamull, Tataloodynar, Imrapoor, Ekanasoor, Haulcoort, and Pandalam, &c. which you took from Ram Rage; and further, begging to have the gracious Phirmaun, pardoning your faults, and giving you the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore.—Though your faults, from the beginning to this time, do not merit forgivenes, and by the blessing of God, the reduction of Tanjore was as good as accomplishe, yet as the Imperial court is replete with mercy and forgivenes, and the servants thereof are ever disposed to pardon offences, considering your humiliation and submissive entreaty, I have agreed to your proposal, on condition of your discharging the stipulated tribute, and not by any means afflicting the rebellious Ramah.—I have sworn by the King, who is the shadow of the Moft High (for whose safety may thousands give their lives) and having marked this paper with the palm of my hand, have sent it you, as an assurance that you may, in peace of mind and in confidence, discharge your tribute, deliver up the forts and districts, avoid any connection with the rebel, and not act in any manner whatsoever, contrary to orders; that we may write to the presence of the King, and obtain for you his gracious Phirmaun, granting you forgivenes of
succession of the posterity of Ecko-jâ in Tanjore, the settled tribute was paid, and the feudatory services performed, by that country, for more than thirty years†. That, when the Rajah proved refractory, his superior, the Nabob of Arcot, feized his country, as a forfeiture to the empire, and threw the revolted vassal into prison, as a punishment for his contumacy‡. That, though the Rajah, during troubles, which arose in the Carnatic, recovered his liberty and government, he continued subject to the empire of the Moguls; and was accountable for his tribute and feudal duties to the Nabob of Arcot, the mediate power between him and the throne.

During the wars, which arose on the coast of Coromandel, from the ambition of the French and the intrigues of M. Dupleix, it has been shewn, that the Rajah of Tanjore not only neglected to pay his tribute, but acted a very undutiful and faithless part towards

of your faults, and giving you the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore,—by which you will be honoured and exalted!!

Translation of an Obligation to Zulphukar Cawn Babauder, from Sauhougee, Zemindar of Tanjore.

"It having pleased the most high and mighty Zulphukar Cawn, Nabob, to intend taking Tanjore from me Sauhougee, Zemindar thereof,—I do hereby promise and engage to act differently from my former conduct, and to have no connection with, and give no affianced to, Ram Rage, but faithfully and humbly to pay submission to the Imperial court of his high Majesty, which is like Solomon's in glory and magnificence; and being convinced that remaining my faithful subject must contribute to my preferment and future welfare and advantage, I therefore submit myself to his order, and promise to serve him as his vassal; and I have agreed to pay him a tribute of thirty lacs of rupees annually. I will now pay twenty lacs in ready money, jewels, and elephants, and I will be answerable for ten lack in the next year; and instead of furnishing the said Nabob, in his expedition against Gingee, with a thousand horse and four thousand Sepoys from my troops (as was intended), I will deliver him up three forts, viz. Pollamcottah, Cittoners, and Task, with their districts; and also Culmanagoodry, Sheenuity, Tuttegodynar, Inrapoor, Elvanore, Haulcoughry and Pandalum, &c. which I took from Ram Rage; all which I give the said Nabob as a tribute. I hope, as a servant of the Court, to receive the gracious Phirmaun in my name, through the means of the said Nabob, giving me to the title of Rajah, and the Zemindary of Tanjore. I promise that I will by every means, support a connection with the garrisons, which are placed in the new-conquered countries; and I will not, in any respect, be guilty of disobedience, or deviate from the path of subjection,—Given this 7th of Shavaul, in the 33th year of his Majesty's reign."

† Rous's Appendix, No. IV. p. 70.
‡ P. 60.
his superior the Nabob and the English Company *. That though he sent a force to assist them in 1752, it was after they had obtained a manifest superiority, by the junction of the Marattas and Mysoreans †. That when they had lost that superiority in 1753, he amused them with insidious promises, whilst he actually treated with their enemies ‡. That his conduct during the whole war, was not only uniformly deceptions §, but that he privately corresponded with the enemy ¶, entertained their agent at his capital ℧, stopped provisions from being sent to the English army, and disconcerted their operations **. That, though the French attacked his capital in 1758, he exhibited marks of animosity against the English, and, when he thought their fortune on the decline, when Madras was besieged, he not only refused assistance to them and his superior, the Nabob, but treated their representative, Major Calliaud, with every mark of disrespect and contempt ††. That, though the power of the French manifestly declined, when they were forced to raise the siege of Madras, he not only refused assistance to his superior the Nabob, but answered the request of the Presidency with a sarcasm upon their conduct ‡‡.

Notwithstanding the treaty of 1762, which settled the tribute of Tanjore, at less than half the sum paid in the most regular times, was so favourable to Pretaupa Sing, it has appeared, that he shewed so little inclination to be punctual, in performing his part of the terms, that nothing but his terror from the troops, marching to the siege of Madura, could induce him to pay his second Kift §§. When, upon the death of Pretaupa, in December 1763 ||, his son Tulja-ji succeeded to the Rajahship, he improved on his father’s obliquities and crimes. Having

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* P. 87.
† Orme, vol. i. Lawrence’s Narr. passim.
‡ Lawrence’s Narr. p. 41. Orme, vol. i.
§ Lawrence’s Narrative, p. 44.
|i 2 removed

** Lawrence’s Narrative.
‡‡ Ibid. p. 465.
§§ Rous’s Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.
|||| Ibid. p. 83, 89.

The treaty of 1762 raises no gratitude in his mind.

Succeeded by Tulja-ji,
removed the legitimate branches of his own family, either by the
dagger or bowl ||, he formed a close connexion and established a se-
cret correspondence, with Isph Chan, then in actual rebellion, and
besieged in Madura, by the Nabob and English ¶. When a war
was kindled between Hyder Ali and the English, the Rajah, though
he had obtained, at the time, favours from the Presidency, assisted
their enemy with money §§. When that chief invaded the Carna-
tic in 1769, Tulja-ji assisted him with money and provisions ††,
which enabled him to carry the war to the gates of Madras, and to
conclude a peace on his own terms. Hyder Ali was so sensible of
the Rajah's services, and the Rajah so certain of the protection and
assistance of that chief, that Hyder insisted, his new ally should
be comprehended in the treaty ¶¶, which he dictated, in a manner,
to the Presidency in April 1769. Though the Presidency, by a sub-
terfuge, to which they endeavoured to affix a meaning ††, insisted
upon including the Rajah in the treaty, as their friend, he did not
consider himself in that light; but, on the contrary, depending upon
the power of Hyder Ali, flopped the payment of the stipulated tri-
ble, which became due, just three months after the treaty of April
1769 was concluded **.

It has appeared, that the Court of Directors were so sensible of
the duplicity and treachery of the Rajah, and so much irritated at
the whole of his conduct, that, on the 17th of March 1769, they
sent positive orders to the Presidency, to assist the Nabob in bringing
to a severe account his undutiful vassal *. That the Court plainly
were of opinion, that the treaty of 1762 had not abridged any part
of the constitutional rights of the Carnatic over Tanjore. That they
considered that country, as a P A R T of the Carnatic; and its Rajah

|| Rou's Appendix, No. XIII. p. 198.  
¶ P. 147.  
§§ P. 155.  
†† Mr. Du Pâ's Vindication, p. 15.  
* Rou's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.  
†† Ibid.  
** Rou's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.  
* P. 164, 165. Directors to the Governor and Council, and to the Select Committee, March 17th, 1769.
only a Zemindar of that province †. That he had not only de-
served chasmeiment for his conduct; but that the Company were
bound to assist the Nabob against his refractory feudatory ‡. It has been shewn, that the osten
sible reasons, for not ex-
cuting those orders, proceeded from circumstances very different §, from any amendment in the behaviour of the Rajah. That the Pre-
idency, who were, by no means, prejudiced in favour of the Na-
ob, declared that the Rajah certainly deserved chastisement, for
having assisted the enemy of the Carnatic, with money and provi-
sions, and for delaying the payment of the peishcuifi, settled by the
treaty of 1762 ||. That, in the end of the year 1770, the Rajah's
correspondence with Hyder and the Marattas, which two powers he
invited to an invasion of the Carnatic, was discovered, by the Pre-
idency, as well as the Nabob ¶. That, whilst he solicited foreign
enemies to attack the Nabob, he himself actually took up arms against
the dependents and vassals of that prince ††. That when the English
President wrote to the Rajah to suspend hostilities, instead of paying
attention to that application, he conveyed insult and impertinence, in
his answer **. That, upon the whole, the intrigues of the Rajah,
with the avowed enemies of the Carnatic, his taking up arms against
the dependents of a prince, to whom he himself was tributary †††,
his breach of the treaty of 1762, of which the Company were gua-
rantees, his opposition to the English commerce, his connection with
other European factories, his avowed disobedience to his superior,
his ingratitude to his protectors, his behaviour in the late war, the
danger that might result from his known character, in any future
war, rendered it just, expedient and necessary, to bring him to a
severe account *.

† P. 165.
‡ Ibid.
§ Rous's Appendix, No. XXV. p. 939.
¶ Ibid.
|| Ibid. No. XXII. p. 569.
‡‡ President to Nabob, Feb. 20th, 1771.
* Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 685.

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Though the conduct of the Rajah appeared to the Presidency to merit the ultimate chastisement of war, it has been shewn, that the Nabob preferred negotiation to hostility. That when the decision of arms became necessary, he vested his eldest son with powers, to accommodate matters with the Rajah. That when an agent was sent with letters to Tanjore, from the President, the General, and the young Nabob, Tulja-ji treated him with indignity, and his dispatches with contempt. That notwithstanding, when a practicable breach was made, a peace was concluded, so favourable to the Rajah, that the Presidency expressed the highest dissatisfaction, on that head. That, from the known character and views of Tulja-ji, it was the opinion of the Presidency, that a second expedition against Tanjore would soon become necessary; and that nothing short of the absolute reduction of the Rajah could preserve the peace of the Carnatic. That this opinion was verified by the subsequent conduct of the Rajah, who renewed his intrigues, with foreign powers, as soon as the guns, which had breached his walls, were withdrawn from the batteries. That he demanded succours from the Marathas, affured Hyder, that he had no other protector, promised to assist that chief, in dismembering the Carnatic. entered into intrigues, treaties and agreements for a military assistance, with the Dutch of Negapatnam, Danes of Tranquebar, and French at Pondecherry. That, instead of treating the just authority of his superior, with becoming respect, he had refused, upon requisition, to assist him with troops, in terms of his tenure. That he received,
protected and aided the enemies of the Nabob, encouraged depredations in his country, and neglected to pay the money, stipulated by the agreement, to the observance of which he had solemnly sworn, in the month of October 1771.

Upon the whole, it has been shewn, that the Rajah, by withholding, for more than two years, the tribute stipulated to be annually paid to the Nabob, had broken the treaty of 1762, to which the Company were guarantees. That the Company were bound, by that treaty, which they themselves had made, to assist the Nabob against the Rajah. That, though the Rajah, as a tributary to the Carnatic, was in justice bound to furnish his quota of men and money, towards the general defence, he refused both, and assisted the enemy. That the Presidency of Fort St. George, by the express orders of their superiors, were obliged to give their assistance to the Nabob, in preserving the peace of the Carnatic, as well as the rights and dignity of his government.

That the dangerous intrigues, preparations, and even hostilities of the Rajah had broken that peace of which they were the guardians. That their duty to their superiors, their engagements to the Nabob, and even self-preservation, forced them to take the field. That, when a war was once commenced, they could only appear, as they themselves uniformly acknowledged, in the light of allies, auxiliaries or mercenaries. That, in none of those characters, they possessed, or pretended to possess, any right to what might be obtained by victory, except the plunder of places taken by storm. That, as Tanjore was a part of the Carnatic, as being tributary to that province, the keeping possession of that place, when reduced, or the giving it to any other, than

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1 Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1119.
2 Ibid. p. 1120.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. No. XXIV.
5 Ibid. No. XXV. p. 939. Mr. Du Pré's Appendix, paffim.
6 Treaty dated Sept. 26th, 1762.
7 Letter of March 17th, 1769.
8 P. 194, 195.
9 Rous's Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1118.
10 Ibid. p. 1117 & passim.
11 Ibid. Its
its lord paramount, the Nabob, would have been, in the Company, a direct infringement of the treaty of Paris, which guaranteed Mahomed Ali, in the entire and exclusive possession of the whole country. That, granting Tanjore had not been a part of the Carnatic, a position which we deny, it became a part of that country, when it was conquered by the arms of the Nabob, in a necessary, regular, and solemn war. That, as soon as it became a part of the Carnatic, by conquest, which is the least disputable of all rights, it immediately fell under the security of the treaty of Paris. That nothing but another conquest, or a voluntary cession of Tanjore, by the Nabob himself, could alienate it from that prince. That the Company, by taking possession of it, by keeping it for themselves, or transferring its revenue and government to another, not only infringed the guarantee of the state, but committed an act of private injustice, if not robbery, which ought to be, and perhaps is, punishable by the laws of their country. That, by restoring Tanjore to the Rajah, or, what in fact is the case, their seizing it for themselves, they broke a solemn contract, concluded with the Nabob, under the faith of their own seal.

The merits of the case being stated, it may not be improper, to contrast the characters of the persons, principally concerned. The Nabob of Arcot possesses the acknowledged and lawful sovereignty of the whole Carnatic, by the fundamental laws of the Mogul empire, and by the regular and legal phirmans of all the successive emperors, who have swayed the sceptre of Delhi, for thirty years. Tulja-jī is descended of an illegitimate branch of the family of a Maratta adventurer, who wrested Tanjore, a part of the Carnatic, by treachery, from the hereditary Naig, who was himself a vassal to

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\footnote{Vide 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, Feb. 1765.}
\footnote{P. 195 & passim.}
\footnote{Under the faith of this contract, the Nabob paid to their army, as mercenaries, a gift of seven lacks of pagodas (286,000 l.), besides the enormous expences of the expedition.}
the Mogul. Mahommed Ali has adhered, without deviation, for more than thirty years, to the English interest, and the English cause. The father of the Rajah, and after him the present Rajah, were, during that period, uniformly treacherous, and often hostile to their superior, and always faithless to his allies. The Nabob, besides his other expenses in defending the Carnatic, against the enemies of the English, as well as his own, had paid, from the year 1750 to the end of 1773, 17,984,916 pagodas, a sum exceeding seven millions sterling, into the Company's cash. The Rajah, whose territories lay in the heart of the Carnatic, instead of furnishing his proportion of the general expence of defence, assisted the enemies of the country, with money and provisions. The Nabob deviated, on no occasion, from his engagements to the Company. Tulja-ji broke their treaties, disregarded their guarantee, and insulted their principal servants. The Nabob is not less different in his private character, than in his public behaviour, from the new favourite, whom the Court of Directors have preferred to an old friend. Mahommed Ali was not only dutiful to his father, but affectionate to brothers, who had rebelled against his government; yet, whom he not only pardoned, but still maintains, together with their families, at an expence, suitable to their dignity. Tulja-ji was suspected of having murdered his father; and he actually cut off, upon his accession, as has been already related, almost all his relations. The first is virtuous in his private life, just and dignified in his public conduct. The second is addicted to almost every vice, that depraves and disgraces human nature; and his public transactions have been uniformly marked with treachery and folly.

The chain of facts, with the arguments, which naturally arose from those facts, contained in the preceding pages, and founded

† "The money, which I have paid into the Company's cash, since the year 1750, amounts to 17,984,916 pagodas (7,193,661 l. 8 s.).—The rest is well known to others now in England," Nabob to Sir Robert Hatland, Jan. 15th, 1774.

Chiefly
chiefly on the authority of the papers published by the Directors, in their own defence, may be thought sufficient to decide the judgment of the public. But the carrying forward a concise narrative of transactions to the restoration of Tanjore, may not be disagreeable to some readers. In the year 1772, the mismanagements of the Company abroad, but chiefly their pecuniary distresses at home, reached the ears of the nation, and roused, in some degree, the attention of government. The matter, when set afloat in parliament, was tossed and tumbled, with all that vehemence and indecision, which are the characteristics of numerous assemblies. A subject rude and without form, extensive in itself, and rendered still more intricate and perplexed, by those who dreaded an enquiry, was not likely to receive much light or benefit, from the delusive examination of men averse to application and labour. Committees were appointed to interrogate witnesses, and to examine records. Much time was lost, but little information gained. A bill was, at length, introduced and passed, which was so much amended in its progress, that it fell short of its object. A change made in the government of Bengal rendered that opulent province less subject than formerly to the control of the Court of Directors. But the less fortunate coast of Coromandel was left as a field for the exercise of their talents, and the exertion of their authority.

The principal discovery made by the Committees, who examined the affairs of India, was, in all appearance, conveyed to them, by some members of the Court of Directors, who were displeased, at the short duration of their own power. They represented, that the mismanagements abroad arose chiefly, from that disregard to the orders sent from home, which had been naturally encouraged, by those fluctuations in men and opinions, which had sprung from a frequent choice of Directors. To give permanency to the power of Directors, was the only way to secure the obedience of Presidencies. This suggestion was seized with eagerness, by men averse to the labour of an annual
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annual exertion of influence. Vainly imagining that gratitude was a stronger passion than fear, they hoped to gain by a favour, persons whom that very favour placed beyond their control. The permanency so much recommended and requested was accordingly given to the Court of Directors; but, instead of producing amendment, it served to confirm, and perpetuate the old system, with all its errors and absurdity. The Court became, at once, independent of Government and the Proprietors. The latter were, in fact, reduced to mere cyphers, though they were still amused, with the yearly mockery of voting for six Directors; who had actually secured their election, by an agreement with the eighteen brethren, whom they had left behind the bar, the year before. Thus the Directors themselves, like the parliament of Paris, became their own electors; whilst an impov'dent Government and an ill-used Proprietary were left spectators of measures, which they could not prevent, and which were too troublesome to be reversed.

The Court feeling their own independence, began to think of the means of turning it to the best advantage. The law, which had rendered them perpetual dictators, had unluckily deprived them of Bengal, their best and most desirable province. On the Coast, some advantages and much resentment still remained. A conquest had been made of an opulent province, under the auspices of a governor, who, having come by accident to the chair, had not, perhaps, offered the customary Nazir, to his superiors. Mahommed Ali, though persecuted by servants, had not yet felt the heavy hand of the masters, to correct him, for his defection to the State. The State, with peculiar respect to the Company, had delivered the victim into their hands; but the hurry arising from a parliamentary enquiry, had hitherto prevented the building of the altar, on which the sacrifice was to be made. A new governor for Madras, to officiate as high-priest, at the intended ceremony, was still to be found; and as the exorcist pieces were to become his perquisites, there were many candidates for the office.

K k 2
The intrigues of Leadenhall-Street are frequently too dark to be traced, and are seldom worth the labour of detection. The Court of Directors having, by a small majority, nominated a governor for Fort St. George, in the beginning of 1775, their nomination was reversed by the Proprietors, by a still smaller superiority of votes. The object of the Company's choice was Lord Pigot, who, before he attained the rank of an Irish Baron, had managed the affairs of the Company, for some years, as their President, on the coast of Coromandel.

Such parts of the conduct of Mr. Pigot, in that station, as suited the public eye, have been explained, with the strictest impartiality, in the preceding part of this work. Other things we have chosen to leave in the shade, from a respect due to the dead. Besides, the misfortunes, which attended the latter part of Lord Pigot's life, though they cannot justify his measures, claim an indulgence, against the severity of animadversion. But an undeviating attention to such truths, as are absolutely necessary to explain our subject, must supersede every other consideration.

Mr. Pigot, having returned to Europe, soon after the conclusion of the last peace, had successively obtained the rank of a Baronet and that of a peer of Ireland. Though possessed of those honours and an ample fortune, Lord Pigot, after having passed twelve years in England, growing suddenly tired of the vapid pleasures of an idle life, resolved to solicit the government of Madras, and to return to India. More motives, than a love of business, probably suggested this resolution to his Lordship. The treaty of 1762, which had settled money-matters between the Nabob of Arcot and his vassal the Rajah of Tanjore, had been, for various reasons, the favourite measure of his former government. The vague reports, concerning the deprivation of the Rajah, had been confirmed to his Lordship, by a letter from Moodoo-Kilna, a Dubash, whose steady friendship had remained unimpaired, during an absence of many
many years. This faithful Dubash, having rented lands to a very considerable amount from Tulja-ji*, lamented the fall of that Rajah, with all the sincerity of a grateful tenant. In the warmth of his zeal, he probably represented to his noble friend, the case of "that monarch" in a very different light, from that established, by incontrovertible evidence, in the preceding part of this work.

To his representations of the injustice of the reduction of Tanjore, Moodoo-Kiftna probably added those reports of the cruelties of the Nabob, which were industriously circulated in the beginning of 1775, in Leadenhall-Street. It was alleged that Tulja-ji was closely confined in a dungeon at Tanjore; and, at the same time, that he was in irons at Trichinopoly. Though these two stories could not possibly be true, they were both believed, by some tender-hearted persons in the India-house; if their own allegations deserve any credit. Some feeling clerks in office dissolved into tears, upon hearing the melancholy tale; and even a few Directors, at the weekly feast in the London Tavern, were observed to abstain from the delicacies of the Company's table, when they heard the sad reverse of fallen Majesty. Lord Pigot himself, transferring all his friendship for Prentupa, to the unfortunate Tulja-ji, resolved to pass immediately to Asia, to save the life of the devoted Rajah, from the dagger of Mahommed Ali. That hardened prince, it had been found by experience, was capable of any injustice. Though he had appointed Lord Pigot his agent in England, much of the salary annexed to the office remained unpaid. The Nabob, it seems, had sheltered himself under the trite maxim, "that no reward ought " to be given, where no service is performed;" and had consequently been unpardonably negligent, in his remittances.

Though a majority of the Court of Directors had voted, for another Governor, they were not so much attached to their former choice.

choice, as to carry their resentment to any steady opposition to the measures proposed, by the noble Lord recommended, by their constituents. The party, who had opposed the nomination of Mr. Rumbold, acquired credit and consequently influence, by the decision of the Proprietors, in favour of Lord Pigot. The event of the contest brought to the latter all the advantages, derived from victory. A new light fell upon the India-house, which laid open at one view, to the Directors, all their own negligences and the errors of their predecessors. The obtaining or enjoying a government in India, without the splendour of some great revolution, was an object beneath the dignity of a noble person, who had already made a distinguished figure, in the affairs of the East. The example of another Lord, who had new-modelled the tenure of the Company in Bengal, was an inducement to emulation, though not an object of jealousy. The distress of Tulja-ji, and the merits of his father, brought the softer feelings of pity and gratitude to the aid of the more sturdy passion of ambition.

The Nabob of Arcot, though he had uniformly fulfilled his engagements to the Company, had, in his attention to friends in the East, neglected those in the West. He had besides, been sufficiently hardy to have appealed to a Government, who had suffered a signal defeat, in the contest, which had given a new governor to Fort St. George. These reasons, combining themselves with the wishes of a successful opposition in the India-House, left Lord Pigot and his party the arbiters of the fate of the Carnatic. Orders and instructions were framed, less consistent with the former conduct of the Directors, than suitable to their present views. These views were so powerful, in their effect, that, in the pursuit of them, all regard to matter of fact, as well as to justice, was overlooked. The orders of the Court of Directors, for removing Mr. Wynch and appointing Lord Pigot, together
gether with the commission to the latter, we may safely affirm, are not to be paralleled, in the records of any body of men vested with authority. Ignorance, which by itself only merits contempt, assumes, in those papers, a presumptuous form, which might justify indignation, were the authors worthy of a passion of any dignity. In every sentence, nay in every line, the Directors not only contradict matter of fact, but fly in the face of their own records, with a total want of caution, which is liable to detection, and consequently must meet with disgrace, and ought to suffer punishment. The facts, which we have established, by incontrovertible evidence, in the preceding pages, are diametrically opposite to all the allegations contained in the orders of April the 12th 1775. If the Directors will choose to deny this truth, they must own, that they have imposed spurious records on the world, in the volumes, which they have published in their own defence.

To pursue these orders, through all their mazes of absurdity and ignorance, would be a laborious and undignified task. We shall, however, examine briefly the most material; though to answer ill-founded allegations, may give them a consequence, which they do not deserve. "We have been uniform in our orders," say the Directors of 1775, "prohibiting our servants from extending the territories of the Company and the Nabob." But the reduction of Tanjore was not extending the Nabob's territories. That country was already in the heart of his dominions, defended by his resources and arms, subject, under certain stipulations, to his government, liable to fall as a forfeiture into his hands, upon the disobedience of its Rajah, and in every respect a part of the Carnatic. The true meaning of former orders, against enlarging territories, was to circumcribe the extent of country to be defended, and to limit the expense of defence. The reduction of Tanjore, instead of increasing

* Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 145. Paragraph 27.
the present expence, was providing against a future waste. It was
the removing an internal enemy, and the obtaining resources against
foreign invaders. Besides, the treaty of 1762 was superior, in au-
tority, to any orders from the Court of Directors, could even these
orders be construed to extend to territories, within the limits and go-
vernment of the Carnatic. The Rajah had broke that treaty. The
Company were bound to assist the Nabob. A war was begun, which
terminated in a conquest. That conquest vested an indefeasible right
to the territory of Tanjore, in the Nabob; and the Company's or-
ders could not affect that right, without violating the law of nature
and nations, the guarantee of their sovereign, and the tenure, by
which they held their own settlements on the coast.

"We can by no means allow," say the Directors, "that you were
warranted in recurring to arms, so long as the king of Tanjore's
vackeel declared himself ready and willing to settle affairs ". The
Directors allude to the expedition of 1771, of which they
themselves had approved in the most ample and solemn manner †.
They aver, that the Rajah's vackeel was ready and willing to settle
affairs. But it appears, from the papers which they have published,
in their own defence, "that the Nabob had opened his demand to
the Tanjore vackeel. But that the vackeel declared, he had no
powers to accommodate the matter ‡." How could the vackeel
have powers, when his master meant nothing less, than a reasonable
accommodation §? The Directors have since owned in their defence,
that Tulja-ji "used delays, procrastinations and evasions, in order to
waste the time, till the setting in of the rains and the rising of the
monsoon should deprive the Nabob and the English of the power

* Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 146, paragraph 31.
† Vide public thanks to Mr. De Prè for every part of his conduct, during his govern-
ment, especially for his supporting the rights of the Nabob of Arcot. Aug. 1771.
‡ Rous's Appendix, No. XXII. p. 726.
§ Ibid. p. 728. 72.
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"of the power of military compulsion, for the season." What are we to think of the morality of men, who advance falsehoods for facts? what of their knowledge, when they are ignorant of the very records, which they published in their own defence?

The Directors affirm, in their orders for the restoration of Tanjore to the Rajah, that it was, at the request of the Nabob and Pretaupa Sing, that the Presidency became guarantees to the treaty of 1762. But we have already shewn, that the treaty was forced on the Nabob. That Mr. Pigot framed it without his consent. That he seized the Nabob's chop, and put it, with his own hand, to the paper; and that even Pretaupa Sing would have been glad to forego the benefit of that treaty, could he have retained the money, expended in the course of the negociation. The reduction of Tanjore, say the intelligent Directors, was "a direct violation of the treaty of 1762, and contrary to our repeated instructions." The first is an extraordinary position in politics, and worthy of the wisdom of a body, who dispose of kingdoms, with the dash of a pen. Why are treaties formed, but to be equally binding on the parties? Had not the Rajah broken that treaty, and forced the guarantees to take up arms against him? Did not a regular and solemn war commence, which ended in another treaty, in which the former was not so much as mentioned? Does not war, according to the law of nations and the universal consent of mankind, extinguish all prior treaties? Can any treaties, established before a rupture, recover their former force, without being named, in the agreement, between the contending parties, which terminates the rupture? Would the Directors hold it forth, as a maxim, that an agreement

* The noted orders of April 12th 1775, seem to confound together men and things, seasons and years, treaties and agreements, in one confused mass.

† Rous's Appendix, No. IX. p. 153.
between a superior and his vassal is binding on the former, and not on the latter? If neither Pretaupa Sing nor his son were bound, by the treaty of 1762, or amenable to animadversion, for a breach of it, why was the treaty sent to Tanjore, to be confirmed by the signature and oath of the Rajah? And if the Rajah was not accountable for deviating from the treaty, what meaning do the Directors annex to the Company's guarantee, who solemnly promised to assist the party, who should adhere to the treaty, against the party failing to adhere *?

"We have determined," say the Directors, "to replace the king of Tanjore on the throne of his ancestors, upon certain terms and conditions, for the mutual benefit of himself and the Company, without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally Khan, Nabob of the "Carnatic †." This self-contradicting paragraph must be separated, to be exposed. But how have the Directors restored their mock-monarch to his throne? They insist, that he shall admit a garrison of their troops, into his capital ‡. That he shall assign revenues to the Company sufficient for the maintenance of the said troops, and for providing military stores §. That, "if the expense of the garrison shall exceed the amount of the revenues so assigned, then the king of Tanjore shall make good the deficiency ||." That all repairs of fortifications shall be conducted, by the Company's engineer, at the king's expense. That no treaty with foreign powers shall be concluded by the king, without the concurrence of the Company ††. That the number of native guards, necessary for supporting the dignity of his Majesty's government, shall be fixed by the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, and not exceeded nor augmented, by the king, on any account or pretence whatever ‡‡. Such is the manner, in which the East India Company restore a king "to

* Vide Treaty Sept. 20th, 1762.
† Orders, p. 5. No. IX. p. 154.
‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid.
|| Ibid. p. 155.
†† Ibid.
‡‡ Ibid.
They resolve to "infringe the rights of the Nabob." Yet make "no diminution of his authority." They resolve not to "infringe the rights of the Nabob." They are again convicted, by matter of fact.

"Without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally!" This oracular order is worthy of the enlightened Divan of Leadenhall-street. It reminds us of the answer of a late great statesman, who, when...
consulted by his Sovereign, on a perilous occasion, recommended
"vigorouss measures with moderation." There is a degree of
ridicule in making any serious reply to nonsense; but an adherence
to that maxim, would leave the Court of East India Directors un-
answered in all their late literary compositions. Were not the rights
of Mahommed Ali infringed, by depriving him of a country, which
came under his government, by a regular conquest, in a solemn, just
and necessary war? Was not Tanjore a province of the Mogul em-
pire, depending and paying tribute to the Nabob of the Carnatic,
long before the Company extended their views beyond the lands of
Madras? Was not the Rajah often punished, and sometimes deprived,
when he failed in the performance of his duty, as a vassal to the
Nabob of the Carnatic? Did not the Company themselves, in the
treaty of 1762, acknowledge, in the most solemn manner, the an-
cient dependence of Tanjore on the Carnatic, whilst they settled the
amount of the future tribute? Did that treaty comprehend any thing
relative to Tanjore, except the mere adjustment of accounts and the
settlement of the pecuniary, to be annually paid by the Rajah? Did
it preclude, or even mention, the acknowledged and undoubted con-
futitudinal rights of the Carnatic, to the Rajah’s assistance, in time of
war? Did the Rajah give that assistance? On the contrary, did he not
aid the enemy of the Carnatic and English with money and provi-
sions? Was not a former Court of Directors so sensible of the Ra-
jah’s having broken every tie, which bound him to his superior,
that they sent positive orders, the 17th of March, 1769, to bring
him to a severe account for his conduct; and to assist the Nabob
against him, in a manner suitable to the justice of his claims, and the
dignity of his government?

Did the Rajah of Tanjore adhere to the treaty of 1762, of which
the Company were the pledged guarantees? Did he not, for two
years, prior to the expedition of 1771, with-hold the stipulated
tribute?
tribute? Did he not kindle a war, in the heart of the Carnatic, by invading its vassals and dependents? Did he pay any attention to the friendly interference of the Presidency, to prevent a rupture between him and the Nabob? On the contrary, did he not disregard the guarantee of the Company; and force their servants, from self-preservation, as well as in support of the rights of the Nabob, to take the field? Did he not make treaties with foreign powers, send bribes to foreign states, to invade the territories of his superior, after a solemn treaty had been settled between him and the Nabob? Did he not form connections with other European Companies, alienate to them a part of his country, and receive their aid, to support him against his superior, and the English Company? Was not a second expedition undertaken against his capital, in which the Company's troops were declared, by the Presidency, to be only auxiliaries? Did not the Presidency of Fort St. George, under the seal of the Company, enter into an eventual agreement, that Tanjore should remain in the hands of the Nabob, in case of conquest? Did not that conquest take place, and give the Nabob, as principal in the war, a decisive and incontestible title to Tanjore?

Did not the Nabob fulfill all his stipulations, relative to Tanjore, with the Presidency? Did he not defray the whole expenses of the expedition, pay the captors for their right to the plunder of the place, advance seven lacks of pagodas, as a present to the army? Did he not, upon the reduction of Tanjore, pay all the Rajah's debts to the English and others? Did he not redeem those districts of the province of Tanjore, which the Rajah had alienated, sold or mortgaged to the Dutch at Nagore, to the Danes near Tranquebar, and to the French, round their settlement at Carical? Did he not enter into regular treaties with those three nations, under the sanction of the Plenipotentiary of the King of Great Britain, and the Representatives of the East India Company at Madras? Was not the Nabob
Nabob obliged to borrow money, to discharge all those engagements, from the inhabitants of Madras, and the country bankers, or soucers? Was not the country of Tanjore the Nabob's right, by a kind of purchase, as well as by forfeiture and conquest? Have not the Company, though only auxiliaries, or rather mercenaries in the war, deprived the principal in that war of his conquest, in breach of every law, which binds public societies? And do a set of Directors presume to affirm, in the face of the world, that they have restored Tanjore, "without infringing the rights of Mahommed Ali?"

The manner in which this flagrant injustice was committed, was scarcely less barefaced, than the presumption of defending such a breach of the faith of treaties, before an insulted Public. We have already shewn, that the Court of Directors, after having the most full and regular information of the motives, which induced the Presidency to assist the Nabob against the Rajah in 1771, approved of that measure, in the most ample manner*. That the same Court had received, on the 26th of March, 1774†, three weeks before the latter ships of the season failed, intelligence of the taking of Tanjore, with the whole materials relative to the expedition; but that they remained totally silent. That, in the course of the summer 1774, they received several dispatches relative to the same subject, and the subsequent measures, which arose from the same transaction. That during the winter of 1774, and for more than two months of 1775, they observed the same mysterious silence, which seemed to imply a thorough approbation, at least a tacit consent. The truth is, the resolution relative to the restoration of Tanjore, originated in the appointment of Lord Pigot to the government of Madras. Though the restoration was the principal motive, which induced his Lordship to brave the dangers of a long voyage, and the diseases of a hot cli-

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* Mr. Da Prince’s Vindication, last page. 1364. 1366.
† Rous’s Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1361.
mate, at an advanced period of life, the measure was so strong, that he proceeded with extreme caution. Having opened his mind to the Chairman and Deputy-chairman, men of distinguished Public Virtue, he awakened the feelings of humanity, for decayed Majesty, in their sympathetic bosoms. But, notwithstanding this thaw in the breasts of the two leaders, it was still feared, that some more hardened Directors, would revolt at an absolute restoration. It was, therefore, only proposed, at first, to intercede with the Nabob, for the assignment of a proper allowance, for the maintenance of the Rajah, and a guard for the security of his person.

Had his Lordship, and his two tender-hearted profelytes, floated here, who would not approve, who would not applaud the measure? The Nabob has always been, he still continues, willing to grant a Jaghire, a place of residence to the Rajah, an allowance for a guard to protect his person, or to gratify his vanity. When the country was in the possession of his superior, Tulja-jí was not only treated with humanity, but with an almost unbounded generosity, which was denied nothing but the power of doing harm. He remained within his palace, which was surrounded with gardens of pleasure, more than a mile in circumference, with his family, women, relations, and friends. Not a person belonging to the Nabob ever entered the gates, not one belonging to the Rajah was ever refused admittance. The soldiers, who mounted guard without, were instructed to behave themselves as his servants; within there was a perpetual scene of festivity and joy, dancing, piping, and every demonstration of happiness. No sums were refused to administer to the pleasures of the Rajah, none to satisfy his most extravagant follies. Freed from the weight of a government, which had been too heavy for the weak shoulders of a man devoted to vice and debauchery, he resigned himself to those intemperate pleasures, which had been disturbed before by his ungovernable ambition and unbridled

Observeion.
Nabob always willing to give a handsome establishment to Tulja-jí.
His humanity to that Rajah, when in his hands.
Who put his time in festivity.
and in intemperate pleasures.
unbridled folly *. "His state and dignity are inviolably preferred," says the Nabob to Sir Robert Harland †; "he is, in his own palace, among his women and his family; he drinks and wears what he pleases; his donations to Fackeers are furnished, as usual: he seems sensible of his happiness; and both the Rajah and his mother have written to me very thankful letters on the subject ‡." But

* All these particulars are well known, and, if necessary, will be attested, by several English gentlemen, who resided at the time in Tanjore.
† Letter, January 15, 1774.
‡ Ibid.

Extract of a Letter from the Nabob to Sir Robert Harland, Jan. 15, 1774.

"Ever since that time (the capture of Tanjore), I have treated the Rajah and his family, with every mark of respect and attention. His state and dignity have been inviolably preferred. He lives in his own palace, amidst his women, and in the midst of his family. He drinks and wears what he pleases; even his donations to Fackeers are furnished as usual. He seems sensible of his happiness; and both the Rajah and his mother have written to me, very thankful arzadshits on the subject. In short, he finds no alteration in his present situation, from what it used to be."

Translation of an Arzadsh from Telagazee, receiv'd 19th Rajab 1107 Hegira, or 7th October 1773.

Your Highness has, from the beginning showed kindness towards me, and on my part, as a means to increase your favour, I was heartily disposed to act agreeably to your pleasure, but some of my servants, by many specious reasons to which I gave ear, prevailed upon me to act in a different manner, and so became guilty of a great fault, the consequences of which I now feel. Your Highness, in consideration of the friendship which subsisted between you and the deceased Maha Rajah, has been pleased to pardon my fault, and to send a letter to Nabob Madaur Ul Mulk Bahander, the contents of which he explained to me word by word, in which letter you have been pleased to signify very particularly your intention to protect me at all events, which did me great honour. It is now my resolution to act in every respect conformably to your Highness's pleasure, that I may merit an increase of your favour from you day by day; your Highness is more dear to me in my esteem than the deceased Maha Rajah was, for your Highness has manifested a greater degree of kindness than he ever did. When children are in fault, their parents should forgive them, and restore them to favour; my honour, and every thing that is dear to me are in your Highness's hands.

Translation
But no establishment, no jaghires, no guards could enable Tulja-ji to gratify the humanity of old friends, or to gain the favour of new. Besides the paltry sum of 400,000l. promised as a present by the Nabob, was too small an acknowledgment to the Honourable Company, whose troops had served him as auxiliaries in the reduction of Tanjore. The Presidency, with a negligence not to be pardoned, had relinquished the conquest to the principal in the war. The troops had received prize-money to a large amount, the civil servants had not probably been unconsidered spectators of the scene, but their worthy masters at home, had been entirely forgot. The security, which the removal of an opulent enemy from the heart of the Carnatic, was likely to procure for that country, would render the coast an unprofitable field, for the exertion of the talents of the friends and relations of the Directors. Trade had been long dead; and should emulation and war between princes, be also destroyed, writers and even governors might quit their posts. The Carnatic was the only spot left by the legislature to the management of the leaders of the Company; and as the soil is poor, it must be cultivated, to yield any thing of a good harvest. An irritated

Translation of a Letter from Mahomed Nagif Canun, dated 12th Jummaudalwul 1189 Hijira, received on the 4th.

I have received the favour of your Highness's gracious letter dated the 29th Rabbaauney, wherein your Highness is pleased to mention, that your enemies report that the Rajah Tuljagee and his wife killed themselves; and that I should particularly inform your Highness of the present situation of the Rajah, and all his family.

I am astonished at what your Highness mentions. This story was made by people who wanted something to talk about, and disturbers invent lies; no such thing has happened in the Rajah's family since the reduction of Tanjore, to give rise to any such report as disturbers have propagated: however, by the blessing of God and your Highness's favour, the Rajah, his mother, his father's other widow, his own two wives, his younger brother, his daughter and his son, were all in good health and spirits, besides his relations, slaves both men and women, and his attendants, who are in house, are all very well. Of all the people who have been from the beginning in the Rajah's house, there has but one died, who was a relation, and above eighty years old; he was carried off four or five months ago, by a tedious sickness. This I informed your Highness of at the time it happened; all the other people are in good health and spirits, and Tuljagee often expresses his thanks to your Highness, and his satisfaction in his manner of living. The Circar people who are at his gates, act entirely as his servants, except in taking care of the gates according to my order.

M m

Nabob,
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Nabob, and a restored monarch, had a chance of creating an auction for favour, which might be turned to a good account. Besides, it was but equitable, at any rate, that as the State had got a Nabob on the Coast, the Company should have a King to keep up "the balance of power."

These

* It has been observed in a late publication, that if interested views had influenced the late proceedings relative to Tanjore, the obvious arrangement would have been to support the Nabob, who had made large offers, public as well as private, and not the Rajah who was a mere prisoner skilful of every resource, and consequently could have no favours to confer.

A free examination of measures, and not a disposition of party-misrepresentations, has been the object of our discussion. There might be an indelicacy, perhaps, in any illusions to a corrupt influence, when it points to individuals. But when a public body, such as the India Company, acts with so much seeming inconsistency and injustice, as to leave no explanation of their conduct but upon grounds of unfair influence, the charge may be brought with more freedom, as being attended with presumptions to establish itself. The misconduct of individuals may sometimes be excused, as proceeding more from error than design. But the same indulgence cannot be allowed to large societies of men; whose measures, from the greater variety of opinions upon which they are formed, must be considered as the result of a more poised and deliberate resolution.

To determine more clearly on the merits of the Court of Directors in this business, it is necessary to state a few facts, relative to the respective situations of the Nabob and the Rajah at the time of transferring Tanjore to the latter.

The Nabob has declared, and the declaration is known to be true, that, upon the reduction of Tanjore, he paid all the Rajah's debts to the English and others; and that he redeemed those districts of country, which the Rajah had sold or mortgaged to the Dutch. He, in the same manner, settled with the Danes about their petitions at Tranquebar, as likewise with the French about their settlements of Cochin. These are facts which cannot be controverted; and regular treaties, under the sanction of the Company, and that of the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, were concluded between the Nabob and these foreign powers, on the subject of their respective possessions in the Tanjore country.

But the disbursements of the Nabob, at that period, were not confined to those purposes alone. Besides the payment of the Rajah's debts, and the redemption of the districts which had been mortgaged, what was given as prize-money to the army, as well as the whole expense of a long campaign, must be taken into the account. All these together amounted to an immense sum; and the money was borrowed, by the Nabob, from the inhabitants of Madras, and the country bankers or Seucars, at a very high rate of interest.

The advocates of the Rajah have alleged, that these loans were only a political manoeuvre of the Nabob to get the property of the country into his own hands.

It is generally more easy to disprove the assertions of party than to conquer their obinancy; for the same bold petition continues often to be advanced, when there is not even a colour of probability to support it. In the present instance, this is evidently the case. If his adversaries speak truth, it was certainly a very extraordinary kind of policy in the Nabob, to borrow millions of Pagodas at an exorbitant interest, if there was no occasion for the loan. It was not certainly by a policy like this, that he could have amassed the hidden stores, which he
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

These public-spirited motives, joined to that humane sympathy for fallen MAJESTY, which such good subjects, as the Directors have,

he has been said to possess. But so far were the Nabob's finances from being in the flourishing state represented by his enemies, that, long before the Tanjore orders arrived, and even before they were thought of in London, he was obliged, for want of money, to submit to the daily clamours and insults of his Madras creditors, and the whole power of the Presidency was denounced against him, unless he assigned his country to discharge their demands.

It has been said, and perhaps not without some foundation, that the Nabob himself once told a certain India Governor, who was speaking of his secret wealth, that there was but one way of convincing the English of that matter, and that he was ready, if the Company and their servants approved of it, to give the English Parliament that conviction, which was to try before them his receipts and particular disbursements since his accession to the Nabobship. The officious Governor feared that he would be sacrificed at some unexpected event; and, for obvious reasons, no doubt, he was never heard to say anything more upon that subject.

But to return to the particular point in this affair. It is certain, when the orders for the restoration of Tanjore arrived, that the revenues of the country, together with those of the Carnatic, were assigned, by orders and mortgage, to the Nabob's different creditors, and to the Soucars of the country. This is the common manner in which the princes of India anticipate their revenue. They borrow money, through the Soucars, upon the dotal and produce of the Government, on the ground for the ensuing year; and it is well known, how effectual is the ability of a Soucar, upon the property of the lands. Even a conqueror never attempts to make observation in that which would be destroying the very medium by which his conquest was to become useful to himself afterwards.

We are now to observe, however, that the very reverse of that conduct, which would have been observed by a conqueror, has taken place in the affair of Tanjore. The consequences have been, that the Nabob, who was reduced before to the utmost state of distress by his creditors, was not only deprived of the debt part of his dominions, but his credit, in raising money upon the part that was left, was utterly destroyed. For who would lend him upon any asignments upon countries that might be wrested from him, in the same manner as Tanjore had been? On the contrary, the numerous merchants and Soucars, who attended at the restoration of Tanjore, saw that the only real security in the country was that of the Rajah, who had many advantages on his side. He, at that time, had not a shilling of debt; and, without being burdened with any of the expenses of royalty, he was instantly put in possession of 800,000 a-year, out of which he only paid the Company 160,000, for their military charges. Beside all this income, the particular situation of his country, which protected him against the insurrections of an enemy, enabled the Rajah to anticipate his revenues for not only the ensuing year, but for years thereafter.

Thus, on the one hand, do we see the old and faithful ally of the Company, with whom their prosperity began, and who, for his service, was guaranteed by the treaty of Paris, ruined and deserted by those who ought to have supported him, and left without money, credit, or resource; and that too at a time when he was loaded with a heavy debt of near 8 four millions belonging to English subjects alone. But this is not all. Inhabit has been added to misfortune; and, by an uncommon wantonness of power, the Company have further charged that injured

* See On the Soucars.
† Nabob's Tanjore debts, lately confidential, amount to three millions, as appears by the Company's records.
have always felt, wrought gradually a change in the most obdurate
Members of the Court. The orders, which we have partly exa-
mined, were penned by a ready scribe, a clerk in the India-House,
under the inspection of Lord Pigot. But notwithstanding the
Prince with the pay and maintenance of those
very troops whom they had employed in de-
priving him of his dominions. Oppressed and
borne down by so many calamities, his Durbar
became a scene of misery and distress. His
army, having large arrears due to them, muti-
nied and surrounded his palace. His own life
and the lives of his family were in danger.
And nothing was to be heard, in every quarter,
but the threats of a tumultuous soldiery,
mongled with the clamours of creditors whom
he could not satisfy, and the cries of subjects
whom he could not relieve.

On the other hand, we see the Rajah, a man,
who, so far from having ever rendered any ser-
vice to this country, has always proved its most
determined and inconstant ally; a man, who
has long enjoyed, in the interior parts of the
Carnatic, a perfect security derived from those
wars which have ruined his superior, and in
which much of the blood of Britain has been
shed; a man, who never had an English gar-
rison in any of his forts, who paid not a shilling
towards our expenses, and in whose good or
bad fortune England has not an interest; and
yet this very man, this Rajah, has been cheris-
thed by the Company's favour, exalted by
their power, and now triumphs in the spoils of
his lawful master and superior.

Such are the outlines of the measures which
the Company have adopted, and of the conse-
quences which have ensued; and such is a faint
sketch of the merits and pretensions of two men
whom they have thought proper to treat in so
very different a manner. Can we behold such a
striking contrast of characters and fortunes, with-
out equal wonder and reprobation? Can we think
on the authors of so much undeserved injustice
on the one hand, and ill-placed favour on the
other, without an equal mixture of indignation
and contempt? Or can we possibly give any
but one reason for a conduct so diametrically
opposite to every principle of policy and vir-
tue?

But the evil will cure itself. The Nabob's
creditors for so immense a sum, feel their own
distress, and know who are its authors. The
effects of their distress extend, with their con-
nections, to almost every corner of Great Brit-
tain. They are entitled to redress; and it is the
opinion of the best lawyers, that they can force
it from the contrivers and managers of the or-
ders for restoring Tanjore.

From a moment's survey of the genuine state
of facts we have here given, it will be easy to
determine, on whose side remained the power
of procuring an unjust influence in the East,
that of the Nabob or the Rajah. But, if future
proofs are wanted, they may be found, perhaps,
in the zeal and amazing exertions which the
Rajah's virtues have been able to create for
him, in return, in this country: while the
cause of the Nabob, who has made the fortunes
of thousands, both in his service and by his
generosity, has hardly an advocate to stand up
in his defence.

We will not, however, anticipate this sub-
ject; but hope that justice will be effectually
rendered to the Nabob, that his creditors may
be secured; and even that the Rajah himself, in-
stead of his pretend-mock royalty, may be placed
on such an establishment of security, as may be
most suited to his real happiness. In a word,
we wish he may find the deputies of the India
Company, in whose hands he now is, as faithful
guardians of his life and honour, as he found
that very Nabob, against whom he has been
made to complain, but who, during his power
over him, contrary to the custom of the East,
saved not only his life, but left him undisturbed
in his palace, with the most ample allowances
for his support.
strength of the argument, the acuteness of the reasoning and the
cloquence of the diéson, they lay a fortnight on the table, before a
legal number of signatures could be obtained. The fate of a kingdom
hung, at last, on the point of a moment. Lord Pigot threatened
to resign, Mr. Harrifon was just retiring to Bath on account of his
health, Mr. Wheeler himself became indifferent about the promised
seat in the Supreme Council at Bengal. The infectious sorrow
spread itself to the very clerks in office. Mr. Wilks ceased to pore
upon dispatches and records; and one solitary tear was observed to
wander upon the cheek of Mr. Holt. To brighten up the face of
the India-House some of the opposing Directors thought it expedient
to relent. The orders were accordingly signed on the 12th of
April 1775, on the very day of the annual election, when the
Court of Proprietors were met to chuse new Directors, and had
consequentially suspended the authority of the old.

Such is the history of the restoration of Tanjore, which is de-
levered with all due deference to the public, by whose judgment we
shall abide. To those who may chuse to examine the subject with
attention, it will appear extraordinary, that, amidst all the usurpa-
tions of the arms of the Company, the only conquest made by the
orders of the Court of Directors, is that which they have chosen to
select as an exhibition of their retributive justice. Not satisfied with
a common act of reparation, that honourable body have refined,
upon what they denominate "public honour." In all the history
of their ravaging wars in India, they could produce but one instance
in which their Sovereign, both by his plenipotentiary and per-
sonal approbation, had given a sanction to their hostilities. That
was the act which they thought the most worthy of being stigmat-
tized. The usual progress of the Company, in their military tran-
sactions, had been to begin as allies, to grow into Duans, to con-
clude as usurpers. In the business of Tanjore their conduct has
been
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Their public virtue had various opportunities to be exercised. Their real motives have been more mysterious, and of course less suitable to their common principles. They began as guarantees, remonstrated as advisers, aided as allies, fought and conquered as auxiliaries. In the course of a few years they affected to relent; and with peculiar feeling, knowledge, and propriety, restored, as PRINCIPALS, what they and their servants had been paid for reducing as MERCENARIES.

Where was the black chronicle of Indian devastations when the Honourable Court began to relent? Had they, in the hour of affected sympathy, thrown their eyes on the melancholy history of the Company’s ambition, they might find many acts more worthy of being redressed than the reduction of Tanjore; acts committed by their servants, not executed by their OWN ORDERS. From the banks of the Nirbidda, where the unfortunate Nabob of Broach commenced his alliance and ruin under their auspices: from the Ganges to the mouths of the Ganges, a field fruitful in the SILENT change and destruction of Rajahs; from the mouths of the Ganges to its source, a tract marked with the blood and wreck of Nabobs and Rajahs; and blackened with the most horrid treachery to the unfortunate Emperor, whose servants they professed themselves. In all that extensive scene of desolation, was there no object that called for redress, no Prince worthy of being restored, but the Rajah of Tanjore, whom, for his own perfidy, they themselves had ordered to be chastised? Perhaps not—where the Company act a part, death generally closes the scene!

But to do justice to the Court of Directors, let it be supposed for a moment, that all the Nabobs, Rajahs, and Princes, over whole dominions the hand of ambitious rapacity has passed, are still alive. That the Nabob of Broach had an early claim upon the friendship of any gentleman, or, if the Directors are fond of a title, any NOBLEMAN, appointed to the government of Bombay. That such gentleman or such nobleman had received a letter from India, describing
describing the situation of the Nabob; expressing, at the same time, his remembrance of past favours and allusions of future gratitude. Let it also be supposed, that the deprived Rajahs and Zemindars of the northern Circars had similar claims on gentlemen, about to be sent from Leadenhall-street to be Chiefs in these provinces. That the Jaffiers, the Sings, the Cossims, the Shaw Allums, along the banks of all the branches of the Ganges, had pretensions to the favour and hopes from the support of some old friends preparing to embark for India as Governors in or near their respective countries. In such an intelligible situation, who could doubt the relentings of the leaders among the Directors, or the RESTORING influence of the India-House cabinet? Who could suspect their integrity, or who refuse his applause to their public virtue?

Should it unfortunately happen, that the RESTORING Chief, or Governor, should throw discredit on that public virtue, by his capricious, violent, and arbitrary conduct upon his arrival at the scene of action. That every condition that could be asked, for the interest of the Company and honour of the nation is rejected. That no consideration of public inconvenience, none of private distress can either soften his mind, or suspend his resolution. That the most ample security and provision, for the party supposed to be injured, is rejected: That nothing but revolution itself, with every concomitant influence of terror, can satisfy this umpire of the fate of States and Princes: That, to complete the object of his mission, a sanction, under every denunciation of vengeance, is to be extorted, under the seal of the party aggrieved. In that case, the most ignorant spectator can understand the PIECE, and enter into the conduct of the author, the managers, and the actors, in all the liaison des scenes, from the first idea of the plot to the catastrophe.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
POSTSCRIPT.

UPON a cursory review of the preceding work, the Author perceives some errors in diction and mistakes in dates. He is less solicitous to correct the first, than he is to remove the second; as a scrupulous adherence to truth has been more his object than elegance of language. Some facts have been also forgot, and one paper was omitted, in the hurry of printing, which is here subjoined.

In page 159, Mr. Du Pré is mentioned as Governor of Fort St. George, when a peace was concluded with Hyder Ali, on the 3d of April 1769. But Mr. Du Pré was neither in the chair, when the war was ended, nor on the coast when it began. Mr. Bourchier was President, during that period, and to that gentleman properly belongs either the glory or the censure, which the Public may chuse to annex to the Myfore war.

In page 151, there is a mistake relative to Bengalore, which was not taken, as is there mentioned, by Nizam Ali and the Company’s troops. The Author was led into these and, perhaps, some other immaterial errors, by the contradictory records of the Company, as well as by the enormous load of private papers, which lay before him, when he was writing this volume.

In pages 68, 69, and 70, the reader is requested to supply the narrative of the war in 1749, against Tanjore, with the following very material Letter from Admiral Boscawen, to Anwar-ul-dien, the father of the present Nabob.

ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN to ANWAR-UL-DIEN, Nabob of the Carnatic, &c.

TRANSLATION.

"SIR,"

"SINCE you have employed your troops in assisting Governor Morse at Madras, and sent your son Mahommed Ali Cawn, with a well appointed army, to the assistance of Governor John Hind, and preserved Fort
Postscript.

"Fort St. David from destruction, and, during the siege of Pondicherry, supplied the English army with provisions, coolies and all necessary stores, and sent an army under the command of Abdul Gelleel Cawn; and yourself encamped with your whole army near Gingee, by which means you laid the King, the English nation and the Company under the highest obligations. The English nation, on the part of His Majesty, will ever return those obligations, by affording your Excellency and your family the like assistance.

"In gratitude, for these favours, it is our duty to render every service to your Excellency. Pertaub Sing* is an usurper of the country of Tanjore, and your subject; as Tanjore is dependent on the Carnatic. At your request we will send our army with you to reduce Tanjore under your government, or if you think proper to appoint Gattcar†, descended from a good family, to be your representative there. Pertaub Sing has not the shadow of right to that country; and if you will be pleased to make over Devicotah to the Company, they will with gratitude accept it. I will dispatch two ships with warlike stores to that place, and Governor Floyer will dispatch an armament by land."

* Pertaupa Sing.
† Gattica, who was murdered in 1764, by Tulja-ji, the present Rajah, p. 146.